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Beginning in the inter-war years and ending in the early 1970s, this thesis explains 
how and why the ‘environment’ came to play a significant role in mainstream British 
politics. During this period, a range of rural and urban problems became 
conceptualised as ‘environmental’, and governments came to understand their 
responsibilities not simply in terms of providing basic standards of public health, but 
also in terms of improving the broader ‘quality of life’ of all citizens. 
Chapter two explores rural preservation in the inter-war period, and the passage of 
town and country planning and National Parks legislation in the 1940s. Chapter three 
examines air pollution, focusing on the London smog of 1952 and the passage of the 
1956 Clean Air Act. Chapter four explores Britain’s early nuclear power programme, 
and shifting attitudes towards modernisation, risk and the countryside in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Chapter five examines the growth of political interest in ‘environmental’ 
problems during the 1960s, and the eventual formation of the Department of the 
Environment in 1970. Finally, chapter six focuses upon the challenge of traffic in 
towns, exploring proposals for the construction of a motorway network in London 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The thesis concludes that the ‘environment’ was established as a field of public policy 
by the early 1970s. Whereas many existing accounts have emphasised the importance 
of radical critiques of human interaction with the environment, it is the contention of 
this thesis that environmental politics in Britain developed in the political 
mainstream, taking shape amid efforts to address new challenges of governance. The 
rejection of modernity, in the form of industrialisation, urban life, consumer culture 
and economic growth, was never more than a minority position within British 
politics, and successful arguments for environmental protection had to be framed in 
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In the twenty-first century, the ‘environment’ is a well-established sphere of public 
policy. British governments and political parties may vary in the extent to which they 
emphasise their ‘green’ credentials, and the adequacy and sincerity of their proposals 
may certainly be contested, but the need to pay lip service to the environment is an 
undoubted feature of contemporary policy-making. The environment’s political 
position is underlined by the existence of a large number of environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), which, taken together, comprise a significant 
number of members and supporters. While figures vary, and there is undoubtedly 
overlap between the memberships of different groups, one estimate has placed the 
combined number of supporters of environmental organisations in the UK at seven 
million, a figure that allows for the claim that the ‘environmental movement’ is the 
second largest mass movement in British history after trade unionism.1  
Beginning in the inter-war years and ending in the early 1970s, this thesis explains 
how and why the ‘environment’ came to play a significant role in mainstream British 
politics. Phil Macnaghten and John Urry write that before the ‘environment’ could be 
viewed as an area of political concern, a range of different problems had to come to 
be regarded as part of ‘the environment’.2 Similarly, in their comparative study of 
northern Europe and Scandinavia, Andrew Jamison et al note that, in order for the 
environmental movement and environmental politics to gather pace, ‘the 
																																																								
1 Matthew Hilton, James McKay, Nicholas Crowson and Jean-François Mouhot, The Politics of 
Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford, 2013), p. 47; Phil Macnaghten and John Urry, 
Contested Natures (London, 1998), p. 60 
2 Macnaghten and Urry, Contested Natures, p. 21 
	
 8 
environment had first to be constituted as a meaningful area for … political praxis’.3 
This thesis argues that this process took place in Britain during the inter-war and 
post-war periods, as a range of rural and urban problems of governance became 
conceptualised as ‘environmental’. It demonstrates how, through the preservation of 
the countryside, the control of pollution, and efforts to deal with traffic congestion in 
towns and cities, the state expanded its authority over the environment, while parties 
on both the left and right increasingly incorporated environmental issues into their 
political programmes. In part, this process occurred in response to perceived public 
demand as, in the political context of the welfare state, and in the wider social climate 
of post-war affluence, governments came to understand their responsibilities not 
simply in terms of providing basic standards of material security and public health, 
but also in terms of improving the broader ‘quality of life’ of all citizens. 
It is important from the outset to define what is meant by the term ‘environmental 
politics’. The Oxford English Dictionary gives a number of definitions for 
‘environment’, and two in particular provide a basis for exploring the historical 
particularities of the rise of ‘environmental politics’ in Britain. Put simply, 
‘environment’ may refer to ‘the area surrounding a place or thing’; in slightly more 
complex terms, it can mean ‘the natural world or physical surroundings in general, 
either as a whole or within a particular geographical area, especially as affected by 
human activity’. It is therefore a matter of surroundings, and for the purpose of 
politics it relates to the human impact on those surroundings. The existing literature 
varies on whether ‘environment’ should be seen only to comprise the ‘natural’ 
environment, with the built environment excluded, but it is the argument of this 
thesis that ‘environmental politics’ in Britain developed in response to both rural and 
																																																								
3 Andrew Jamison, Ron Eyerman and Jacqueline Cramer, The Making of the New Environmental 
Consciousness: A Comparative Study of the Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands 
(Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 4-5 
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urban problems, and as such it is vital to include the built environment. Therefore, 
throughout this thesis, ‘environmental politics’ will be used to refer to the debate over 
the impact of human society on the ‘natural’ and built environment, and the attempt to manage that 
impact through public policy. For much of the period under consideration, the word 
‘environment’ was not in common use among political actors, and when it was used 
it did not necessarily carry the same meaning that it carries in the present day. It is 
therefore one of the aims of this thesis to trace its growth in use and shift in meaning 
over time. 
An ‘environmental revolution’? 
In much of the existing literature, the development of environmental politics is seen 
to have occurred from the 1960s onwards. For numerous authors, it was at that time 
that a large-scale environmental movement emerged, bringing with it a significant 
challenge to dominant modes of thought concerning the interaction between human 
societies and their surroundings. John McCormick argues that an ‘environmental 
revolution’ occurred between 1962 and 1970, and this is a claim made frequently in 
the existing literature.4 In a recent global study of the subject, the German historian 
Joachim Radkau writes of an ‘ecological revolution of 1970’, and goes so far as to 
describe the growth of the environmental movement as ‘the symbol of a whole era’, 
representative of a ‘New Enlightenment’.5 For those that characterise the events of 
the 1960s and 1970s in this way, the emergence of the environmental movement 
represents a backlash against the technological, growth-centred focus of the 
immediate post-war years. Jamison argues that, ‘like women’s liberation, rock music 
and the internet’, the environmental movement was ‘a product of the 1960s’ and ‘the 
spirit of the times-a-changing’, which emerged as ‘part of the counter-cultural 
																																																								
4 John McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement (2nd ed. London, 1992), p. 47 
5 Joachim Radkau, The Age of Ecology (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 1, 10, 111 
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critique of the “technocratic society” and the widespread questioning of the 
dominant values of the consumer culture’.6 
These authors attribute this development in part to the environmental events of the 
1960s. Growing signs of ecological destruction are viewed as making a contribution, 
while the publication in 1962 of Silent Spring, the bestselling book by the American 
marine biologist Rachel Carson that highlighted the impact of pesticide use on bird 
populations, is frequently cited as the crucial event in the growth of the 
environmental movement. Kirkpatrick Sale writes that Silent Spring marked the 
beginning of the ‘environmental revolution’, and likens its impact to that of Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin on the anti-slavery movement, while David 
Peterson del Mar claims that the book ‘ignited the green fire of environmentalism’.7 
Alongside a new awareness of environmental problems, many authors attribute the 
growth of the environmental movement to a wider shift in values in Western 
societies, based on the sociologist Ronald Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism. 
Inglehart argues that, with the rise of mass affluence in Western societies in the post-
war period, the ‘basic values and goals’ of the public gradually shifted ‘from giving 
top priority to economic growth and consumption, to placing increasing emphasis on 
the quality of life’. Inglehart identifies the growth of the environmental movement as 
evidence for postmaterialism, arguing that one result of the shift in values ‘has been a 
rise in environmental consciousness and a higher priority for environmental 
protection’.8 
																																																								
6 Andrew Jamison, The Making of Green Knowledge: Environmental Politics and Cultural Transformation 
(Cambridge, 2001), p. 16 
7 Kirkpatrick Sale, The Green Revolution: The American Environmental Movement 1962-1992 (New York, 
1993), pp. 3-4; David Peterson del Mar, Environmentalism (Harlow, 2006), p. 102 
8 Ronald Inglehart, ‘Public support for environmental protection: objective problems and subjective 
values in 43 societies’, Political Science and Politics, vol. 28, no. 1 (1995), pp. 61-2 
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Inglehart’s theory has been used to support the idea that the emergence of an 
environmental movement represents a backlash against economic growth and 
consumerism. Stephen Cotgrove argues that the late 1960s were a ‘turning point in 
the triumphant march of science and technology in the esteem of the Western 
world’, and suggests that by the 1970s a postmaterialist ‘alternative environmental 
paradigm’ had emerged that stood in direct opposition to the ‘dominant paradigm’ of 
industrialism and market economics. The new paradigm emphasised the likelihood of 
environmental catastrophe, and rejected the idea that there could be a ‘technological 
fix’ to ecological problems. Instead, catastrophe ‘could be avoided only by 
fundamental and radical changes in the values and institutions of industrial societies’.9 
Andrew Dobson has taken the notion of the alternative environmental paradigm 
further, arguing that it should be considered to represent a new political ideology. 
Dobson distinguishes between ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’, suggesting that 
they are separated by their conception of the ideal relationship between humans and 
the environment. Whereas environmentalists take an ‘anthropocentric’ view, 
believing that humans should care for the environment because it is in their own 
interests to do so, ecologism takes an ‘ecocentric’ perspective, beginning with the 
premise that the environment has intrinsic value, and should not be subordinate to 
human interests. Whereas the reforms proposed by environmentalists may be 
achievable within the existing framework of capitalist society, ecologism ‘seeks 
radically to call into question a whole series of political, economic and social practices 
in a way that environmentalism does not’, envisaging ‘a post-industrial future quite 
distinct from that with which we are most generally acquainted’.10 
																																																								
9 Stephen Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The Environment, Politics and the Future (Chichester, 1982), 
pp. 3, 27-28, 63 
10 Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (4th ed. London, 2007), pp. 15, 103, 189  
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The focus on an ‘environmental revolution’ from the 1960s onwards presents a 
number of problems. Most obviously, by discussing a ‘revolution’ there is a risk of 
exaggerating the extent of the changes that have occurred. While the emergence of 
the environment as a political issue is the starting point for this thesis, it is important 
to retain scepticism as to the degree to which the environment has occupied the 
minds both of political actors and of members of the general public. Similarly, much 
of the existing literature overemphasises the significance of radical forms of 
environmental thought, exemplified by Cotgrove’s discussion of an alternative 
environmental paradigm and Dobson’s suggestion that ecologism represents a 
distinct political ideology. While both authors acknowledge the existence of more 
moderate forms of environmentalism, there is an implication in their work that 
radical ideas have the potential to transform Western societies. Cotgrove wrote his 
book in 1982, and Dobson published the first edition of his in 1990, when perhaps it 
seemed as though radical environmental thought would grow in influence, but from 
our present vantage point it would be difficult to argue that this has been borne out 
in political reality. Inglehart’s postmaterialism thesis must also be evaluated in this 
light. While it may be useful for explaining changing priorities among affluent 
Western publics, it is difficult to discern a value shift that has dethroned the principle 
of economic growth.  
Additionally, a post-1960s explanation poses problems of causation. Luke Martell, 
who is himself a sociologist, argues that postmaterialist explanations for the growth 
of environmentalism can be ‘too sociological’, focusing on structural factors while 
excluding ‘problems identified in the content of its discourse from having a bearing 
on the explanation of its rise’. 11  While the existing literature does point to 
environmental events that occurred during this period, there is a tendency to simply 
																																																								
11 Luke Martell, Ecology and Society: An Introduction (Oxford, 1994), p. 131 
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offer ‘the sixties’ as an explanation, and to emphasise the importance of one book, 
Silent Spring, in triggering the growth of what is presented as a global phenomenon. 
There is a clear need to step back from sociological arguments about value change, 
and examine more closely the context in which environmental politics took shape, 
taking account of the role of events and the decisions of political actors. A key 
challenge to the postmaterialism thesis originates in the work of Ramachandra Guha 
and Joan Martinez Alier, whose identification of an ‘environmentalism of the poor’ 
in the developing world conflicts with the notion that environmentalism is a 
phenomenon particular to advanced industrial societies where postmaterialist values 
are widespread.12 Inglehart himself has attempted to account for this through the 
development of an ‘objective problems, subjective values’ explanation, suggesting 
that while environmental degradation accounts for the emergence of 
environmentalism in developing nations, its emergence in the West, where ecological 
problems are often far less severe, can still be explained in terms of 
postmaterialism.13 This explanation has been the subject of significant debate among 
sociologists, with critics of the postmaterialist thesis remaining unconvinced. 
Through his analysis of global survey data on environmental attitudes, Steven R. 
Brechin has shown that an ‘objective problems plus subjective values explanation 
fails to describe adequately the bases of southern and northern environmental 
concern’, and he stresses that ‘environmentalism is most likely a complex social 
phenomenon, a mixture of social perceptions, local histories and environmental 
realities, international relationships and influences, and unique cultural and structural 
features’.14 Similarly, Riley E. Dunlap and Richard York point out that reliance on the 
																																																								
12 Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History (New York, 2000), pp. 99-100 
13 Inglehart, ‘Objective problems and subjective values’, p. 57 
14 Steven R. Brechin, ‘Objective problems, subjective values, and global environmentalism: evaluating 
the postmaterialist argument and challenging a new explanation’, Social Science Quarterly, vol. 80, no. 4 
(December, 1999), pp. 793, 807 
	
 14 
postmaterialist thesis misses the fact that environmental concern has materialist and 
non-materialist dimensions in all nations.15 
It is necessary, too, to question the importance attached to the emergence of an 
‘environmental movement’. In the social sciences, environmental groups have been 
cited as evidence for the rise of ‘new social movements’, with an emphasis on a shift 
to postmaterialist values and the growth of radical critiques of Western societies.16 As 
has been noted, the environmental movement has been presented as second only to 
trade unionism in the history of mass movements in Britain, yet in order for it to be 
considered on such a scale its numbers must include not only supporters of ‘radical’ 
organisations such as Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Greenpeace, but also 
longstanding ‘moderate’ organisations such as the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds (RSPB) and the National Trust. During the 1970s, new, more radical 
organisations gained significant numbers of supporters (FOE grew from 1,000 
members in 1971 to 18,000 in 1981), but this was dwarfed by the growth of 
moderate groups. The RSPB grew from 98,000 members in 1971 to 441,000 in 1981, 
while the National Trust expanded from 159,000 members in 1967 to 950,000 in 
1980.17 If the growth in membership of environmental organisations is to be viewed 
as evidence for a revolution, bird enthusiasts and visitors to National Trust 




15 Riley E. Dunlap and Richard York, ‘The globalization of environmental concern and the limits of 
the postmaterialist values explanation: evidence from four multinational surveys’, The Sociological 
Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 3 (2008), p. 536 
16 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford, 1999), p. 25 
17 Christopher Rootes, ‘Nature protection organisations in Britain’, Centre for the Study of Social and 
Political Movements, Working Paper 1/2007 (Canterbury, 2007), p. 9; Philip W. Sutton, Explaining 




Alongside the presentation of environmental politics as a post-1960s phenomenon, 
there have been many studies that have emphasised the longer-term roots of 
environmental concern. The work of Keith Thomas has shown that a shift in 
attitudes took place in the early modern period, during which time ‘some long-
established dogmas about man’s place in nature were discarded’ and ‘the relationship 
of man to other species was redefined’. Thomas argues that, whereas the Judeo-
Christian worldview had previously informed an emphasis on human domination 
over a hostile and unforgiving nature, by the end of the eighteenth century 
perceptions had shifted to stress the vulnerability of the natural world and man’s 
responsibility as a custodian.18 Throughout the literature on environmentalism and 
environmental politics, a link is made between industrialisation and the growth of 
concern for the natural world. In the 1930s G.M. Trevelyan, who was himself 
actively involved in campaigning for the preservation of the English countryside, 
stated that the ‘love of nature in its most natural and unadulterated form has grown 
pari passu with the Industrial Revolution’. Trevelyan argued that the extent of public 
interest reflected the scale of the damage inflicted upon nature by industrial 
processes, writing that ‘no doubt it is partly because the destruction is so rapid that 
the appreciation is so loud’.19 
Trevelyan’s perspective has been reflected in later treatments of the subject. Russell J. 
Dalton, for example, notes that environmental concern increased in the nineteenth 
century as ‘the environmental consequences of the Industrial Revolution were 
becoming manifest’, while Philip W. Sutton argues that ‘organised environmentalism 
																																																								
18 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth, 
1983), p. 15 
19 G.M. Trevelyan, ‘The call and claims of natural beauty’, in An Autobiography and Other Essays 
(London, 1949), pp. 92, 101 
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emerged around the point at which the process of industrialisation began to be 
sensed as irreversible, and the experience of living in an industrial society became 
widespread’.20 The formation of a number of ‘environmental’ organisations during 
this period is regularly cited as evidence of this development. The Commons, 
Footpaths and Open Spaces Preservation Society, described by McCormick as ‘the 
world’s first environmental interest group’, was founded in Britain in 1865, and was 
followed by a range of organisations concerned with the preservation of the 
countryside and the protection of wildlife.21 Philip Lowe suggests that the Victorian 
interest in natural history contributed to the rise of animal protection as a cause, and 
points to the formation of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (1840) and the RSPB (1891) as signs of growing public interest.22 In terms 
of landscape preservation, one of the most significant events was the foundation of 
the National Trust in 1895, which was followed in the early twentieth century by the 
formation of the Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves in 1912 and the 
Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE) in 1926.23 
For a significant number of authors, such nineteenth-century developments provide 
evidence of a backlash against industrialisation and economic growth. Philip Lowe 
and Jane Goyder argue that the late Victorian period saw ‘a reversal of the rationalist, 
progressivist outlook deriving from the Enlightenment’, and a ‘growing 
equivocalness towards industrialisation itself’.24 Similarly, Anna Bramwell dates the 
beginning of the development of radical ecologism to the 1880s, and writes that it 
																																																								
20 Russell J. Dalton, The Green Rainbow: Environmental Groups in Western Europe (London, 1994), pp. 26-
27; Sutton, Explaining Environmentalism, p. 176 
21 McCormick, Global Environmental Movement, p. viii 
22 Philip Lowe, ‘Values and institutions in the history of British nature conservation’, in Andrew 
Warren and F.B. Goldsmith (eds.), Conservation in Perspective (London, 1983), pp. 330-32 
23 McCormick, Global Environmental Movement, p. 6 
24 Philip Lowe and Jane Goyder, Environmental Groups in Politics (London, 1983), p. 19 
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emerged from increasing ‘disillusionment with Western progress’.25 Peter C. Gould 
makes use of Cotgrove’s notion of the ‘alternative environmental paradigm’ to state 
that ‘the most fecund and important period of green politics before 1980 lay between 
1880 and 1900’. Pointing to ideas of ‘back to the land’ and ‘back to nature’, and the 
work of socialist thinkers such as John Ruskin and William Morris, Gould argues that 
in late-nineteenth century Britain ‘the philosophy of industrialism … received an 
extraordinary degree of critical examination’.26 Such arguments have been heavily 
influenced by the work of Martin J. Wiener, who writes that the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries saw the English ‘articulate classes’ develop an ‘ambiguous 
attitude toward modern industrial society’, and acquire values ‘resistant to economic 
innovation and growth’. Wiener’s central concern is with the economic impact of 
‘anti-industrial’ values, and their supposed contribution to British ‘decline’ in the 
twentieth century, but the trends he identifies also have implications for the 
emergence of environmental politics. In Wiener’s view, from the late-nineteenth 
century the English middle classes retreated behind ‘the rustic and nostalgic myth of 
an “English way of life”’ and attention turned not to further industrial innovation, 
but to ‘taming and civilising the dangerous engines of progress’. While one outcome 
of this process was ‘persistent economic retardation’, Wiener argues that it also led to 
the emergence of environmental practices, such as nature conservation, that ‘served 
to humanise urban industrial society’.27 
There is a line through from the identification of an anti-industrial outlook in late-
nineteenth century Britain to the emphasis on environmental politics as a radical, 
																																																								
25 Anna Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (London, 1989), p. 13; Anna Bramwell, The 
Fading of the Greens: The Decline of Environmental Politics in the West (London, 1994), p. 28 
26 Peter C. Gould, Early Green Politics: Back to Nature, Back to the Land and Socialism in Great Britain, 1880-
1900 (Brighton, 1988), pp. vii, 15-16 
27 Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (2nd ed. Cambridge, 
2004), pp. ix, xv-xvi, 6, 9-10, 154 
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post-1960s phenomenon. Meredith Veldman makes a connection between the 
development in the 1960s and 1970s of what she terms the ‘green movement’, and 
the emergence both of new forms of English fantasy literature (exemplified by the 
work of J.R.R. Tolkien and C.S. Lewis) and of the anti-nuclear protest movement of 
the 1950s and 1960s. In Veldman’s view, those three developments are linked by a 
Romantic worldview defined by ‘the belief that the empirical and analytical methods 
of modern science cannot comprehend all of reality’. Emerging ‘in the late eighteenth 
century as a reaction against the new society taking shape under the impact of 
empiricism and industrialisation’, Romanticism endured in the twentieth century 
among those for whom ‘the gains of affluence could not outweigh the losses 
resulting from bureaucratisation [and] the “massness” of modern society’.28 Veldman 
points to Wiener’s notion of an English ‘anti-industrial’ spirit and argues that by the 
1960s it gave rise to a green movement that demanded ‘political and economic 
decentralisation, a no-growth or steady-state economy, environmental preservation, 
alternative technologies, and the conservation of energy resources’. The movement 
represented a reaction against ‘the technological optimism of the 1950s and early 
1960s’, as ‘large numbers of people’, predominantly drawn from the middle classes, 
‘began to realise that the wonders of science and technology could be viewed as 
unparalleled horrors, particularly in the environmental context’. Such horrors 
included pesticide use (as documented by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring), air and 
water pollution, and radioactive fall-out from nuclear weapons testing.29 A Romantic 
strand of environmental thought has also been identified by Frank Trentmann, who 
argues that sections of the inter-war outdoor movement displayed a ‘neo-
																																																								
28 Meredith Veldman, Fantasy, the Bomb and the Greening of Britain: Romantic Protest, 1945-1980 
(Cambridge, 1994), pp. 3, 304 
29 Ibid., pp. 207, 244 
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Romanticism’, inspired by the socialism of Ruskin and Morris and characterised by a 
commitment to a ‘comprehensive break with modern urban-commercial society’.30 
Modernity, planning and ‘consensus’ 
It is a key contention of this thesis that radical forms of protest, rooted in anti-
industrialism and a suspicion of technology and economic growth, did not play a 
central role in the development of environmental politics in Britain. In this respect, 
the thesis is informed by the work of those that have critiqued the ‘declinist’ 
perspective. While Wiener argues that English culture was marked by ‘a suspicion of 
material and technological development’, and asserts that the nation’s fortunes were 
shaped by an ‘anti-industrial’ spirit which ‘permeated English life’, the existence of 
such a spirit and the extent of Britain’s supposed twentieth-century economic decline 
have received extensive historiographical scrutiny.31 A common criticism of Wiener’s 
thesis is that it ignores the fact that anti-industrialism has formed part of the national 
culture of other industrial powers, such as Germany and the United States, whose 
economies are seen to have outperformed Britain’s during the twentieth century.32 
W.D. Rubinstein points out that every national culture contains strands that are anti-
capitalist and anti-business, and argues that ‘British culture has been markedly less 
strident in its condemnation of capitalism than virtually any other Western culture’.33 
Rubinstein notes that British culture contained an ‘arguably more significant tradition 
which emphasised rationality and science as the primary desiderata of evolving 
society’, and points both to ‘the extraordinary British contribution to science over the 
																																																								
30 Frank Trentmann, ‘Civilisation and its discontents: English neo-romanticism and the 
transformation of anti-modernism in twentieth-century Western culture’, Journal of Contemporary History, 
vol. 29, no. 4 (1994), p. 584 
31 Wiener, English Culture, pp. 5, 81 
32 Andrew Gamble, ‘Theories and explanations of British decline’, in Richard English and Michael 
Kenny (eds.), Rethinking British Decline (London, 2000), p. 11 
33 W.D. Rubinstein, ‘Cultural explanations for Britain’s economic decline: how true?’, in Bruce Collins 
and Keith Robbins (eds.), British Culture and Economic Decline (London, 1990), p. 78 
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past 300 years’, and to ‘a popular culture which was always surprisingly friendly to 
science’.34 He concludes that Britain’s ‘cultural base is founded not in anti-rational, 
anti-modern ‘gentry’ values but, on the contrary, on a value system and thought 
patterns which emphasise positivism and rationality to a remarkable degree’.35 
In addition to pointing out the flaws in Wiener’s characterisation of English culture, 
critics have also noted that the focus on ‘decline’ misrepresents economic reality. As 
Guy Ortolano writes, the ‘declinist’ perspective served an ideological purpose during 
the post-war decades, allowing proponents to condemn the nation’s supposed 
economic backwardness, lament ‘the supposedly marginalised status of science, 
technology and expertise’, and argue for political programmes of modernisation, but 
such claims lack a clear evidential basis.36 David Edgerton suggests that the ‘anti-
industrial’ or ‘anti-scientific’ spirit of the elites has become a cliché, used to portray 
Britain as becoming less technological over time, when in fact the opposite has been 
true. Edgerton notes that ‘the most obvious feature of British science, technology 
and industry since 1870 is its expansion, rather than its contraction’, and points out 
that while Britain experienced relative economic decline during the twentieth century 
when compared with the growth rates of, for example, the United States, Germany, 
France or Japan, it did not suffer absolute decline. The British economy did grow 
more slowly than the global economy, but it nevertheless continued to grow by a few 
percentage points each year, except for during brief periods of economic slump.37 On 
the subject of Britain’s supposed weakness in technological innovation during the 
twentieth century, Jim Tomlinson writes that it is ‘simply untrue’ to suggest that 
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‘engineers and scientists were a small minority excluded from power and influence’, 
and convincing evidence for British engineering prowess is provided by Edgerton in 
his study of the military and civil aviation industries in the inter-war and post-war 
years.38 Edgerton suggests that the historiographical focus on the creation of the 
welfare state has led to the misconception that Britain was ‘neither a warfare state, 
nor … a “developmental state” devoted to industrial modernisation’, and 
demonstrates, through close analysis of aircraft research and development, that it was 
in fact a ‘technological and militant nation’, in which the state was ‘committed to 
scientific, technological and industrial modernisation’.39 
Further questioning of the existence of an ‘anti-industrial’ spirit comes from Peter 
Mandler, who argues that the trend in twentieth century Britain was away from, 
rather than towards rural nostalgia, and questions the validity of Wiener’s thesis for 
explaining the growth of interest in the conservation of the nation’s built and natural 
heritage. He warns against creating a ‘Whiggish’ history of the ‘preservation’ 
movement, which begins with the assumption that its ideas have prevailed in the 
present, and thus seeks signs of its success in earlier periods.40 Mandler suggests that 
such a history risks missing the fact that opponents of industrial society comprised a 
small, embattled minority of the elite, and ignoring the extent to which the British 
people displayed enthusiasm for science, technology and consumer culture. Pointing 
to the inter-war period, he argues that anti-industrialists pitted themselves ‘against 
nearly the whole of the electorate’, with the majority of the population wishing to 
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enjoy the advantages of economic growth.41 This was reflected in government policy, 
which remained ‘populist’ and ‘pro-growth’, and certainly did not seek to inhibit 
industrial development.42 
The development of environmental politics in Britain took place not in a context of 
anti-industrialism and suspicion towards science and technology, but rather in a 
social and political context in which modernisation and economic growth were 
widely considered to be key priorities. A Romantic rejection of industrialisation was 
not the driving force behind environmental debate and policy proposals. On the 
contrary, such discussion was characterised by a desire to reconcile the twin aims of 
economic development and the provision of a clean and amenable environment. 
With this in mind, it is worth considering the work of Michael Bess on 
environmental politics in France. Bess uses the term ‘the light-green society’ to 
describe the impact of environmental thought and activism on present-day France, 
arguing that French society in the post-war era became ‘caught between the lure of 
technology, progress, and abundance on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
gnawing fear of losing contact with the natural world, of drifting insensibly out of 
touch with its most cherished heritage and traditions’. 43  Setting the growth of 
environmentalism in the context of post-war economic development, Bess writes 
that a wave of ‘technological enthusiasm’, exemplified by grand projects like 
Concorde and nuclear power, was tempered by the desire for ‘a safe, clean, verdant 
environment in which to enjoy’ the fruits of modernisation. 44  ‘One cannot 
understand the impact of environmentalism in France,’ Bess argues, ‘unless one takes 
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this ambivalence towards technological modernity as one’s basic starting point.’45 Out 
of this ambivalence, concludes Bess, there arose an unintended compromise, a ‘half-
revolution’ in French environmental consciousness: 
The greening of France ran shallow and wide. It ran wide, in the sense that 
practically every facet of French society eventually came to acquire an 
environmentalist tint: school-teachers, journalists, government bureaucrats, 
politicians, industrialists, scientists, citizens’ groups, philosophers – everyone 
eagerly donned the green mantle. Yet it also ran shallow, in the sense that the 
more radical aspects of the green vision utterly failed to take hold.46 
There are problems with Bess’s foregrounding of public ‘ambivalence’ towards 
technology. For one, it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, and we should also 
ask how far the idea can really take us: if ‘ambivalence’ represents a middle ground 
between total enthusiasm and complete rejection, then it is surely an extremely 
common emotional reaction, suitable for describing general public opinion on a vast 
array of subjects. It is also worth asking just how much technological ambivalence 
there ever really was, given the central role that technology occupies in present-day 
Western (and indeed non-Western) societies. Nevertheless, Bess offers a convincing 
interpretation of the rise of environmental politics. He rightly plays down the role of 
radicalism, and presents environmental policy as a compromise between 
modernisation and the protection of rural and urban surroundings. While it is 
important to recognise that environmental politics in France developed within a 
particular national context, the notion of ‘shallow greening’ offers a useful 
framework within which to consider the British case. 
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In mid-twentieth century Britain, as in France, there were significant levels of 
technological enthusiasm. Ortolano writes that in the post-war decades ‘the 
“modern” seemed to promise liberation from the past and [the coming of] a 
preferable future’.47 Becky Conekin et al use the term ‘high modernity’ with reference 
to post-war Britain, arguing that ‘there were clear and identifiable languages of 
modernisation (accompanied by adjacent terms such as “the new” and “the future”) 
occurring across British society’.48 In her work on the 1951 Festival of Britain, 
Conekin examines how modernity was negotiated in this post-war British context, 
demonstrating the ways in which the Labour governments of Clement Attlee 
emphasised the importance of progress and stressed the role that science and 
technology would play in building a better Britain.49 Yet, while the notion of progress 
was central to the vision presented at the Festival of Britain, this did not necessitate 
the complete abandonment of the past. As Conekin shows, alongside futuristic 
demonstrations of technological ingenuity, Festival exhibitions on ‘the Land’ and ‘the 
People’ placed emphasis on Britain’s natural beauty and its people’s historic 
connection with the land.50 In Conekin’s view, Britain in the post-war period ‘saw 
itself generally as a special combination of the ancient and the modern’, and thus at 
the Festival modernism ‘combined with the most traditional imaginings of 
Englishness or Britishness’.51  
The concept of modernity can also help to inform understanding of the growth of 
the state in Britain. In his work on the nineteenth century, James Vernon 
characterises modernity as arising as the result of ‘the sustained and rapid growth of a 
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population that was increasingly concentrated in urban areas, and mobile over ever-
greater distances’. For Vernon, a key characteristic of modernity is the creation of a 
‘society of strangers’, within which traditional structures of local and personal 
relations are no longer adequate for the management of social, economic and 
political challenges. One outcome of modernity is the creation of new forms of 
bureaucracy, and the extension of state governance to manage the problems posed 
by industrialisation, urbanisation and mobility. 52  Vernon’s conceptualisation of 
modernity can be applied to environmental politics, which has undoubtedly entailed 
the regulation of problems arising from industrial activity and the arrival of the 
‘society of strangers’, and has led to new forms of government intervention. As 
Patrick Joyce notes, even under governments, such as Margaret Thatcher’s, that have 
expressed the desire to ‘roll back’ its parameters, the reach of the state has continued 
to extend into new areas.53 The environment offers a good example of the tendency 
for modernity to create new problems of governance that lead to extended forms of 
governmental regulation. 
In considering mid-century Britain in terms of modernity, it is important to 
acknowledge the centrality of rising standards of living. While Harold Macmillan’s 
assertion in July 1957 that many people had ‘never had it so good’ has become 
something of a cliché for describing post-war Britain, Mark Donnelly points out that 
the Prime Minister’s words reflected reality for large numbers of Britons, who by the 
late 1950s ‘were healthier, better-educated, better-housed and more prosperous than 
ever before’.54 As Arthur Marwick writes, ‘average weekly earnings rose 34 per cent 
between 1955 and 1960, and 130 per cent between 1955 and 1969’. Disposable 
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income rose steadily, almost doubling between 1951 and 1974, and this was 
accompanied by a comparable rise in expenditure on consumer goods.55 With regards 
to the consumer boom, Dominic Sandbrook notes that there was continuity between 
the inter-war and post-war periods, as it was during the 1930s that many households 
were first connected to the electricity grid, and ‘middle-class consumers first became 
familiar with radios, vacuum cleaners, cookers, electric irons and family cars’.56 
Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton point out that Britain’s twentieth-century 
history contains a paradox. While the nation did undergo relative economic decline, 
the mass of the British people experienced an enormous, albeit uneven, 
improvement in living standards, and that trend was accompanied by rising public 
expectations. 57  A similar point is made by Rubinstein, who writes that while 
‘declinist’ authors have focused on a downturn in national economic performance, 
the post-war decades saw ‘the most marked and singular rise in the standard of living 
for the ordinary Englishman and woman of any period in history’.58 
In that context, it would have been extremely difficult for advocates of 
environmental policies to challenge the twin discourses of modernity and affluence. 
In his work on the connection between the landscape and Englishness in the inter-
war years, David Matless shows how campaigners for the preservation of the 
countryside negotiated this problem by tempering their Romantic inclinations and 
appealing to the dominant priorities of the period. Matless focuses on the CPRE, and 
notes that ‘the common identification of preservation with nostalgia and anti-
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modernity does not hold’.59 As tempting as it may be to view campaigners for rural 
protection as anti-modern, Matless argues that ‘the movement for preservation 
entailed not a conservative protection of the old against the new but an attempt to 
plan a landscape simultaneously modern and traditional under the guidance of an 
expert public authority’. For that reason, Matless characterises the CPRE as part of a 
‘planner-preservationist’ movement, committed to allying ‘preservation and progress, 
tradition and modernity, city and country in order to define Englishness as orderly 
and modern’.60 
The desire of the CPRE to plan the English landscape was in keeping with the wider 
political enthusiasm for ‘planning’ in the inter-war and post-war periods. Alongside 
rising interest in the ‘rational’, long-term planning of a national economic strategy, 
expressed through the work of coalitions of ‘middle opinion’ such as Political and 
Economic Planning and the Next Five Years Group, the 1930s saw growing calls for 
the organised planning of the physical development of both town and country.61 
Gordon E. Cherry notes that strides were made in the furtherance of state 
intervention during the inter-war years, most notably through the passage of the 
1932 Town and Country Planning Act, and that ‘planning’ had entered the 
vocabularies both of political parties and of local authorities by the outbreak of war 
in 1939.62 However, it was not until wartime that planning moved to the centre of 
British political life. John Stevenson argues that ‘the planning movement of the 
1930s was to find its apotheosis in the conduct of the war and the plans for post-war 
reconstruction’, with town and country planning providing ‘the most decisive 
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example of the war acting as an agent of deliberate plans for the future’.63 A Ministry 
of Town and Country Planning was established in 1943, and, as Matless notes, when 
Britain went to the polls in July 1945, all political parties felt obliged to speak the 
language of planning.64 Dennis Hardy describes 1945 as a high water mark for 
physical planning, as the Labour government set about implementing a programme 
that included the establishment of new towns, comprehensive town and country 
planning legislation, and the creation of National Parks.65 
It has been argued that town and country planning formed part of a post-war 
consensus in British politics. Paul Addison writes that faith in economic planning 
dovetailed with a belief in planning the environment, while Cherry suggests that by 
the late 1940s there was a ‘broad consensus’ whereby ‘the administrative elite in 
governance and business saw merit in the virtues of planning’.66 Similarly, Stevenson 
argues that ‘the countryside had become an integral component of the post-war 
consensus’, with both the Labour and Conservative parties willing to use state power 
to regulate its development. 67  Against such perspectives must be weighed the 
arguments of those that question the existence of such a consensus. Daniel Ritschel 
argues that accounts of the planning debates of the 1930s and 1940s have tended to 
ignore the ideological dimension, and in so doing have overlooked the intense 
disagreement that continued around an issue that cut across questions of property 
rights and the relationship between the individual and the state.68 While Ritschel 
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refers to the debate over economic planning, the argument can also be applied to the 
physical planning of town and country. As this thesis shows, the issue acquired a 
different emphasis when approached from left or right, and there were significant 
disagreements between the Labour and Conservative parties over how much 
government intervention was required. It is also worth questioning the extent to 
which the public were invested in the ideal of planning. Nick Tiratsoo cautions 
against assuming that ‘ordinary people in the 1940s had clear views about what a 
future Britain would be like’ and that they ‘desired to participate actively in its 
making’. Beyond concerns around housing, ‘only a very small minority really felt very 
strongly about wider questions of development’.69 Nevertheless, it is not necessary to 
believe in what Ben Pimlott calls ‘the Shangri La of a lost consensus’ in order to 
acknowledge that there was a level of political agreement on the desirability of 
planning in post-war Britain. 70  Both Labour and the Conservatives spoke the 
language, and they were willing to extend state intervention in the physical planning 
of the land, albeit with differing emphases and to varying degrees. As Glen O’Hara 
shows, this is a language that they would continue to speak into the 1960s, with both 
parties putting forward confident and comprehensive long term plans in a multitude 
of policy areas.71 
The thesis outlined 
This thesis argues that the inter-war and post-war periods were crucial to the 
development of environmental politics in Britain. Between the late 1920s and the 
early 1970s, a range of problems were identified as arising from the interaction 
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between society and its natural and built surroundings, and political actors on both 
the left and the right sought to mitigate them through the extension of state 
regulation. Whereas many existing accounts have emphasised the importance of 
1960s ‘counter-culture’ and radical critiques of human interaction with the 
environment, it is the contention of this thesis that environmental politics in Britain 
developed in the political mainstream, taking shape amid efforts to address new 
challenges of governance. The rejection of modernity, in the form of 
industrialisation, urban life, consumer culture and economic growth, was never 
anything more than a minority position within British politics, and successful 
arguments for environmental protection had to be framed in line with dominant 
social and political priorities. 
In keeping with this, the thesis does not provide an account of environmental 
politics that foregrounds the emergence of a social movement. In their account of 
the growth of NGOs in post-war Britain, Matthew Hilton et al rightly observe that 
environmental organisations have not, on the whole, been characterised by their 
radicalism. Even groups such as Greenpeace and FOE, which are often cast as 
archetypes of post-1970 radical environmentalism, underwent a process of 
moderation and professionalisation soon after their formation, with their sizable 
memberships playing the role largely of a passive and loyal base of support for what 
was essentially the business of technocratic, expert lobbying of national and local 
government.72 For Hilton et al, NGOs represent not a backlash against mainstream 
politics rooted in the rebellious spirit of the late 1960s, but rather a 
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professionalisation of politics in the post-war era, whereby both state and non-state 
actors participated in the increasingly complex process of governance.73  
Thus, where campaigning organisations feature in this thesis, it is as lobbyists 
contributing to the development of environmental governance, rather than as 
representatives of a movement dedicated to overturning established social norms. 
The groups that feature, such as the CPRE and the National Trust, represent a 
moderate mode of thought that will be referred to as preservationist or conservationist, in 
contrast to the radical ecologism discussed by authors such as Dobson and Bramwell. 
While the latter has been characterised as ecocentric in its outlook, preservationism 
remained to a large extent human centred, or anthropocentric, with a focus on 
addressing environmental problems because of their implications for society. The 
human-centred outlook of conservationist organisations was underlined by their 
frequent use of the word ‘amenity’ with reference to the aim of preserving rural and 
urban surroundings. Rather than viewing protection as worthwhile for its own sake, 
such organisations pursued their aims on account of the perceived social advantages 
of a satisfactory environment.  
Such anthropocentrism has been central to the development of environmental 
politics in Britain. Throughout the decades under consideration in this thesis, 
environmental policy was formulated in response to man-made problems that had 
negative implications for human society. This is why the definition of the 
‘environment’ must include both ‘natural’ and built surroundings. Environmental 
policy-making covered rural problems, such as the destruction of the countryside and 
the pollution of unspoilt coastline, but it also covered problems that were firmly 
urban in character, such as the pollution of the air by domestic and industrial coal 
																																																								
73 Ibid., pp. 55, 62-63, 190 
	
 32 
burning, and the challenge of integrating mass car ownership into city life. As the 
term ‘environment’ became incorporated into political discourse, it was used with 
reference to both the urban and the rural, and the ‘natural’ and the built. What all 
environmental problems had in common was that they arose as unwanted or 
unintended side effects of the developments associated with modernity, which may 
include industrialisation, urbanisation, mass affluence and consumerism. For the 
most part, environmental policy did not amount to an attempt to halt or reverse such 
processes. Instead, the aim was to regulate development, retaining the advantages 
while controlling the negative side effects. To some extent, the present-day principle 
of sustainable development found early expression in the environmental policies of 
the inter-war and post-war periods. 
At the top of the list of unwanted side effects were those that posed genuine threats 
to human health, and as such the emergence of the environment as a sphere of 
public policy cannot be separated from developments in the political management of 
risk. Anthony Giddens describes modernity as a ‘double-edged phenomenon’, in 
which the creation of ‘vastly greater opportunities for human beings’ has occurred 
alongside the increased risk to human life and welfare posed by industrialisation.74 In 
Giddens’ view, industrialisation transformed the basis of risk. Whereas ‘the risk 
environment of traditional cultures was dominated by the hazards of the physical 
world’, in modernity ‘the dangers we face no longer derive from the world of nature’. 
Instead modern ‘ecological threats are the outcome of socially organised knowledge, 
mediated by the impact of industrialism upon the material environment’.75 Similarly, 
Ulrich Beck argues that ‘the gain in power from techno-economic progress [has 
been] overshadowed by the production of risks’. Whereas in the early stages of 
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industrialisation hazards tended to be ‘limited to certain localities or groups’, in the 
twentieth century it became apparent that modernisation posed significant dangers to 
the health of entire communities and societies, and perhaps even threatened the 
existence of all life on earth. As a result, risk came to ‘achieve a central importance in 
social and political debates’. As publics in industrialised nations became increasingly 
aware that the ‘sources of wealth’ produced ‘hazardous side effects’, responsibility 
fell to governments to take steps to mitigate new threats to human health.76 
However, the development of environmental politics was not simply related to 
concern for public health. Although risk played a role in determining public policy, 
there was also in the mid-twentieth century increased political attention to the 
perceived need to bring about improvements in ‘quality of life’. While this naturally 
included improvements to health, it also encapsulated desires for heightened levels of 
wellbeing that were not directly connected to physical risk. It is in this respect that 
use may be made of Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism. As levels of affluence rose 
in the twentieth century, and basic standards of health and material need were 
satisfied, the public increasingly looked to government to secure new levels of 
comfort. In relation to the natural and built environment, measures of quality of life 
could include aesthetic satisfaction, freedom from air and noise pollution, the 
availability of leisure space (both in town and country), and the ability to travel 
quickly and conveniently. As this thesis shows, during the post-war period both the 
Conservative and Labour parties came to view the securing of quality of life as a 
potential vote winner among all classes, and environmental protection was presented 
as a desirable aim that could be pursued alongside continuing economic growth. The 
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public was perceived to desire not only affluence, but also an environment in which 
to enjoy its benefits.  
In sections of the existing literature, it is argued that the environment did not acquire 
mainstream political significance in Britain until the 1980s, or perhaps even as late as 
the 1990s. For example, Neil Carter suggests that there was only incipient party 
political interest in environmental issues before the mid-1980s, and writes that parties 
only began to incorporate the environment into their agendas once they came under 
threat from radical greens.77 Similarly, Mike Robinson argues that a ‘greening’ of 
British politics took place in the 1980s ‘after years of relative neglect’.78 In the view of 
McCormick, successive British governments responded slowly to environmental 
problems during the post-war period, before coming under pressure from the 
environmental movement from the 1970s onwards.79 This thesis does not dispute the 
view that the environment increased in political importance during those later 
decades, but it does argue that it was already established in British politics by the 
beginning of the 1970s, and contend that, in order to understand later developments, 
it is necessary to pay attention to the events of earlier decades. In the inter-war years, 
and then in the immediate post-war period, the role of the state in regulating 
environmental problems expanded dramatically, and the ‘environment’ took shape as 
a concept that encapsulated a range of governmental challenges. 
This thesis explores this process by examining five key episodes: the development of 
National Parks and town and country planning policy during the 1930s and 1940s; 
smoke pollution and the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1956; the implementation of 
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Britain’s nuclear power programme and its relationship to countryside preservation 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s; the growth of political interest in ‘environmental’ 
problems during the 1960s, and the eventual formation of the Department of the 
Environment in 1970; and the challenge of traffic in town, with a focus upon the 
proposals for the construction of a motorway network in London in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The five episodes have been selected because of the insight that 
analysis can provide into the evolution of the politics of the environment over the 
course of the inter-war and post-war periods, as a range of problems, impacting both 
urban and rural surroundings, became conceptualised as ‘environmental’, and 
recognised as components of a unified field of public policy. Each of the problems 
explored in the five central chapters was integral to the environmental programme of 
the British government by the early 1970s, which marks the end point of the period 
examined by this thesis. 
As the following literature review shows, there is an existing, although uneven, body 
of historiography for each of the five case studies which locates environmental 
problems within a broader political and cultural climate that valued rationality, 
scientific expertise and economic growth, and, in contrast to explanations that have 
been set within the framework of the ‘declinist’ thesis, does not present 
environmental politics as the product of an ‘anti-industrial’ mind-set. This thesis 
builds upon this literature but also pushes beyond it. While the five cases are already 
familiar to historians, there is value in reassessing them together in terms of the 
broader question of how the politics of the environment developed over the course 
of the inter-war and post-war years. By considering the episodes alongside one 
another, it is possible to draw out important links and continuities across the period 
that are not developed in the present historiography. Rather than viewing the cases in 
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isolation, it is the aim of this thesis to demonstrate how each distinct environmental 
problem contributed to the emergence of the ‘environment’ as a field of policy and 
drove the expansion of the British state’s responsibility for both built and natural 
surroundings. This thesis also takes a different approach from much of the existing 
literature, in that it focuses upon the role of government and the leading political 
parties in shaping environmental policy. The existing literature goes some way 
towards redressing the emphasis elsewhere upon radical activism and an ‘anti-
industrial’ spirit, but there remains a disproportionate focus upon the work of 
organised campaigning groups, albeit those of a ‘moderate’ rather than a radical 
character. Additionally, there is a tendency for existing works to examine either a 
rural or an urban problem, neglecting the links between the two and their 
overlapping roles in the development of environmental politics. It should also be 
noted that the existing literature is more extensive for some of the episodes 
examined here than it is for others. As will be shown, while there are strong bodies 
of work on National Parks and the Clean Air Act, other cases, such as the 
construction of nuclear power stations and, particularly, the creation of the 
Department of the Environment, have been subjects of limited historical research. 
Chapter two of this thesis investigates the debate around the preservation of the 
countryside in the inter-war period, and the eventual passage of National Parks and 
town and country planning legislation by the Attlee government in the late 1940s. As 
has been noted, the existing literature on National Parks is relatively extensive. John 
Sheail has traced the institutional developments leading up to the 1949 act in two 
articles, while his study Rural Conservation in Inter-War Britain explores the wider 
interest in preservation and planning in the 1920s and 1930s.80 The genesis of 
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National Parks policy is also outlined by Gordon E. Cherry in his official history of 
the subject, published in 1975.81 This existing work explains how National Parks 
legislation came to be passed, but it does not provide an in-depth analysis of the 
arguments made in favour of preservation, nor examine the broader political context 
of the debates.  
Perhaps the most insightful work on the inter-war period comes from Matless, who, 
as is noted earlier in this introduction, explores the emergence of what he terms a 
‘planner-preservationist’ movement in the inter-war period, exemplified by the 
CPRE and its campaigns to restore a sense of order to the relationship between the 
urban and the rural.82 Matless points out that inter-war preservationism should not 
be seen as a form of anti-modern, pastoral Romanticism. Instead, we should 
recognise that it sought to reconcile progress with preservation, using expert 
knowledge to protect the countryside while encouraging the continuation of well-
planned urban and industrial development. 83  Inter-war preservation is also the 
subject of an important study by Bill Luckin, which explores the debate surrounding 
the construction of the national electricity grid between 1927 and 1934. Luckin 
presents the debate as involving a clash between ‘triumphalists’, who argued that 
‘economy, society and culture would be rapidly and radically transformed by the new 
source of energy’, and ‘traditionalists’, who fought for the protection of the rural 
landscape in the face of the threat of a national network of pylons. While electricity 
industry lobbyists, with the enthusiastic backing of the British state, advanced 
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triumphalism, the traditionalist cause was represented by local and national 
preservationist organisations, with the CPRE playing a leading role.84 
Chapter two builds upon the work of both Luckin and Matless. In the case of 
Luckin, it is useful to note the British state’s commitment to technological 
triumphalism and the public’s support for innovation, and the obstacle that this 
presented to arguments for the protection of the rural environment. However, it is 
important that preservationism is not presented as entirely traditionalist in character. 
Luckin goes some way to acknowledging this, noting that the CPRE moderated its 
stance in the 1930s, and examining the diversity of viewpoints among its leading 
lights, including the willingness of the planner and campaigner Patrick Abercrombie 
to seek accommodation between preservation and development, but ultimately the 
emphasis in his work is upon the clash between triumphalism and traditionalism over 
the national grid, and there is need for a fuller discussion of the growing interest 
among mainstream political actors in the protection of the countryside during the 
inter-war years.85  
With this in mind, Matless’s identification of ‘planner-preservationism’ is of 
particular importance. He is absolutely correct to argue that campaigners sought to 
reconcile progress and preservation during the inter-war period, and this thesis takes 
this idea further, arguing that such a vision was present not only in campaigning 
organisations such as the CPRE, but also in the wider political community. To a 
greater extent than existing studies, chapter two investigates why government was 
eventually convinced to implement National Parks, and it is argued that the policy 
appealed to political actors on two levels. On the one hand, National Parks offered a 
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means of ‘rationalising development’, reconciling ongoing economic progress with a 
desire to protect and preserve, while the policy also contained a public health 
dimension, with Parks presented as a potential space for healthy outdoor recreation 
for the nation’s urban population, and a means for offsetting the risks of urban life. 
The eventual passage of the Attlee government’s 1947 Town and Country Planning 
Act and 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act represented 
significant extensions of the state’s control over the development of the countryside 
and, as subsequent chapters of this thesis show, post-war environmental policy 
would continue to be shaped by the desire to seek accommodation between 
modernity and the protection of both rural and urban surroundings. 
In chapter three, attention turns from the rural to the urban environment, with 
examination of the problem of air pollution. The chapter focuses on the London 
smog disaster of December 1952, which was held responsible for the deaths of more 
than 4,000 people, and explores how that event led to the passage of the 1956 Clean 
Air Act, which gave local authorities new powers to control the emission of coal 
smoke in urban areas. As with National Parks, the case of the London smog and the 
Clean Air Act has received significant attention from historians. One of the first 
academic assessments of the passage of the act came in 1975 from Roy Parker, who 
examined the events that led to legislative action, and argued that the smog, and the 
political pressure that followed, were key to the introduction of new air pollution 
regulations. Parker’s account was written without access to the official documents, 
and thus fails to provide insight into the government’s perspective, and while it 
analyses the political debate around clean air, it does not place the discussion in its 
wider political context.86 Similarly, Eric Ashby and Mary Anderson’s 1981 study of 
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the politics of clean air and Peter Brimblecombe’s 1987 history of smoke pollution in 
London both provide overviews of how legislation was proposed and passed in the 
years following 1952, but do not analyse the debate in depth.87 
A number of later studies have investigated the long-term history of air pollution in 
Britain. Stephen Mosley has explored the impact of smoke in Victorian England, in 
particular in Manchester and Salford, and provides a thorough account of local and 
national efforts to tackle air pollution from industrial and domestic sources. 88 
Additionally, both Mosley and Catherine Mills have written about the difficulties in 
the twentieth century of persuading the British public to part with their open coal 
fires, which were identified as a leading cause of air pollution.89 The subject has also 
received attention from Luckin, who writes in a short chapter that the key question 
around the Clean Air Act is how ‘in this particular time, this particular environmental 
dilemma came, finally, to be interpreted as unendurable?’ Luckin argues that it was 
long-term technological change, in the form of the development of smokeless fuels, 
together with the ‘human tragedy’ of the 1952 smog that finally prompted change.90 
The most comprehensive study is that by the environmental historian Peter 
Thorsheim, who explores the history of air pollution in Britain from the Middle Ages 
onwards, with particular attention to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Influenced by the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas, particularly her 
assertion that conceptions of pollution are culturally determined, Thorsheim argues 
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that the idea of pollution was invented in Britain in the late nineteenth century in 
response to the smoke problem. He provides a convincing account of the impact of 
the 1952 smog, but pays more attention to medical responses and changing 
perceptions of pollution than he does to the political processes that led to the 
passage of legislation.91 
While chapter three draws upon these existing studies, it offers a new interpretation 
of the Clean Air Act by examining its passage in the context of wider problems 
facing post-war governments, including growing public expectations of state action 
to secure citizen wellbeing, and assessing the role of air pollution in the emergence of 
the environment as a new sphere of government policy. It is argued that the Clean 
Air Act reflected the willingness of post-war British governments to extend state 
regulation of both the urban and rural environments, with the aim of reconciling 
economic development with the provision of amenable surroundings, and enhancing 
the public’s experience of modernity. In existing studies, there is significant criticism 
of the governmental response to the London smog – for example, Parker suggests 
that the Conservative government was disinterested in the smog problem, and 
Thorsheim writes that it sought to ‘escape blame’ and ‘avoid being pressured into 
stricter controls on air pollution’. 92  It is argued by those authors that NGOs, 
particularly the National Smoke Abatement Society, were integral to ensuring that the 
government felt compelled to act.93 By contrast, chapter three of this thesis argues 
that government did more than it is usually given credit for, and questions the 
importance of campaigning organisations. While there was a certain amount of 
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reluctance at Cabinet level, there was nevertheless an acceptance that the political 
context of the 1950s, particularly in terms of public expectations of the welfare state, 
necessitated government intervention. The chapter acknowledges Thorsheim’s 
argument that scientific and medical expertise was crucial to the identification of 
smoke pollution as a public health problem, but builds upon this by suggesting that 
the government deserves greater credit for bringing such expertise to bear and 
moving forward with the implementation of a policy solution informed by technical 
advice.94 
In chapter four, this thesis returns to the rural environment, exploring Britain’s early 
nuclear power programme and its implications for the countryside. While plans in 
the 1950s to establish nuclear power in Britain generated a high degree of official and 
public enthusiasm, proposals to site power stations in remote rural areas, such as 
Bradwell in Essex, Dungeness in Kent, and Trawsfynydd in North Wales, led to 
fierce debates, and a series of local public inquiries were held before governmental 
permission was given for the construction of atomic installations. While the 
technicalities of Britain’s nuclear power programme have received extensive 
coverage, less attention has been paid to the inquiries into the siting of the first 
power stations in the late 1950s and early 1960s.95 In his study of the reception of 
nuclear power by the British public, the political scientist Ian Welsh draws on the 
published reports (but not the archival sources) of two public inquiries from the 
1950s – Bradwell and Hunterston in Ayrshire – in order to argue that public anxieties 
around radiation were present from the beginning of the nuclear power 
programme.96 Chapter four disputes Welsh’s claim, noting that evidence for such 
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anxieties is not readily apparent in the archival records, and arguing that a focus on 
radiation distracts from the central debate at the inquiries, which concerned 
technological development on the one hand and, on the other, the appeal for the 
preservation of Britain’s rural landscape. That debate is discussed by Luckin at the 
end of his study of the national grid, in which he argues that the triumphalist 
commitment to scientific and technological advancement continued to define the 
British state’s approach in the immediate post-war decades.97  
Luckin’s insight is an important one, but it is necessary to say more about the 
discussions around the siting of nuclear power stations, and to examine the full set of 
public inquiries (Luckin only looks at the Bradwell inquiry). Nuclear power is an 
important case study because it highlights the complexity of the politics of the 
environment in the post-war decades. While there was indeed a triumphalist tone to 
the official case for nuclear power, the siting debates exemplify the contradictions of 
British government policy. On the one hand, Labour and Conservative 
administrations wished to advance the nation’s technological standing and economic 
development, but at the same time they committed the British state to the statutory 
preservation of amenity and the rural landscape, through the passage of National 
Parks and town and country planning legislation. Triumphalism coincided with an 
official willingness to take steps to protect the environment. Nor can the arguments 
made by objectors to the power stations easily be characterised as traditionalist in 
tone. Preservationists advanced their case, but often did so within the framework of 
modernity, appealing for reconciliation between technological development and 
conservation. Their representations at the inquiries rarely stand out as evidence for 
an ‘anti-industrial’ spirit. However, it is necessary to note that nuclear power 
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ultimately demonstrates the limits of environmental politics in the post-war period. 
While government took a sympathetic stance towards conservation, it was not willing 
to override its commitment to economic modernisation, and for that reason all of 
the power stations contested at the inquiries were eventually constructed. 
In chapter five, the focus is on the role of central government in the 1960s, as it 
sought to address a range of rural and urban problems. The chapter culminates with 
the creation of the Department of the Environment (DOE) by the Conservative 
government of Edward Heath in 1970. The British government was the first in the 
world to establish a dedicated environmental ministry at cabinet level, yet the 
creation of the DOE has received little attention in the historical literature. 98 
Whitehall, Peter Hennessy’s study of the history of the civil service, does not explore 
the reasons for the department’s creation, while James Radcliffe’s book, The 
Reorganisation of Central Government, deals with it largely in terms of the Heath 
government’s wider reforms to the machinery of government.99 The DOE receives 
some attention in works on the environment and environmental activism in Britain, 
but even that literature does not examine its history in detail. John Sheail covers it 
briefly in his environmental history of twentieth century Britain, noting that there 
was political capital to be made from environmental protection by the end of the 
1960s.100 In The Greening of British Party Politics, Mike Robinson suggests that the 
creation of the DOE ‘symbolised the advent of a new political awareness’ of 
environmental issues, but focuses largely on the 1970s and 1980s, arguing that the 
‘greening’ of politics only really occurred during those decades.101 In his study of the 
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global environmental movement, John McCormick briefly outlines some of the 
events that led to the department’s creation but concludes – somewhat strangely 
given how little academic attention it has received – that it ‘is often given greater 
significance than it deserves’.102 
Chapter five aims to redress the lack of attention given to the DOE, arguing that the 
department’s creation was a significant moment in the development of 
environmental politics in Britain. Throughout the 1960s, both Conservative and 
Labour governments proved attentive to what were increasingly being conceptualised 
as ‘environmental’ issues, and, far from being a mere administrative change to the 
machinery of Whitehall, the creation of the DOE represented the conscious 
formalisation of the environment as a field of policy. The new Department was 
formed in part as a response to the difficulty of incorporating mass car ownership 
into the fabric of Britain’s towns and cities. The effects of urban traffic congestion 
were considered to be the greatest environmental challenge of the period, with 
successive governments seeking planning solutions to the problem, and it was in that 
context that the word ‘environment’ began to acquire political resonance, used to 
refer to the desirability of reconciling the car with amenable urban surroundings. 
During the 1960s, the problem of pollution also rose up the political agenda, not 
least because of the Torrey Canyon tanker disaster of March 1967, which saw 120,000 
tons of crude oil spilled into the sea off the Cornish coast. The Labour government 
of Harold Wilson proved particularly attentive to pollution, putting in place new 
regulatory mechanisms at home, and playing an active role in discussions abroad, 
including preparations for the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. For both main parties, the perception that the public desired the 
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enhancement of ‘quality of life’ was central to their growing attention to 
environmental issues, and by the early 1970s this was reflected both in the existence 
of the DOE, and in commitments in party election manifestoes. In contrast to 
studies that have presented the rise of environmental politics during the 1960s as a 
counter-cultural reaction against industrialism and economic development, chapter 
five points to the creation of the DOE to argue that environmental politics was 
shaped in Britain by conventional political actors as part of an effort to deliver higher 
standards of living and manage anxieties associated with post-war technological 
modernity. 
Finally, in chapter six, the thesis examines the challenge of traffic in towns in greater 
detail. Whereas chapter five explores the issue in relation to its impact on the 
machinery of central government, chapter six looks more closely at the social and 
environmental impact of traffic, and the debates that arose over how to address the 
problem. Specifically, the chapter examines the challenge of traffic in Greater 
London, where there was an attempt in the late 1960s to address it through the 
construction of a network of four urban motorways. The proposal, put forward by 
the Greater London Council (GLC) in its Greater London Development Plan 
(GLDP), became the subject of intense opposition, and led to what was at the time 
the largest public inquiry in British history.  
In spite of its size, the GLDP inquiry has not received widespread coverage in the 
historical literature. One important exception is a chapter by John Davis, which 
examines the demise of the Plan in the face of public opposition, and points to the 
limitations of comprehensive planning in offering ‘simple solutions to complex 
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problems’. 103 Davis’s focus is not upon the significance of the GLDP for the 
development of environmental politics, but his work nonetheless contains some 
valuable insights, particularly his observation that the inquiry involved a clash 
between two features of post-war affluence in mass car ownership and increased 
owner-occupation of housing.104 Chapter six builds upon this work, arguing that 
affluence was central to the conflict over the future of urban surroundings during the 
1960s and early 1970s, while providing a deeper exploration of the implications of 
the traffic problem for the emergence of the environment as a field of public policy. 
Beyond London, even the broader issue of traffic in towns does not feature 
prominently in the historiography. An article by Simon Gunn offers an important 
contribution, rightly noting that the work of the town planner Colin Buchanan, in 
particular his influential 1963 report Traffic in Towns, played a role in the development 
of environmental discourse in Britain.105 However, Buchanan’s contribution warrants 
further discussion. Gunn correctly argues that presented a vision that combined 
modernism and conservationism, but it is important to note that he found himself on 
the side of the GLC during the GLDP debate. For the objectors to the motorways, 
Buchanan’s vision represented a grave threat to the environment of London, and this 
clash is explored in depth in chapter six.106 Additionally, urban motorways appear in 
the wider literature on the history of motorways in Britain, but their implications are 
not explored in detail, and the link to the development of environmental politics is 
not developed in significant depth.107 
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Chapter six uses the GLDP inquiry to show how the traffic problem was central to 
the development of environmental politics. During the 1960s, the problem came to 
be conceptualised as ‘environmental’, and proposals for solving it were framed in 
terms of the need to secure a ‘good’ environment. At the GLDP inquiry, the 
environment became the battleground on which the motorways plan was contested, 
with both supporters and opponents of the proposal expressing an aim of improving 
London’s environment. The inquiry underlines the connection between 
environmental politics and ‘quality of life’, as for both sides the motorways were seen 
as an environmental issue because of their potential implications for living standards. 
While the ‘environment’ was still a loosely defined political term, it was by the early 
1970s established as the label for a range of policy problems, including countryside 
preservation, pollution, and traffic congestion in towns, all of which were considered 
to relate to the quality of life. In terms of state responsibility, this no longer meant 
simply securing basic conditions of material security and public health, but also 
providing surroundings in which urban and rural populations could enjoy the 
benefits of affluence. 
Together, the five central chapters of this thesis make use of a series of familiar cases 
in order to provide a new picture of the development of environmental politics in 
Britain, which places the role of the state and the work of conventional political 
actors at the heart of the story. The politics of the environment, at least in their most 
influential form, are not presented as having their origins in an ‘anti-industrial’ spirit 
that can be traced back to the nineteenth century, nor are they framed as the product 
of a radical form of 1960s activism infused with Romantic sensibilities. By contrast, 
this thesis presents the environment as a challenge of governance, whereby political 
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actors responded to a series of problems, arising out of the circumstances of 
modernity, by enacting policies that sought to reconcile the priorities of economic 
growth, industrial development and technological innovation with the public desire 
for healthy and amenable surroundings. While environmental policies are credited 
with significant success, it is noted throughout this thesis that they always had their 
limits, particularly in instances in which they could not be squared with dominant 
political priorities. 
This thesis is not the first study to suggest that environmental politics took shape 
within a society committed to science, technology and economic development, but it 
aims to take the argument further, demonstrating that the period between the inter-
war years and the early 1970s saw the emergence of the environment as a unified 
field of public policy. In doing so, it picks up on some important threads in the 
existing literature, and uses them to highlight continuity across the period examined. 
Thus, Matless’s identification of modernist tendencies with the CPRE, and Luckin’s 
discussion of triumphalism around the construction of the national grid are both 
taken further, and used to inform the argument that governments across the inter-
war and post-war decades, committed to economic and technological development, 
sought to reconcile those priorities with the protection and improvement of urban 
and rural environments. Such an aim can be discerned in the political approach to all 
the problems discussed, from the preservation of the countryside to the control of 
various forms of pollution and the challenge of traffic in towns. Similarly, the 
expertise that Thorsheim argues informed the response to the London smog is 




Crucially, this thesis diverges from the existing literature in terms of the central role 
given to government and actors within the two leading political parties. Whereas 
existing studies give significant credit to the work of NGOs, their relative importance 
is questioned here, and it is argued that the development of environmental politics 
was shaped less by organised campaigns, and more by the efforts of government and 
political parties to respond to challenges posed by twentieth century modernity. Key 
to driving this response were the political imperatives of affluence, as political actors 
sought to deliver a quality of life in keeping with the rising public expectations of the 
period. 
Sources and geographical scope 
As a history of governmental and administrative developments, the thesis draws 
extensively upon material held in the National Archives. In chapter two, the archives 
of the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Ministry of Works, and the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning provide insight into the emergence of ideas around planning 
and the preservation of the countryside, and include the papers of the committees on 
National Parks that reported in 1931 and 1947. In chapter three, the relevant 
departments are the MOH and the MHLG, and detailed use is made of the papers of 
the Committee on Air Pollution, which was set up in 1953 and chaired by Sir Hugh 
Beaver. In chapter four, the British nuclear power programme is explored through 
the archives of a number of government departments and agencies, including the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power (simply the Ministry of Power from 1957), the MHLG 
and the UK Atomic Energy Authority. The chapter also draws extensively upon the 
papers produced by the public inquiries held at Bradwell, Trawsfynydd, Dungeness, 
Oldbury and Wylfa. In chapter five, the origins of the DOE are traced through the 
department’s own records, as well as the papers of the MHLG. The chapter also 
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makes use of the archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Throughout 
the thesis, government sources are also drawn from the papers of the Cabinet Office 
and the Prime Minister’s Office. There is also extensive use of the Hansard report of 
parliamentary debates. 
In addition to the National Archives, in chapter six the problem of urban traffic is 
explored through the papers of the GLDP inquiry, which are held in the records of 
the GLC at the London Metropolitan Archives, and through the papers of the 
Blackheath Motorway Action Group and its chairman, the MP for Lewisham North 
Roland Moyle, which are held at the Local History and Archives Centre in 
Lewisham. In chapter two, there is also use of the papers of the Standing Committee 
on National Parks, a body set up by a number of conservationist organisations in the 
1930s in order to campaign for the establishment of National Parks. The Standing 
Committee’s papers are held in the archives of the CPRE at the Museum of English 
Rural Life in Reading. In chapter four, there is reference to the papers of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which are held at the London School of 
Economics. Due to its focus on formal politics and governance, this thesis does not 
make a systematic attempt to trace public opinion on environmental issues (it is 
debatable how this could be done for the pre-1970 period, given the difficulty of 
using oral history and the lack of extensive opinion polling data), and it does not 
explore cultural constructions and representations of the ‘environment’. 
Nevertheless, it does engage with public voices, particularly at moments where they 
intersect with party politics and policy-making processes. In chapter four, members 
of the public feature as witnesses at the nuclear power inquiries, and provide a 
snapshot of the variety of opinion around the atomic energy programme. Similarly, 
in chapter six public representations at the GLDP inquiry underline the weight of 
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feeling around the traffic problem, and illustrate the connection between conceptions 
of the ‘environment’ and the emphasis on quality of life. National and local 
newspaper sources are used throughout the thesis, with the aim of gauging the 
climate of opinion around the various environmental issues, and highlighting the link 
drawn by government between media coverage and the perceived wishes of the 
electorate. The thesis also makes extensive use of printed sources, particularly in the 
form of official reports and studies of environmental problems, and contemporary 
accounts of significant environmental events, such as the Torrey Canyon tanker 
disaster. 
In terms of geographical scope, this thesis aims to explain how and why the 
environment came to play a role in British politics at the national level. Many of the 
debates explored in the thesis occurred nationally, and prompted changes at the level 
of central government and new policy discussions within national political parties. 
However, due to the administrative structure of Britain, there is greater focus on 
developments in England and Wales than on developments in Scotland. In chapter 
two, the debate around National Parks initially encompassed England, Wales and 
Scotland, but while policy in England and Wales was the concern of the MOH and 
MHLG, in Scotland it was the responsibility of the Scottish Office. The 1949 
National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act led to the establishment of 
National Parks in England and Wales, but it did not cover Scotland, and National 
Parks were not introduced north of the border until 2000. Similarly, while the 
environmental debates of the 1960s discussed in chapter five were UK-wide, the 
creation of the DOE was only directly applicable to England. Additionally, in 
chapters three and six there is particular focus on London. It is difficult to judge the 
extent to which the existence of the problems of air pollution and traffic congestion 
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in the capital increased their political profile, but it is certainly the case that the 
involvement of London did not lessen the attention paid to environmental debates. 
While the problems could also be explored through the lens of regional towns or 
cities, the centrality of London to chapters three and six serves to underline how 
environmental politics emerged from issues that had implications for millions of 
people. 
Finally, it must be noted that this is not an international or comparative history of 
environmental politics. Studies of other national contexts and global histories form 
part of the historiographical background, but one of the problems with the existing 
literature, particularly within the social sciences, is that it has sought to provide a 
globalised explanation for what is perceived to have been a global political 
development. This thesis acknowledges that environmental politics in Britain 
developed in parallel to environmental politics in other Western countries, but one of 
the risks of global history lies in missing the particularities of different national 
contexts. Environmental politics in Britain had international influences, but it 
emerged in the peculiar national context of the inter-war and post-war periods, in 
response to challenges that arose from specific political, social, economic and 





National Parks and Town and Country Planning 
In December 1949, Royal Assent was given to the Labour government’s National 
Parks and Access to the Countryside Act. Hailed by Lewis Silkin, the Minister of 
Town and Country Planning, as ‘a people’s charter for the open air’, the act was a 
highly significant moment in the history of nature conservation and outdoor 
recreation, giving the state responsibility for ‘the preservation and enhancement of 
natural beauty in England and Wales’. The responsibility was twofold – National 
Parks were established, administered by a National Parks Commission and intended 
for public access, and a newly formed Nature Conservancy was charged with 
administering nature reserves for the purpose of providing ‘special opportunities for 
the study of, and research into, matters relating to the fauna and flora of Great 
Britain’.1 
The creation of National Parks followed two decades of discussion and investigation. 
Two government committees had explored the idea and recommended legislative 
action. In 1929, the Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald established the 
National Park Committee, chaired by the former Minister of Health, Christopher 
Addison. The Addison Committee published its report in 1931, in which it advised 
that a network of National Parks should be established. At the end of the Second 
World War the Labour government of Clement Attlee set up a second National 
Parks Committee, chaired by Sir Arthur Hobhouse. The report of the Hobhouse 
Committee, published in 1947, provided the basis for the legislation of 1949. In 
Scotland, a committee chaired by Sir Douglas Ramsey published its findings in 1945, 
recommending five suitable National Park areas. However, a bill for Scottish 
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National Parks was never brought forward, and it would take until 2000 for them to 
be introduced north of the border. Parallel to the debate around National Parks, 
there were also calls to protect the rural landscape by extending the provisions of 
town planning law, first introduced with the 1909 Housing, Town Planning, &c. Act, 
to the countryside. The first Town and Country Planning Act was passed by the 
National government in 1932, and additional acts were passed by the wartime 
coalition in 1944 and the Labour government in 1947. The town and country 
planning legislation established the principle that ‘amenity’, which served as a broad 
term for describing the satisfactory character of physical surroundings, should be 
considered as part of decisions concerning the development of both urban and rural 
land.2 
The origins of the National Parks debate can be traced back to the nineteenth 
century. As John Sheail writes in his international study of the emergence of National 
Parks, the appeal for such measures in England began with William Wordsworth, 
who wrote in his 1835 guide to the Lake District that ‘persons of pure taste 
throughout the whole islands … testify that they deem the district a sort of national 
property, in which every man has a right and interests who has an eye to perceive 
and a heart to enjoy’.3 In Parliament, the first mention of National Parks appears to 
have been made just over 50 years later, in an 1887 Commons debate on the 
extension of the railway into Ambleside in the Lake District. Arguing against the 
railway, Henry Howorth, MP for Salford South, cited the example of the United 
States, which ‘had engaged to preserve the Yellowstone District absolutely intact 
from railways or the other vulgarities of modern life, and to preserve it as a great 
National Park’. Howorth received support from Robert Graham, MP for Lanarkshire 
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North Western, who suggested that the ‘Ambleside district might be most 
advantageously bought by the nation and preserved for the people of our great towns 
as a democratic playground’.4 
However, while such discussion began in the nineteenth century, concern over the 
status of the countryside and natural beauty grew more intense during the inter-war 
period, and became enshrined in law with the legislative measures of the 1940s. This 
chapter examines the debates of the inter-war and immediate post-war years, and 
explains why the period saw both the Conservative and Labour parties accept the 
need for greater state regulation of the rural environment. Whereas existing studies 
of National Parks have prioritised the technicalities of the legislation, and the work 
of campaigning organisations in advancing their case, this chapter focuses upon why 
conventional political actors became convinced of the desirability of such policies. It 
traces this development through two distinct but related themes. On the one hand, 
those calling for preservationist measures focused upon the pace and extent of 
economic development, and its implications for the countryside and rural amenities. 
Advocates of preservation argued that, without measures to control the expansion of 
towns and the exploitation of the land by industry, the British landscape risked being 
lost to future generations. Alongside this argument, the case for National Parks was 
also made on the basis of public health. Just as the moral reformers of the late-
nineteenth century had argued that impoverished workers needed access to clean 
outdoor space, advocates of National Parks in the inter-war years contended that 
preservation of the countryside would have significant health benefits for the urban 
population. While the two arguments stemmed from alarm at urban trends and the 
pace of industrial development, and overlapped in numerous respects, they did not 
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represent identical visions of how and why the landscape should be preserved, and 
they shaped the eventual political measures in different ways. 
It is also necessary to set National Parks and town and country planning in their 
broader social and political context. The legislation of the 1940s coincided with the 
extension of governmental authority into other areas of national life, and the 
willingness of both main parties to use state power in the interests of public welfare 
would help to shape the development of environmental politics in subsequent 
decades. However, we should not overemphasise the existence of a political 
consensus in the 1940s. While significant agreement did emerge around the need for 
greater centralised planning of town and country, and the preservation of the 
countryside through National Parks, close examination of the debates reveals that a 
more contested politics lay beneath the common ground. Crucially, actors on the left 
and right of British politics advocated the policies for very different reasons – there 
was agreement on the need to protect the shrinking countryside from the risks posed 
by continuing economic development, but Conservatives tied this to the importance 
of defending the interests of landowners, while Labour politicians emphasised the 
social democratic merits of planning and National Parks. 
The discussion of National Parks and town and country planning in this opening 
central chapter introduces some key themes that will be present throughout this 
thesis. As will be discussed in the following section, while National Parks and town 
and country planning were policies designed to protect the rural landscape from on 
going urban and industrial development, they did not have their roots in a desire to 
curb development, and they should not be seen as a manifestation of an ‘anti-
industrial’ spirit. The desire to reconcile progress and preservation, identified by 
David Matless in the work of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England 
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(CPRE), was present outside of campaigning organisations, and came to define 
parliamentary discussion and government policy on the conservation of the 
countryside.5 This desire combined with the aim of enhancing the public experience 
of modernity through the provision of a healthy and amenable environment, and 
both themes can be found in the cases examined in later chapters, including clean air 
policy and the search for a solution to the problem of traffic in towns. Additionally, 
National Parks and town and country planning set the precedent for the post-war 
increase in state responsibility for the environment, a process that would continue 
over the period explored in the remainder of this thesis. It should also be noted that 
National Parks underlined clear limits to environmental protection, particularly when 
it clashed with dominant political priorities, and this would become increasingly 
apparent in the years that followed the passage of the 1949 Act. 
In demonstrating how and why National Parks and town and country planning 
legislation was developed and passed in the 1930s and 1940s, this chapter draws on a 
rich array of sources. The government National Parks committees of 1929-31 
(chaired by Addison) and 1945-47 (chaired by Hobhouse) produced extensive 
documents, all of which are available in the National Archives, alongside a wide 
range of documents relating to government discussion of and correspondence 
around National Parks and town and country planning. National Parks also receive 
extensive coverage in the archives of the CPRE, which established a Standing 
Committee on National Parks in the 1930s, bringing together numerous campaigning 
organisations to advocate for the creation of National Parks. The documents of the 
CPRE and the Standing Committee are held at the Museum of English Rural Life in 
Reading. The chapter also makes use of government reports, parliamentary debates, 
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newspaper sources and books published by preservationist figures during the inter-
war and post-war periods. 
The rationalisation of development 
The argument that the Industrial Revolution had proved destructive to the British 
countryside was integral to the early growth of environmental politics, contributing 
to the formation of the Commons, Footpaths and Open Spaces Preservation Society 
(1865) and the National Trust (1895), and to the founding of the Garden City 
Association in 1899, with its declaration ‘that the continual growth of our large cities 
and the decline of population in country districts is an unhealthy sign’.6 The growth 
of such organisations represented early success for the preservationist cause, but this 
did not dampen concern around the impact of expanding industrial and urban 
centres, and arguments intensified during the inter-war decades. The best-known 
voice warning of the threat to the countryside in the 1920s was the architect Clough 
Williams-Ellis, whose 1928 book England and the Octopus offered an acerbic critique of 
the destructive impact of industrial and urban expansion. Williams-Ellis wrote that 
the Industrial Revolution had ushered in an ‘age of stupid exploitation’ whose impact 
had worsened in the years following the First World War, and argued that state 
action was required, because ‘if a Government has one function above all others, 
surely it is to protect the natural heritage and rights of its future citizens against the 
infringements of selfish squanderers in our present time’.7 
Williams-Ellis’s concern that the situation had become critical in the 1920s is borne 
out in statistics, which indicate that, in spite of the economic difficulties of the inter-
war period, industrial and urban development was accelerating. Over 4,000,000 new 
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houses were built between the wars, while the number of private cars on Britain’s 
growing road network rose from 110,000 to 2,300,000, opening the countryside to 
millions of new residents and visitors.8 It was against this background that the 
preservation of the countryside began to play a more prominent role in British 
political discourse. In 1929 the Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald 
appointed the first National Park Committee under Addison, and it was given the 
following terms of reference: 
[To] consider and report if it is desirable and feasible to establish one or 
more National Parks in Great Britain with a view to the preservation of 
natural characteristics including flora and fauna, and to the improvement of 
recreational facilities for the people.9 
At the first meeting of the Committee there was an immediate recognition that the 
relatively small size of Britain posed particular challenges for preservation. While the 
term ‘National Park’ had been borrowed from the United States and Canada, it was 
noted that Britain could not hope to set aside the kind of large reserves that were 
possible across the Atlantic. 10  In the opinion of the Conservative peer Lord 
Bledisloe, this served to underline the need for protection. Destruction was 
‘proceeding apace and as industry expanded into the country the process would be 
accelerated’.11 This view was echoed in a letter to the Committee from John Bailey 
and J.H. Hamer of the National Trust. Welcoming the Committee’s appointment, 
Bailey and Hamer suggested that ‘no Prime Minister would have dreamed of 
appointing such a Committee thirty years ago’, something that was ‘proof at once of 
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the extent of an evil and the urgency of the public demand for a remedy’. The 
countryside, the letter continued, was 
being every year more and more rapidly destroyed or disfigured beyond 
recognition. The process of urbanisation which has been going on for a 
century and a half has become much more rapid in the last 20 or 30 years. 
The motor car has enormously extended the possibilities of living in the 
country for those whose business lies in the town. … The nation itself, which 
through its chief spokesmen, is always deploring these irremediable losses, is 
itself by its public action, one of their chief causes.12 
The sense of urgency was reiterated in the Addison Committee’s final report. 
Recommending that a system of National Parks should be established in Britain, the 
report pointed to the ‘small, densely populated and highly developed’ character of 
the country, and noted that  
these considerations emphasise the need of adequate measures for preserving 
the countryside, and this need is accentuated by the rapid progress of 
urbanisation, the extension of transport facilities, changes in land ownership, 
and other modern developments.13  
The report concluded that the measures were ‘necessary if the present generation is 
to escape the charge that in a short sighted pursuit of its immediate ends it has 
squandered a noble heritage’.14 
At the same time as the Addison Committee was carrying out its investigation into 
National Parks, debate in Parliament revealed that there was cross-party concern 
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around the impact of development on the rural landscape. In 1930 the Conservative 
MP Sir Edward Hilton Young introduced a private Rural Amenities Bill with the aim 
of securing wider powers to safeguard the British countryside. In a lengthy 
Commons debate, members on both sides of the House emphasised the extent of 
the threat to the rural landscape. Hilton Young said that ‘the process of the 
destruction of the beauty and amenities of the countryside’ had ‘more rapidly 
approached a crisis’ since the end of the First World War, while Labour’s Philip 
Noel-Baker argued that ‘unless something drastic and immediate is done, future 
generations will be without the heritage we have had’.15 In the view of John Buchan, 
Unionist member for the Scottish Universities, the crisis Hilton Young identified 
could not have become more urgent: 
In our now highly industrialised country, where modern means of transport 
allow the people to access what a generation ago were the most retired 
corners in the land, in a society like this, some conscious expenditure of 
effort is required to preserve our rural beauty. I believe that our countrymen 
are at last awake to their heritage, and desire to preserve it; but they have 
awakened only just in time. Another generation or two of apathy, and rural 
England would have been no more.16 
In proposing action to safeguard the countryside, Hilton Young stressed that he ‘had 
no thought, no shadow of a thought, of the arrestation [sic.] of development’. Here 
we see a reflection in Parliament of the ‘planner-preservationist’ philosophy that 
Matless attributes to the CPRE. Hilton Young argued that advocates of preservation 
could ‘assist development by bringing to bear a reasonable measure of forethought, 
in order to make sure that the development shall take place with sympathy for all that 
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is best in the country’s life, and not one side of it only’.17 It was an approach neatly 
summed up by the Liberal MP Herbert Samuel, who borrowed from the language of 
inter-war industrial planning to state that what Hilton Young was proposing was ‘the 
rationalisation of development’. ‘What seems to me to be needed,’ Samuel explained, 
‘is to introduce the idea of the Plan, the conscious action of society to get rid of evils 
and to rationalise its own development’.18 
The notion of rationalising development proved popular with both Labour and 
Conservative politicians in the 1930s. While Hilton Young’s private member’s bill did 
not become law, it received sufficient support in principle from the Labour 
administration to prompt the introduction of a Town and Country Planning Bill in 
the spring of 1931. Following the collapse of the Labour government in August 
1931, a new Town and Country Planning Bill was introduced in early 1932. It was 
steered through parliament by Hilton Young, who was by then Minister of Health in 
the National government, and it became law in 1932. While the legislation was 
permissive rather than prescriptive, giving local authorities the power to voluntarily 
produce development plans for town and country, it nevertheless represented a 
forward step for planning, and a widening of the scope of state responsibility for the 
protection of the countryside. For the first time, the securing of rural ‘amenity’ and 
the preservation of ‘places of natural interest or beauty’ were established as principles 
of national planning policy.19 
However, while advances were made in town and country planning, National Park 
proposals were shelved amid economic depression, and advocates of the measures 
continued to lobby for them throughout the 1930s and into the Second World War. 
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During this time, the rationalisation of development remained at the heart of the 
debate. Leading a deputation from the CPRE’s Standing Committee on National 
Parks to the Ministry of Health in March 1937, E.N. Buxton explained that the 
Committee were not ‘fanatical idealists who will have their own scheme, and no 
other’, but rather ‘practical men’ who recognised the balance that had to be struck in 
the preservation of the countryside. ‘We accept the need of building new things on 
old foundations and a gradual process of development,’ Buxton said, ‘but there 
should be a national plan for all this.’20 While the campaigners did not wish to halt 
development, they did contend that preservation should receive increased 
consideration. In the foreword to a Standing Committee pamphlet published in 1938, 
the historian G.M. Trevelyan argued that the time had come for society to reassess its 
priorities:  
[Science] and machinery have now armed [man] with weapons that will be his 
own making or undoing, as he chooses to use them; at present he is 
destroying natural beauty apace in the ordinary course of business and 
economy. Therefore, unless he now will be at pains to make rules for the 
preservation of natural beauty, unless he consciously protects it at the partial 
expense of some of his other greedy activities, he will cut off his own 
spiritual supplies, and leave his descendants a helpless prey for ever to the 
base materialism of mean and vulgar sights.21 
Beyond Trevelyan’s impassioned foreword, the pamphlet revealed that the Standing 
Committee were realistic in their expectations. The pamphlet acknowledged the wide 
range of ‘legitimate claimants’ upon the land in Britain – including housing, roads, 
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electric power schemes, military training, mining, quarrying and forestry – and asked 
for preservation to be considered alongside those claims. In the view of the 
pamphlet’s authors, there was ‘an urgent need of a national policy for conserving the 
whole and allocating it on a comprehensive plan’, according to the ‘balanced interests 
of the nation’. 22  The emphasis on balance tells us much about the tactical 
considerations of the CPRE and its allies in campaigning for National Parks. While 
Matless is correct to identify the modern, ‘planner-preservationist’ approach of the 
campaigners, it is clear that there was a Romantic inflection to their conceptualisation 
of the English countryside in terms of heritage and the spiritual value of the 
landscape. For a figure such as Trevelyan, there was a deeper purpose to preservation 
beyond the straightforward protection of the land from development. However, if 
the Standing Committee were to make a successful political case, it would be 
necessary to present National Parks as a pragmatic and achievable policy. Heritage 
and moral good may have appealed to the campaigners, but if preservation were to 
be sold to government, it would have to fit alongside more pressing political 
priorities. 
The tactics of the campaigners are evident in their correspondence. Writing to 
Viscount Ullswater to reassure him that a National Park in the Lake District would 
not intrude upon his interests, the Standing Committee’s secretary, H.G. Griffin, 
stated that there was ‘no question of excluding or curtailing rural industries in 
National Park areas’. While noting that the Standing Committee would not wish to 
see ‘alien industries’ established in National Parks, Griffin also acknowledged that it 
would be ‘impossible, supposing for example oil were discovered in a National Park 
area, to prevent it from being worked, and I should not imagine that anyone would 
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attempt to do so’.23 Throughout their campaign, the Standing Committee worked to 
emphasise that their ideas were reasonable, and would not undermine the nation’s 
economic development. ‘The proposal for National Parks was not put forward by 
faddists or cranks,’ the Standing Committee’s chairman Norman Birkett told an 
audience in June 1938, ‘but was sponsored by reasonable people in all walks of life.’24 
This position was welcomed by the naturalist Brian Vesey-Fitzgerald, who praised 
the CPRE for recognising that, while ‘preservation is, of course, essential’, 
development ‘is not only inevitable, but desirable’.25 
While National Park areas would be protected on account of their natural beauty, 
proponents frequently stressed that such protection would not undermine the 
economic interests of those living within the Parks. As a CPRE policy document 
outlined in 1938, it was not the intention to freeze National Park areas in time: 
Preservation is not a passive but an active policy, which must continue to 
correct abuses and encourage a continuous and beneficial balance between 
natural forces, wild life, agriculture and human recreation. A National Park is 
not a sterilised museum specimen, but a living organism which must be given 
continual health to survive in a conflicting and ever changing environment.26 
By creating National Parks, the CPRE argued that the government could fulfil a 
number of objectives. The rural environment was not viewed as a relic that could be 
sealed off from development, but rather as a space that was continually shaped by 
both ‘natural’ and social forces. The conservation of the landscape and wild life was 
one purpose of National Parks, but that could occur alongside the fulfilment of more 
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functional, social ends. As Birkett explained in December 1944, Britain’s relatively 
small size meant that the policy needed to be approached differently than in the 
United States or Canada, where the intention had been to preserve vast areas and 
keep them largely free from development. ‘There is no suggestion,’ Birkett wrote, 
‘that any National Park should become a museum piece of natural beauty. National 
Parks must be a part of “farming England” and must be farmed better.’ It was 
important to recognise that human activity had played its part in shaping what was 
considered to be ‘natural’ beauty. ‘For the colours and texture of it, the sudden 
contrasts of the civilised and the wild, are made by man, who mixes his labour with 
the earth and creates the intricate pattern of its beauty.’27 
The importance of human activity was emphasised by the architect John Dower, a 
long-time campaigner for National Parks who was asked to carry out an investigation 
into the practicalities of the policy while employed as a civil servant at the Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning in 1943. In his report, published in 1945, Dower 
pointed out that the creation of National Parks could not only involve negative and 
restrictive measures for the protection of the landscape.28 While heavy industry 
should be excluded from the areas, unless the national interest was at stake and no 
alternative could be found, rural industries, particularly agriculture, should not be 
restricted: 
Almost everywhere, save on the rock summits, faces and screes of mountains 
and on the peat-hag tops of high moorlands, the landscape to be preserved is 
the joint product of nature and of human use over many generations; it 
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cannot be preserved in anything like its present aspect unless that human use 
is kept fully going.29 
Dower’s proposals provided the basis for the deliberations of the second National 
Parks Committee under Hobhouse, and in its final report the Committee emphasised 
the need to strike a balance between development and preservation. It stressed that 
England and Wales could not hope to emulate the great National Parks of America 
or Africa. ‘Instead,’ the report pointed out, ‘we are dealing with a closely populated 
and highly developed country, where almost every acre of land is used in some 
degree for the economic needs of man.’30 In the view of the Committee, this only 
served to underline the urgency of taking action. The time had come ‘to ensure that 
some at least of the extensive areas of beautiful and wild country in England and 
Wales are protected as part of the national heritage’, and that such considerations 
‘carry due weight in the inevitable competition with more utilitarian, and sometimes 
more powerful, claims to the use and development of land’. In line with the Dower 
report, the Hobhouse Committee argued that ‘National Parks must not be sterilised 
as museum specimens’. Instead, ‘farming and essential rural industries must flourish, 
unhampered by unnecessary controls or restrictions’.31 The aim, the report later 
stated, should be to achieve a new balance between economic development and the 
preservation of the countryside: 
[In] countries so closely developed as England and Wales man is himself the 
most powerful agent in disturbing the natural balance and in changing the 
face of nature for his own ends. These ends have in the past been largely 
utilitarian, and the means used to achieve them not always wise or far sighted. 
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It must be an essential purpose of National Park policy to harmonise man’s 
material needs with the protection of natural beauty.32 
However, the rationalisation of development was not the only justification offered 
for National Parks. Alongside that argument, the other primary justification lay in the 
potential benefits to the public of outdoor recreation, particularly for urban residents 
forced to endure the conditions of crowded towns and cities. In many respects, the 
public health and leisure argument complemented the case for rationalising 
development, but, as we shall see, the two did not always fit comfortably together. 
Modern life had given rise to a case for protecting the countryside, but it had also 
equipped large numbers of people with the means to visit rural areas, and National 
Parks policy necessarily required compromise between the two aims. 
Public health and recreation 
While the nineteenth-century concern around urban squalor and sanitation eased in 
the twentieth century, there remained a widespread view that life in towns and cities 
had a negative impact upon the moral and physical health of the population, and as 
interest grew in the preservation of the countryside in the inter-war period, fuelled by 
the further expansion of urban centres, the implications for public health came to 
play a significant role in the ensuing campaigns and debates.33 An early advocate of 
National Parks was the Conservative peer Lord Bledisloe, who captured the interest 
of Stanley Baldwin in 1928 with his argument that the creation of Parks would be to 
the ‘benefit of the tired brain workers of the country’.34 While this suggested a 
concern for lower-middle-class office clerks rather than manual workers, Bledisloe 
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felt confident in selling his proposal to Labour when the party took office in 1929, 
telling the First Commissioner of Works George Lansbury that he could not 
‘conceive of any proposal being put forward by the Labour government which would 
prove more popular and more conducive to the health of the nation’.35  
It was Bledisloe’s lobbying that prompted Ramsay MacDonald to set up the first 
National Park Committee, and the choice of Addison, a medical doctor who had 
served as the first Minister of Health from 1919 to 1921, as chair was an indication 
that public health would be at the forefront of the Committee’s deliberations. 
Outdoor and recreational organisations were invited to submit evidence, and 
numerous witnesses testified to the potential value of National Parks to public 
health. Evidence was received from the Ramblers’ Federation of Great Britain, the 
Camping Clubs of Great Britain and Ireland, the Fell and Rock Climbing Club, and 
the Cyclists’ Touring Club, all of which emphasised the recreational value of National 
Parks.36 This was a view supported by G.W. Cowan, President of the National Union 
of Teachers, who welcomed the idea on account of the opportunities it would 
present for the urban poor. ‘The average working man – and woman,’ he explained, 
‘is extremely fond of outdoor life and of nature; but unfortunately industrial 
conditions are against this and life is spent cooped up in narrow, ill-kept and often 
unsanitary streets.’37 The Conservative MP Leo Amery argued that it would only be 
possible to justify the expenditure of state funds on National Parks ‘on the grounds 
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of national health, physical and moral’, and for that reason the policy would need to 
focus upon the recreational benefits of rural conservation.38 
To a certain extent, public health and the rationalisation of development were 
complementary motivations for the preservation of the countryside. Industrialisation 
and urbanisation had brought about both the loss of natural beauty and the crowded 
and unhealthy conditions of towns and cities, and measures such as National Parks 
promised both protection of the landscape and the provision of space in which 
members of the public could enjoy outdoor recreation. However, as quickly became 
apparent during the deliberations of the first National Park Committee, the two aims 
were not necessarily easily reconciled. As the British Correlating Committee for the 
Protection of Nature noted in their evidence to the Addison Committee, if National 
Parks were to offer recreational opportunities for large numbers of visitors, it would 
follow that their ‘utility for the preservation of fauna and flora is limited’.39 For some, 
the problem was not simply the numbers that would visit, but also the types of 
people. Ioan Gwilym Gibbon, the Ministry of Health’s representative on the 
Committee, suggested that the provision of recreational facilities in National Parks 
‘would attract undesirables’. 40  The same issue was noted by The Times, which 
questioned how much would be gained in terms of preservation if Parks were 
‘thrown open to the public, traversed by charabancs, and overrun by holiday 
makers’.41 
In the view of Lord Bledisloe, the influx of the public into National Park areas did 
present problems, but he believed they could be overcome. Currently the public were 
‘uneducated in what makes for the beauty and serenity of life’, but they were not 
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‘uneducable’, and the best form of education would come from having greater 
contact with nature. It was vital they were given access to rural recreation, because 
the ‘nerve-strain’ suffered in crowded towns was ‘not always remedied by spending a 
short annual holiday in the hectic atmosphere of one of our more popular or 
fashionable holiday resorts’.42 In his 1929 letter to Lansbury, Bledisloe had pointed 
out that ‘Margate and Blackpool are the worst remedies for overwork’.43 Bledisloe’s 
view was shared by the geographer and preservationist Vaughan Cornish, who 
suggested that large numbers of visitors would not damage the National Park areas, 
as long as there was sufficient ‘recreational education of the young’.44 
In their concerns over the impact that public access could have on rural beauty, some 
advocates of National Parks betrayed a sense of cultural superiority that at times sat 
uneasily alongside the claim that their proposals could have great benefits for the 
nation as a whole. While public health through outdoor leisure was presented as an 
argument for creating National Parks, not all members of the public were considered 
welcome to spend their leisure time in the proposed Parks, particularly if they were 
going to bring with them forms of behaviour perceived as more suited to Blackpool 
or Margate. Matless notes that preservationist campaigners of the inter-war period, in 
particular members of the CPRE, promoted an ‘art of right living’ based around 
concepts of citizenship and ‘anti-citizenship’. Forms of ‘acceptable’ rural recreation, 
such as walking and cycling, were promoted and portrayed as ‘generating intellectual, 
moral, physical and spiritual health’, while other forms of behaviour, involving, for 
example, litter or noise (i.e. behaviour learned through ‘uncultured’ urban life), were 
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seen as necessitating re-education or perhaps even exclusion.45 Matless notes that 
even John Dower, a committed democrat and advocate of outdoor recreation, 
expressed a wish to exclude the ‘anti-citizen’ from National Parks, telling a wartime 
meeting of the Town Planning Institute that ‘those who want to spend their holidays 
gregariously … had far better keep away’, and that such people would be discouraged 
from visiting by being denied ‘the kinds of facilities they desire’.46 
However, despite this suspicion of mass visitors, the arguments focused upon public 
health and recreation moved to the forefront of the case for National Parks during 
the 1930s. Writing in Country Life in May 1936, Clough Williams-Ellis noted that, 
while he had ‘an instinctive, illogical and quite indefensible feeling that seemly 
architecture and a gracious landscape are sufficient ends in themselves’, he had come 
to realise that it was necessary to take a more ‘utilitarian’ view, accepting ‘that what 
really matters is that the appreciation and enjoyment of beauty shall be as widely 
diffused and shared as possible’. Williams-Ellis conceded that this approach had its 
problems, but argued that they would have to be overcome in order to justify the 
creation of National Parks: 
With the overwhelming mass of our teeming population town-bred, 
barbarously reared in far other than splendid cities, having had little contact 
with beauty of any kind and therefore knowing or caring little for it, the 
introduction is a hazardous one, for people do not always respond 
appropriately when presented to the hitherto unknown. Yet it is a risk that 
must be taken. We must perforce put up with the inevitable 
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misunderstandings and gaucheries that will mark the first contacts of the 
uninitiated with their hitherto unrealised heritage.47 
By the late 1930s, the health and leisure argument had come to dominate the 
campaign of the Standing Committee on National Parks. After a meeting with 
Robert Hudson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health, in March 1937, it 
was noted that Hudson had been ‘clearly favourably disposed’ to the public health 
argument, and it was suggested that ‘without altering the scale of our proposals in 
any way, we should take care to emphasise this connection’.48 This marked an 
important tactical shift for the CPRE and its allies. As Williams-Ellis acknowledged, 
while Romantic notions of natural beauty and national heritage were reason enough 
for dedicated campaigners to support the creation of National Parks, at the political 
level there was a need to justify the proposal in terms of its implications for public 
welfare. After meeting Hudson, the Standing Committee realised that government 
was more likely to listen when National Parks were presented as potentially beneficial 
to public health. While protection of the landscape continued to play a role, 
particular emphasis was placed on the recreational value of National Parks, and the 
Standing Committee invited Lord Horder, a medical doctor and chair of the National 
Fitness Council, to speak in support of the policy.49 
As the campaign moved into wartime, and further investigations were launched into 
the possibility of creating National Parks, public health remained at the centre of 
discussions. Writing to Lord Portal, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
Works and Planning, in May 1942, William Jowitt, the Minister without Portfolio 
with responsibility for reconstruction, argued that campaigners from the Standing 
																																																								
47 Country Life, 16 May 1936 
48 MERL SR CPRE C/1/102/10, Suggestions for Action Following the Deputation to Mr Hudson, 
15 March 1937 
49 MERL SR CPRE C/1/102/13 Standing Committee on National Parks (1938), Press Meeting at the 
Niblett Hall, Inner Temple, 30 June 1938 
	
 75 
Committee had made a good case, both for the preservation of the landscape and 
wildlife, and for ‘the far more important cause of providing the means for public 
outdoor recreation’.50 In his 1945 report, Dower emphasised the potential benefits of 
National Parks to the health of the nation. The ‘holiday and recreational use’ of the 
Parks, wrote Dower,  
should be for people – and especially young people – of every class and from 
every part of the country, indeed of the world. National Parks are not for any 
privileged or otherwise restricted section of the population, but for all who 
care to refresh their minds and spirits and to exercise their bodies in a 
peaceful setting of natural beauty. Few national purposes are more vital or 
more rich in the promise of health and happiness than the provision, first, of 
general and generous opportunity for holidays (by the “holidays with pay” 
system and otherwise) and, second, of large, open and beautiful tracts of 
country in which holidays can be freely and inexpensively enjoyed.51 
When the Hobhouse Committee was appointed later in 1945, it was clear from the 
outset that health and recreation was at the top of the agenda. In their early meetings, 
the Committee agreed that it would be necessary to select the National Park areas 
based on their proximity to large areas of population, in order to provide easy access 
for urban residents. 52  The Committee took evidence from a wide range of 
recreational and outdoor organisations, including the Youth Hostels Association 
(YHA), the Caravan Club, the Holiday Fellowship, the Ramblers Association, and 
the National Voluntary Youth Organisations. In its submitted evidence to the 
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Committee, the National Association of Boys’ Clubs suggested that National Parks 
could benefit the ‘future welfare’ of the nation by helping to raise the fitness of the 
youth. There was a need to ‘counteract the effects of town life’, and the provision of 
National Parks offered a means of achieving this.53 
That view was reflected in the final report of the Committee, which, while noting the 
necessity of nature conservation, placed special emphasis on the importance of 
National Parks for Britain’s urban population: 
Four-fifths of the population dwell in urban areas, many of them in the 
smoke-laden atmosphere and amid the ceaseless traffic and bustle of our 
industrial towns and larger cities. They need the refreshment which is 
obtainable from the beauty and quietness of unspoilt country.54 
Thus, while the ‘rationalisation of development’ and the preservation of the 
countryside and nature remained central to the National Park proposals, it was clear 
by the late 1940s that public health and leisure were key concerns. As the two aims 
were not always complementary, the resulting legislation necessarily required 
compromise. Development in National Park areas would need to be controlled, but 
the recreational needs of the public would also have to be catered for. Given that 
much emphasis was placed by campaigners on public need, it is necessary to examine 
the social context in which National Parks and town and country planning policy was 
developed, and to ask whether the lobbying and political discussion of the 1930s and 
1940s was reflective of a public appetite for such measures.  
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It is difficult to determine where the public stood on the question of National Parks. 
While elite discussions are well documented, evidence of wider public opinion on the 
subject is much harder to come by. Opinion polling had begun to take place in 
Britain in the inter-war period, notably through the work of the British Institute of 
Public Opinion, but, perhaps unsurprisingly, National Parks, and even the wider 
issue of town and country planning, were not major topics for early polls.55 Similarly, 
Mass Observation provides a rich source for inter-war and wartime public opinion, 
but does not address this subject directly. 
Looking at the CPRE and governmental documents, it can be seen that National 
Parks campaigners believed that they had the backing of a considerable body of public 
opinion. In evidence to the Addison Committee in 1929, the National Trust argued 
that widespread apathy as to the fate of the countryside had ‘largely passed away’, 
and that the appointment of the National Park Committee was proof that the 
protection of scenery and the provision of open spaces had ‘now become a public 
problem’.56 Similarly, in the 1930s, the CPRE and the Standing Committee on 
National Parks appeared convinced that public opinion was on their side, and 
expressed bemusement that the government was not paying more attention. 
Following the deputation to the Ministry of Health in March 1937, the Standing 
Committee noted that the Ministry ‘seemed ignorant of the very wide public support 
for National Parks’, and suggested that public interest needed to be better 
communicated to government through ‘vigorous, clear and reasonably specific 
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propaganda’.57 By the 1940s, the view that public opinion was in favour of National 
Parks appears to have been taken up within Whitehall. In a memorandum to the War 
Cabinet in late April 1945, the Minister of Town and Country Planning, William 
Morrison, emphasised the ‘large and growing popular demand’ for National Parks, 
and recommended that the government should move forward with the proposals.58 
There is a lack of direct evidence to support such claims of public support, but it is 
clear that the campaign for National Parks reflected a well-documented trend of the 
inter-war period. Although it was set up by the CPRE and its sister body, the Council 
for the Preservation of Rural Wales, the Standing Committee on National Parks was 
an umbrella group comprised of a range of organisations, many of which represented 
the growing public interest in outdoor recreation. Alongside conservation groups 
such as the National Trust and the Commons, Footpaths and Open Spaces 
Preservation Society, members of the Standing Committee included the Camping 
Club (which had 10,000 members in 1939), the Ramblers’ Association, the Youth 
Hostels Association (YHA, 83,500 members in 1939) and the Cyclists’ Touring Club 
(36,500 members in 1939), as well as motorists’ societies such as the Automobile 
Association (AA) and the Royal Automobile Club (RAC).59 While we do not know 
what proportion of the public wished to see the introduction of National Parks, we 
do know that there were significant numbers interested in the recreational activities 
that would be available within National Park areas, and that the numbers able to 
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enjoy holidays in the countryside was increasing as a result of holidays with pay.60 It 
is therefore significant that outdoor organisations lobbied heavily for National Parks 
in the 1930s and 1940s – when organisations such as the Ramblers’ Association, the 
YHA and the Camping Club made their arguments for National Parks to the 
Hobhouse Committee after the war, they did so in the belief that they were speaking 
on behalf of the growing numbers that participated in outdoor recreation, and in 
doing so strengthened the conviction among policymakers that public health and 
recreation should be a central purpose of National Parks. While the National Parks 
may not have come about as a result of direct public demand, they were introduced 
in response to a perceived public demand, arising from the expansion of outdoor 
recreation in the inter-war years. 
However, it is important not to assume that there was an inevitable progression from 
public interest in outdoor recreation to the protection of rural beauty through the 
introduction of National Parks. As Peter Mandler argues, the preservationists were 
far from representative of the cultural mainstream in the inter-war years, and had to 
work in the face of a ‘resonant language’ of progress. While the period did see rising 
interest in the preservation of nature, Mandler points out that it also saw widespread 
enthusiasm for countless ‘modern wonders’, from motor cars and airplanes to radio 
and cinema screens. It was also the period in which the familiar retail culture of the 
twentieth century began to take shape, with chains and department stores 
increasingly lining the high streets of towns and cities.61 
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It is in this context that the campaign for National Parks should be seen. The desires 
of the public were diverse, and often contradictory. There was a wish for access to 
the outdoors, but that went together with a desire for the suburban housing that 
preservationists saw as the leading threat to the landscape, the retail and 
entertainment opportunities of the town, and an electricity supply that would 
necessitate the erection of pylons through the countryside. 62  Mandler correctly 
cautions against viewing the history of preservation as a binary contest between a 
‘good’ side, in the form of preservationist campaigners, and a ‘bad’ side, in the form 
of agents of economic development.63 It is more helpful to look for the interplay 
between development and preservation, and to recognise that many members of the 
public were unlikely to have held strong feelings in either direction.  
Often, development and preservation worked hand in hand. The expansion of leisure 
was driven by economic development, and this in turn strengthened the demand for 
the protection of areas of interest to holidaymakers. There is no better illustration of 
this than the involvement of the AA and the RAC in the campaign for National 
Parks. Giving joint evidence to the Hobhouse Committee in 1946, the two 
associations argued that ‘we in Britain should keep unspoiled our national heritage of 
the beautiful country scene, for the enjoyment of all road users who may seek it’.64 
The Chairman of the RAC, J. Sealy Clarke, emphasised that the freedom of ‘wheeled 
transport to enjoy the beauties of these Parks is one of first importance’.65 With over 
two million cars on the road, their owners desired spaces in which to drive them, and 
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one of the symbols of economic and technological progress was offered as 
justification for the preservation of the rural landscape. 
The campaign for National Parks revealed a multitude of conceptions of the 
meaning of the rural environment. For some of those associated with the CPRE, the 
English landscape was understood in Romantic, pastoral terms, and was considered 
worthy of preservation on account of its status as an integral component of the 
nation’s heritage. Tied to this conception was a view that there was moral and 
‘spiritual’ value in spending time in the countryside, and campaigners varied as to 
whether they saw all sections of society as capable of appreciating the landscape on 
that level. Yet alongside the Romantic view, the rural environment was also 
presented as having practical value as a leisure space, particularly for town and city 
dwellers in need of rest and recreation. For the wealthy, this was a case of leisure for 
its own sake, exemplified by the support of the AA and RAC for National Parks, but 
for poorer sections of the population it was also argued that Parks would have 
practical health benefits, providing a means for off-setting the risks of living in 
crowded urban conditions. There were also those that viewed rural preservation not 
in terms of its potential social advantages, but rather in terms of the opportunities 
offered for nature conservation. Alongside landscape protection and recreational 
organisations, the Standing Committee included representatives of organisations 
such as the Zoological Society and the Wild Plant Conservation Board, for whom 
National Parks were conceptualised as spaces suitable for the scientific conservation 
of flora and fauna.66 Finally, the rural environment was also viewed as a vital 
economic resource. Agriculture was a key interest, for which National Parks 
																																																								




campaigners were keen to express their support, but rural land also continued to 
offer opportunities for urban and industrial development. 
When the Labour government introduced National Parks legislation in 1949, it was 
necessary to strike a compromise within this complex web of interests. The nature of 
this compromise is key to understanding the development of environmental policy in 
the post-war period, and the fact that it was achieved under the Attlee government 
raises broader questions about the character of post-war British politics. 
Political context 
Given that National Parks finally became a reality in the late 1940s, it is necessary to 
interrogate the impact of the Second World War and the role of National Parks in 
the social democratic project of the post-war Labour government. It is clear that the 
circumstances of war proved favourable to the cause of National Parks. Within 
government the shift to a war footing led to an increase in activity throughout 
Whitehall, a process the nature conservationist and wartime civil servant Max 
Nicholson later referred to as the ‘wartime suspension of the normal British 
mechanisms for securing inaction’.67 As is well established, this not only occurred 
within areas of government crucial to the war effort, but also within departments 
focused on the nation’s post-war prospects. As the Minister of Works from October 
1940, Lord Reith assumed responsibility for preparing for post-war reconstruction, 
and his department proved sympathetic to proposals for National Parks.68 Reith 
established two committees that would prove highly influential in the development 
of town and country planning in the 1940s. A Committee on Compensation and 
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Betterment, chaired by Mr Justice Uthwatt, was tasked with investigating the 
financial implications of tighter planning regulations, while a Committee on Land 
Utilisation in Rural Areas under Lord Justice Scott considered the future of the 
countryside. 69  When the Scott Committee reported in 1942, it stated that ‘the 
establishment of National Parks in Britain is long overdue’, and advised that ‘the 
delimitation of the Parks should be undertaken nationally’, with ‘the setting up of a 
body to control National Parks under the Central Planning Authority’.70 
In the closing years of the war the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, led by 
the Conservative minister William Morrison, made it clear that it intended to push 
forward with plans for National Parks.71 In June 1945 the National Parks Committee 
was established under Hobhouse, and asked to work on the assumption that 
National Parks would be established in England and Wales.72 Giving the Rede 
Lecture at Cambridge University in 1945, Norman Birkett felt able to express great 
optimism for the future of National Parks. The end of the war, Birkett said, was 
‘charged with the highest promise for National Parks’. After six years of war there 
had been ‘a great stirring in men’s minds, a vast quickening in man’s social 
conscience’, and it was ‘felt that some compensation might be found for so large a 
calamity, that something nobler should emerge for those who had endured so 
much’.73 
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Such a notion was, of course, at the heart of the Labour Party’s manifesto in 1945, 
and the landslide election of the Attlee government ensured that the advances made 
by town and country planning would continue in the post-war years. While Labour’s 
manifesto, ‘Let Us Face the Future’, did not explicitly mention National Parks, it did 
contain a commitment that ‘the State and the local authorities must have wider and 
speedier powers to acquire land for public purposes wherever the public interest so 
requires’, alongside the assertion that ‘national and local authorities should cooperate 
to enable people to enjoy their leisure to the full, to have opportunities for healthy 
recreation’.74 On becoming Minister of Town and Country Planning in August 1945, 
Lewis Silkin wrote to Hobhouse to ask whether the National Parks Committee’s 
report could be ready as soon as possible, and, while the process did encounter 
delays, the legislation was introduced within the Attlee government’s first term, 
becoming law at the end of 1949.75 
Given the developments of wartime and the post-war years, National Parks and the 
broader objective of town and country planning could be see as evidence for the 
emergence of a consensus within British politics during the 1940s. Having stalled in 
the 1930s, planning moved to the heart of government during the war, with the 
commissioning of a number of reports into reconstruction and the creation of a new 
Ministry of Town and Country Planning in 1943. At the same time, both Labour and 
Conservative members of the coalition government showed enthusiasm for the 
establishment of National Parks, and were working towards the fulfilment of the 
policy by 1945. This enthusiasm continued under the post-war Labour government, 
which extended the planning powers of central and local government, and the 
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Ministry of Town and Country Planning under Lewis Silkin actively pursued the 
creation of National Parks, passing the necessary legislation in 1949. 
However, while acknowledging the emergence of cross-party agreement in the inter-
war period, and the role of the war in accelerating the passage of preservationist 
measures, the depth of consensus should not be exaggerated. The issue acquired a 
different emphasis when approached from left or right, and there were significant 
disagreements between the Labour and Conservative parties over how much 
government intervention was required. As noted, both parties had advocated the 
extension of planning to the countryside while in office in the early 1930s, but when 
the post-war Labour government introduced a comprehensive Town and Country 
Planning Bill in 1947, there was widespread opposition on the Conservative benches. 
Under the proposed legislation, planning permission would be required for all 
development, and landowners would no longer be automatically entitled to 
compensation for any refusal of permission to develop their land, as had been the 
case under the 1932 Town and Country Planning Act. Additionally, any increase in 
land value owing to development would be subject to a development charge 
(betterment), a provision Gordon E. Cherry describes as ‘the nationalisation of 
appreciating land values’.76 While Silkin hailed the bill as the beginning of ‘a new era 
in the life of this country, an era in which beauty and culture will play a greater part 
in the social and economic life than they have ever done before’, a tumultuous 
Commons debate revealed that there was no comfortable consensus between the 
parties.77  
Speaking for the opposition, William Morrison acknowledged that ‘a further measure 
of Town and Country Planning is desirable’, but objected to Silkin’s bill, arguing that 
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it would make the individual liable to the ‘unpredictable vicissitudes’ of government. 
The language of the emerging Cold War was evident in Conservative criticism of the 
bill – in Morrison’s view, while totalitarian states may expect individuals to surrender 
questions of planning ‘to the wisdom and provision of the Government’, in Britain 
planning had succeeded when ‘the State has confined itself to general direction’.78 
David Gammans, Conservative MP for Hornsey, pushed this criticism of the bill 
further. It was, he told the House, ‘a good Bill with a worthy purpose, which will be 
ruined by political prejudice, spite and arrogance’. While representatives of all parties 
wanted ‘wide roads, green belts and open spaces’, the compensation and betterment 
clauses of the bill were not intended to achieve those ends, but rather ‘to destroy the 
middle class in this country’, because ‘the whole object of Government policy is to 
turn Great Britain into a land of propertyless proletariat, depending upon the 
Government for its housing, its shelter, and its very right to live’.79 
As Cherry notes, while the bill was passed in 1947, the compensation and betterment 
clauses did not survive the return of the Conservatives to power – they were first 
amended, and then subsequently abolished by the 1954 Town and Country Planning 
Act.80 On National Parks, disagreement was less pronounced, but the parliamentary 
debates on the policy revealed significant differences in emphasis. The public health 
aspect of National Parks offers a useful example of the divergent ideological 
approaches of the two parties. When campaigners realised that the health argument 
had traction in the late 1930s, they pursued it by tying National Parks to the 
Conservative-led government’s National Fitness Campaign, which emphasised 
personal responsibility for health and fitness through diet and recreation, rather than 
the need for a comprehensive welfare state (in this respect, the campaign for 
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National Parks mirrored inter-war appeals for greater access to playing fields and 
green spaces within towns and cities).81 By contrast, under Labour the issue became 
tied to the party’s wider social democratic project. Introducing the bill in March 
1949, Lewis Silkin explained that the government was creating National Parks with 
the ‘direct and specific purpose’ of ‘seeking to promote happiness for ordinary men 
and women, and added that such provisions were ‘just as much a part of positive 
heath and wellbeing as the building of hospitals or insurance against sickness’.82 
There was clear cross-party support for National Parks, but Labour and Conservative 
MPs commended different aspects of the policy. Following Silkin’s introduction of 
the 1949 bill, Barbara Castle, the Labour MP for Blackburn, echoing the radical 
campaigns for access pursued by ramblers in the 1930s, emphasised the democratic 
significance of the legislation, noting that it marked ‘the end of the disinheritance of 
the people of this country from enjoyment of the countryside’.83 Similarly, Barbara 
Ayrton-Gould, Labour MP for Hendon North, praised the bill, stating that it would 
‘give the people of Britain their heritage of access … to the most beautiful 
countryside in the world’, while her colleague Billy Hughes, Labour MP for 
Wolverhampton West, described it as ‘a very important step forward in the long 
struggle of the common people of this country to establish their right to the freedom 
of their own land’.84 In their invocation of national heritage, such arguments bore 
similarities to those of CPRE campaigners in the inter-war years, but in the hands of 
Labour MPs heritage was stripped of its elitist connotations, and rural preservation 
was presented as being in the interests of all classes. Access to the countryside was 
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portrayed as a democratic right, and as such National Parks were viewed as 
compatible with the political programme of the Attlee government. 
Where Labour MPs emphasised the social democratic value of National Parks and 
pointed to the importance of public access, Conservative members pointed out that 
countryside interests needed to be protected. Osbert Peake, Conservative MP for 
Leeds North, praised the bill and the ‘non-party atmosphere’ in which it was debated, 
but noted that there could not be unrestricted access to the proposed National Park 
areas ‘without very serious effects on agriculture’. He also suggested that the ‘many 
people who do not appreciate these areas, who are gregarious and who much prefer 
the noise of the holiday camp’, should not be encouraged to visit, at least if the 
proposed Parks were to ‘be handed on unimpaired to succeeding generations’.85 
William Fletcher-Vane, Conservative MP for Westmorland, told the House that it 
was unfair to suggest that it was ‘only the Tories and wicked landowners who 
grumble about the damage done by urban people who walk about the countryside’, 
and noted that agricultural interests needed to be given priority over the interests of 
those seeking leisure in open space.86 That view was supported by Tufton Beamish, 
Conservative MP for Lewes, who, while noting that the objects of the legislation 
were ‘entirely worthy’, stated that he was not going to make ‘exaggerated claims’ 
about ‘setting the people free’, as ‘one has to strike a balance between agricultural 
interests, without which we cannot live, and allowing people to roam all over the 
place’.87 
The approaches of Labour and Conservative MPs in the parliamentary debates 
highlight the diverse interests that had to be considered in devising National Parks 
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legislation. The National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of 1949 was 
designed to balance that range of interests, but, in doing so, arguably failed to please 
any of them. Preservationist campaigners were certainly not satisfied by the act. The 
Hobhouse Committee had recommended that a National Parks Commission should 
be established with executive powers, but the legislation only created a commission 
with an advisory role. In January 1948, Norman Birkett wrote to Silkin to express 
disappointment that the Ministry of Town and Country Planning had declined to set 
up an executive commission.88 While government did not wish to undermine the 
planning powers of local authorities, which had been extended by the 1947 Town 
and Country Planning Act, the National Parks campaigners argued that an advisory 
commission would lack the powers to secure the necessary protection of National 
Park areas, particularly from development by ‘Government Departments and 
Statutory Undertakers’.89 
In limiting the powers of the National Parks Commission, Silkin pointed out that ‘life 
went on inside our National Parks no less than outside and that must be borne in 
mind when recommendations were made on what development might or might not 
be allowed’.90 As seen in the parliamentary debates on the National Parks Bill, 
Conservatives emphasised the need to protect agriculture within the proposed Parks, 
echoing an argument that had long been made with reference to the policy. As both 
the wartime coalition and the Labour government set about exploring and 
implementing National Parks legislation in the 1940s, they faced opposition from the 
Department of Agriculture, which expressed concern that farming interests would be 
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undermined. In 1945, the Ministry of Agriculture tried to block the publication of 
John Dower’s report on National Parks on the grounds that it would ‘cause much 
uneasiness among farmers’. When the Hobhouse Committee was appointed, the 
Ministry insisted that it should include a representative of agricultural interests 
among its members, and the agriculturalist Sir William Gavin joined the Committee.91 
When the Committee heard evidence from the National Farmers’ Union it was told 
that, while farmers were not opposed to National Parks, ‘the interests of all 
connected with the land and the farming operations themselves within the National 
Park areas must be protected against interference or interruption’.92 
A further clash of interests was between nature conservation and public access. From 
the very beginning of discussions around National Parks in Britain, it had been noted 
that the two aims could not be easily reconciled, and this was acknowledged with the 
creation of a sub-committee of the Hobhouse Committee, the Wild Life 
Conservation Special Committee, chaired by the biologist Julian Huxley. Giving 
evidence to that Committee, the British Ecological Society argued that the 
management of nature reserves represented a different concern from the 
management of National Parks, and argued that a separate body should be 
established, ‘fully competent to take the necessary measures through its scientifically 
trained staff’.93 This recommendation was reflected in the final report of the Special 
Committee, which stated that the government should establish a Biological Service, 
separate from any National Parks Commission, with ‘responsibility for the protection 
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and management of certain sites of special biological, geological, physiographical and 
other scientific value as National Nature Reserves’.94 
Thus, if the National Parks Act was the outcome of consensus, it was also the result 
of compromise. The new National Parks Commission was given the role of 
designating National Parks (the first would be established in 1951) and Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty in England and Wales, but would have no permanent 
staff or executive powers for controlling development within the protected areas. 
Meanwhile, a Nature Conservancy was established under the Lord President of the 
Council, with responsibility for protecting ‘the flora and fauna of Great Britain’, and, 
unlike the National Parks Commission, the Conservancy was given executive powers 
for managing National Nature Reserves. Responding to the growth of outdoor 
recreation and the Labour government’s commitment to improving the health of the 
population, the principle of public access was placed at the heart of the legislation, 
but the reality fell far short of the unlimited access that outdoor campaigners had 
long appealed for. Amid concerns among landowners and farmers, the act only 
provided access rights by agreement or order, whereas the Hobhouse Report had 
recommended the automatic granting of access to all open land.95 Local authorities 
were given the responsibility of managing National Park areas under the 1947 Town 
and Country Planning Act, and while this gave them the power to restrict private 
building, it did not allow for the control of agriculture and forestry, or the prevention 
of government-sponsored industrial developments. Clearly, while the cause of rural 
preservation had come a long way since National Parks were first proposed in the 
1920s, the measures passed in the 1940s did not represent an outright victory for 
campaigners.  
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Following the passage of the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside 
Act, the first three National Parks were designated in the Lake District, Snowdonia 
and the Peak District. While legislation was not passed for Scotland, a further seven 
National Parks were created in England and Wales by 1957, covering Dartmoor, the 
Pembrokeshire coast, the North York Moors, the Yorkshire Dales, Exmoor, 
Northumberland and the Brecon Beacons. Although the powers of the new advisory 
National Parks Commission did not live up to the expectations of National Parks 
campaigners, the 1949 Act was, nevertheless, a key moment in the history of 
environmental politics in Britain. Together with the 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act, the legislation established the principle that the preservation of the 
rural landscape, both for the purpose of nature conservation and for public 
recreation, should be the responsibility of the state.  
The debates of the 1930s and 1940s saw the emergence of two themes that would 
prove to be central to the development of environmental policy during the post-war 
period. Despite improvements to housing and sanitation since the nineteenth 
century, concern continued over the risk posed by towns and cities to the wellbeing 
of their inhabitants, and the argument that National Parks would have a positive 
impact on public health increased the attractiveness of the policy for both Labour 
and Conservative governments. While some of the campaigners connected to the 
CPRE conceptualised the rural landscape in terms of natural heritage and ‘spiritual’ 
value, such ideas were not sufficient for convincing ministers that the preservation of 
the countryside was worth the expenditure of public funds, and over the course of 
the inter-war years campaigners shifted their tactics to emphasise the value of the 
countryside as a space for healthy recreation. The human-centred character of the 
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policy was underlined by the frequent use of the term ‘amenity’, which implied that 
the protection and enhancement of the environment was to be carried out in the 
interests of the community. 
Parallel to public health, the case for conservation rested on the argument that the 
growth of heavy industry and the expansion of urban centres was destroying the 
British landscape. That argument had originated in the nineteenth century, as the 
profound impact of the Industrial Revolution became increasingly apparent, but it 
gathered pace in the twentieth century, particularly in the inter-war period, when the 
continued expansion of towns and cities, the growth of suburbs, and the emergence 
of motorised transport appeared to heighten the threat to the rural landscape. 
Advocates of town and country planning and National Parks argued that the 
situation had become critical, and that it needed to be brought under control before 
the countryside was lost to future generations.  
The arguments for National Parks were not, on the whole, framed in opposition to 
the dominant values of the period. As this thesis argues, the emergence of the 
environment as a theme of public policy during the inter-war and post-war years was 
not driven by an ‘anti-industrial’ reaction against economic and technological 
development. The appeal in the 1930s for the ‘rationalisation of development’ can be 
seen as a precursor to present-day arguments for ‘sustainable development’, in that it 
implied a balance between continued economic growth and the preservation of the 
rural environment. While there was a Romantic inflection to some of the arguments 
made by the CPRE and its allies, the campaigners were realistic in their aims, and this 
was reflected in the ‘planner-preservationism’ identified by Matless, which sought to 
reconcile the protection of the countryside with well-planned development. In 
numerous ways, the National Parks policy reflected the trends associated with 
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modernity. The policy was framed to provide for the leisure interests of a population 
that was gaining increasing access to holidays with pay, and was even intended, in the 
motor car, to accommodate the users of one of the symbolic developments of the 
age. For the post-war Labour government, National Parks were a reflection not only 
of its commitment to raising standards of public health, but also of its wish to 
democratise access to leisure and bring about a more general improvement in the 
‘quality of life’ for all classes. 
Crucially, National Parks and town and country planning reflected a growing 
willingness of governments to extend the reach of the state, and that trend would 
continue over the ensuing decades, as is demonstrated in the chapters that follow. 
The inter-war enthusiasm for various forms of planning, most clearly seen in the 
ideas of groups of ‘middle opinion’ such as Political and Economic Planning and the 
Next Five Years Group, gained one of its fullest expressions in the discipline of town 
and country planning, which was to move to the centre of political life with the onset 
of the Second World War. There is no need to overplay the existence of a post-war 
consensus in British politics, but there is no doubt that both the Labour and 
Conservative parties emerged from the war with a commitment to interventionist 
policies. There were important differences of degree and emphasis, but in the field of 
town and country planning the policies of both parties provided for control over the 
development of the land.96 
The events of the 1930s and 1940s set the course of environmental politics in post-
war Britain. This thesis gives a central role to conventional political actors, arguing 
that, when in government, both Labour and the Conservatives were willing to 
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introduce new environmental measures, particularly when there were implications for 
public welfare. This is illustrated in the next chapter of this thesis, which looks at the 
Conservative government’s introduction of clean air legislation in the 1950s, and in 
chapter five, which explores the environmental policies of both parties during the 
1960s. However, there were clear limits to the saliency of environmental concerns, 
particularly when they conflicted with the dominant priorities of the post-war period. 
As chapter four demonstrates, conservation was established as a necessary 
consideration in policymaking, but it did not carry sufficient weight to override major 
industrial projects. When the construction of a nuclear power station was proposed 
in the Snowdonia National Park in the late 1950s, the limits of environmental 




Atmospheric Pollution and the 1956 Clean Air Act 
In 1956 the Conservative government of Anthony Eden passed the Clean Air Act, a 
landmark piece of legislation designed to tackle air pollution in Britain’s towns and 
cities. The act strengthened a number of pre-existing regulations governing emissions 
from industrial facilities, and, most significantly, introduced for the first time national 
measures intended to curb smoke created by domestic coal fires. The introduction of 
clean air legislation came in the aftermath of one of the most severe environmental 
disasters in modern British history. Between 5 and 9 December 1952, unusual 
weather conditions and high smoke emissions resulted in London being affected by a 
smoky fog, or ‘smog’, that was dramatic even by the standards of a city notorious for 
such events. In the weeks following the smog, it became clear that it had resulted in 
significant increases in the city’s mortality and morbidity rates, and it was eventually 
estimated that as many as 4,000 people had died prematurely. Amid media attention 
and political pressure, a governmental Committee on Air Pollution was established 
under Sir Hugh Beaver, the former managing director of Guinness, in the summer of 
1953, and the Committee’s 1954 report provided the basis for the legislation 
eventually brought forward by the government in 1955. 
Just as the previous chapter examined how and why the state came to extend its 
influence over the preservation of the countryside in the post-war period, this 
chapter explores the reasons for the government’s decision to take action on the 
quality of the air in Britain’s towns and cities during the 1950s. As with National 
Parks and town and country planning, it is argued that clean air policy was intended 
as a means for reconciling the demands of a modern, technological economy with 
the provision of a clean and healthy environment, and this chapter shows how 
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technical expertise was brought to bear in order to understand the problem and 
develop a practical solution. This is in line with the picture presented in the existing 
literature, but this chapter diverges from the historiography by arguing that 
government played a more active, and less reluctant, role in devising and driving 
forward clean air policy than it has usually been given credit for. While ministers, 
particularly the Minister of Housing and Local Government, Harold Macmillan, were 
not always entirely enthusiastic about taking action, their role was of greater 
significance than that of the anti-smoke activists credited in existing studies. The 
chapter places clean air in the political context of the 1950s, and explores how 
ministers recognised that public expectations of the welfare state, through which 
government held responsibility for securing the health and material security of its 
citizens, necessitated action on clean air 
Finally, it is argued that action was taken against air pollution because it was 
successfully established that the policy would be beneficial, rather than detrimental, 
to Britain’s economic development. It would be possible for environmental action to 
be taken in line with the dominant priorities of post-war British governance. In this 
respect, there are important continuities with the town and country planning and 
National Parks policies discussed in chapter two, and with the cases explored in later 
chapters. As a response to a rural problem, based around questions of preservation, 
heritage and leisure, the National Park measures differed significantly from clean air, 
which focused upon the mitigation of risk in towns and cities, but they represented a 
similar willingness of government to extend the state’s regulation of the 
environment, particularly when policies were framed as compatible with the aims of 
promoting economic growth and improving public health. As later chapters show, 
environmental policies gained a successful hearing in the post-war decades when they 
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converged with those political priorities, and tended to fall by the wayside when they 
did not. In twentieth-century Britain, the field of environmental policy was the 
product of technological modernity, formed in line with of the political aim of 
enhancing the public experience of rising affluence. 
This chapter begins with a brief survey of the history of air pollution and efforts to 
regulate it, particularly during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century. It then focuses on the London smog of December 1952, 
examining how the event unfolded and exploring the reactions of the media, 
Whitehall officials and elected politicians. Particular attention is paid to the response 
of the Conservative government, and the question of whether it was reluctant to take 
action to address the problem. The chapter then explores the work of Beaver’s 
Committee on Air Pollution, particularly the rationale behind its recommendation 
that the government should introduce comprehensive clean air legislation. The 
chapter ends by examining the reaction to the Beaver Report, and the political 
process that led to the eventual passage of legislation in 1956. 
The chapter makes use of the extensive range of archival sources relating to the 1952 
smog and the Clean Air Act. In the National Archives, the papers of the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government cover the response to 
the smog and the path towards legislation, while the papers of the Beaver Committee 
provide a thorough record of its work. The chapter also draws on parliamentary 







While the literature on air pollution in Britain understandably focuses on events 
during and after the Industrial Revolution, it is generally noted that the problem of 
smoke in towns dates back as far as the use of coal as a fuel. The use of sea coal in 
London prompted complaints in the Middle Ages, and two royal commissions were 
appointed to investigate the issue in the 1280s.1 This concern continued into the 
early modern era, and in 1661 the author and diarist John Evelyn presented King 
Charles II with a tract entitled Fumifugium, or the Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoake of 
London Dissipated, a document that Luckin describes as ‘an environmental manifesto 
to combat atmospheric pollution’ and Thorsheim as ‘one of the most famous 
denunciations of air pollution ever written’.2 Luckin writes that ‘London probably 
experienced a heavily soot-laden fog about once every four years’ during the 
eighteenth century, but Thorsheim notes that attitudes before the nineteenth century 
were not entirely hostile to man-made smoke.3 At a time when a leading cause of 
disease was thought to be ‘miasma’, an airborne contaminant produced by the 
decomposition of biological material, contemporaries feared fog because it was 
believed to have originated from swamps in the countryside, and smoke was seen as 
potentially beneficial because it could rid the air of miasma. The threat to health was 
seen to come from nature, and man-made processes were viewed as a possible 
source of protection.4 
Perceptions of the dichotomy between the natural and the man-made would shift as 
the impact of industrialisation began to be felt in Britain’s expanding towns and 
cities. Emissions by the alkali industry, centred in the north west and north east of 
																																																								
1 Peter Thorsheim, Inventing Pollution: Coal, Smoke and Culture in Britain since 1800 (Ohio, 2006), p. 5 
2 Bill Luckin, ‘Pollution in the city’, in Martin Daunton (ed.), The Cambridge Urban History of Britain: 
Volume III 1840-1950 (Cambridge, 2000), p. 222; Thorsheim, Inventing Pollution, p. 5 
3 Luckin, ‘Pollution in the city’, p. 222 
4 Thorsheim, Inventing Pollution, pp. 10-11, 16-17 
	
 100 
England, and Clydeside in Scotland, prompted a parliamentary campaign led by Lord 
Derby, and in 1863 the Alkali Act introduced a new system of regulation for the 
industry.5 The new Alkali Inspectorate was ‘the first environmental regulatory body 
in the world’, and its initial mandate to regulate the emission of hydrochloric acid 
vapours by the alkali industry was gradually widened to include pollutants from other 
industries, including the production of heavy chemicals.6 However, the Alkali Act did 
not apply to pollution caused by the burning of coal, and there were few attempts at 
the time to limit the emission of smoke from domestic coal fires. 
Luckin argues that the commitment to laissez-faire economics held back smoke 
abatement efforts in the Victorian period, but, while concrete action was limited, 
there were growing calls for the state to address the problem.7 During the second 
half of the nineteenth century, a number of campaigning organisations formed, 
beginning with the Manchester and Salford Noxious Vapours Association in 1876, a 
group Thorsheim credits with popularising the use of the term ‘air pollution’ in 
Britain. This was followed by the foundation of the National Smoke Abatement 
Institution in 1882, the Coal Smoke Abatement Society in 1898, and the Smoke 
Abatement League of Great Britain in 1909. In 1929, the latter two organisations 
merged to form the National Smoke Abatement Society (NSAS), which would 
remain active during the 1950s as the clean air legislation passed through Parliament.8 
Although the smoke problem was not solved in the Victorian period, a number of 
legislative measures represented the first steps towards concerted state action. The 
Sanitary Act of 1866 gave local authorities limited powers for prosecuting the owners 
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of factories with smoky chimneys, and the 1875 Public Health Act contained clauses 
aimed at tackling the ‘smoke nuisance’.9 
According to Thorsheim, such early measures to regulate smoke coincided with a 
shift in ideas, whereby ‘instead of seeing nature as dirty and civilisation as a source of 
cleanliness, many people began to assume that nature was inherently pure and only 
became unhealthy as a result of technological processes’. 10  It is this shift that 
Thorsheim sees as marking the ‘invention’ of pollution in Britain, and he argues that 
smoke was key to the new understanding. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, scientific investigation played a leading role in the identification of coal 
smoke as a social evil, with the investigations of Rollo Russell, John Aitken, Edward 
Frankland and Louis Parkes all contributing to an emerging consensus that the 
‘yellow fogs’ of London presented a significant danger to public health.11 A number 
of severe fogs were linked to raised mortality rates in the city in the final decades of 
the century, and by the 1890s it is likely that London’s air quality was at the lowest 
level in its history (a fact that raises the question of why concerted action was taken 
in the 1950s, when air quality had actually improved, rather than in the nineteenth 
century).12 
As the twentieth century began, Mosley argues, coal smoke ‘was widely 
acknowledged to be a major environmental problem’, with technical specialists and 
activists drawing attention to ‘blackened buildings, stunted vegetation, begrimed 
belongings, wasted fuel, diminished sunlight, and high death rates from respiratory 
																																																								
9 Ibid., pp. 113-14; Stephen Mosley, ‘The home fires: heat, health and atmospheric pollution in Britain, 
1900-45’, in Mark Jackson (ed.), Health and the Modern Home (London, 2007), p.205 
10 Thorsheim, Inventing Pollution, p. 19 
11 Peter Thorsheim, ‘Interpreting the London fog disaster of 1952’, in E. Melanie Dupuis (ed.), Smoke 
and Mirrors: The Politics and Culture of Air Pollution (New York, 2004), p. 157 
12 Thorsheim, Inventing Pollution, p. 128 
	
 102 
diseases’.13 In 1903 the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, a 
body set up to investigate the reasons for the recruitment crisis during the Boer War, 
identified the lack of sunlight and fresh air as a reason for the poor physical 
condition of Britain’s urban population, while in 1905 the word ‘smog’ was coined by 
the doctor and activist H.A. Des Voex to describe the mixture of smoke and fog that 
blighted the towns and cities.14 While industrial processes were producing less smoke 
than in the nineteenth century, population increase led to a worsening of emissions 
from domestic fires, with annual coal consumption rising from 60 million tons in 
1911 to 189 million tons in 1951. Anti-smoke activists continued to press the issue, 
and the gas and electricity industries advertised the advantages of new forms of 
domestic heating during the inter-war years, but by 1938 bituminous coal was 
responsible for heating 80 per cent of British homes.15  
During this period, the smoke problem was receiving increasing attention from 
government. In 1914 a departmental committee was set up under Lord Newton, and 
when it published its findings in 1921 following the interruption of the war, it 
established that domestic smoke contributed as much to air pollution as industrial 
smoke.16 The Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Act of 1926 gave local authorities 
the ability to apply to the Ministry of Health for permission to regulate black smoke 
from factories, but the legislation was not enforced by the Ministry with sufficient 
zeal, and did not cover domestic smoke. Similarly the Public Health Act of 1936 
defined dark industrial smoke as a nuisance, but imposed an insufficient maximum 
fine of £50, and contained too many loopholes to be effective. After the war the 
Committee on Domestic Fuel Policy under Lord Simon was asked to consider air 
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pollution as part of its investigations and it concluded that action was required to 
address domestic smoke, both from a public health perspective and in light of the 
fact that smoke signified the wastage of fuel through insufficient combustion.17 
However, the clean air recommendations of the Simon Committee were shelved, and 
there is little evidence to suggest that, as the 1950s began, the government had any 
intention of acting on the smoke pollution problem. 
The smog of December 1952 
The event that would become known as London’s ‘Great Smog’ began on Friday 5 
December 1952, when a thick layer of fog blanketed the capital. Meteorologically, the 
fog was caused by an unusual combination of conditions – cold temperatures and a 
lack of wind, together with temperature inversion, whereby cold air close to the 
ground became trapped under a layer of warmer air, produced a fog that mixed with 
the city’s smoke pollution to become a yellow-black smog. In addition to helping to 
create the fog, the cold temperatures led to an increase in domestic coal use, and the 
resulting smoke emissions served to worsen the smog. Thorsheim writes that devices 
designed to measure air pollution in the city became so full of particulates that they 
ceased to function, while concentrations of sulphur dioxide reached their highest 
levels since monitoring had begun in 1932.18 
Two years later, Dr A.E. Martin of the Ministry of Health would write that the smog 
of 1952 was an example of how ‘a metropolis of eight and a quarter million 
population can experience a disaster … without even realising that it had occurred’.19 
While the smog was later established to have been the cause of several thousand 
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deaths, Martin argued that, during the days when it actually occurred, there was 
virtually no awareness that it presented a significant threat to public health. 
Examination of the press during the week of the fog indicates that, to a large extent, 
Martin’s verdict was correct. The occurrence of such a thick fog attracted significant 
media attention, but initial coverage largely focused on it as a curiosity and a source 
of disruption, rather than a danger to health. The leading London newspaper, the 
Evening Standard, reported on the fog as soon as it settled on 5 December, and placed 
emphasis on the delays caused to train services, as well as the postponement of 
football fixtures on Saturday 6 December.20 Coverage in the national press followed a 
similar pattern. The fog was front-page news in the Daily Telegraph and the Daily 
Mirror on 6 December, with the Mirror reporting that it had ‘completely shut down 
the Thames-side towns Twickenham and Teddington’, and caused the closure of 
Richmond Bridge.21 In addition to transport chaos, the newspapers were particularly 
attracted to reports of crimes that took place under the cover of the fog. The Mirror 
reported on handbag snatches that occurred on the first day of the fog, while on 8 
December it ran a story headlined ‘Cosh gangs strike in the black out’, in which 
Scotland Yard was quoted as describing 5-7 December as ‘one of the worst 
weekends of crime for a long time’.22 The press also pointed to the economic cost of 
the disruption, with the Telegraph placing a figure of between £5 million and £10 
million on the ‘stoppage of transport and dislocation of trade’, and the Mirror 
suggesting that the smog was costing London £2 million per day.23 
However, while disruption and crime dominated the press coverage, the potential 
health impact did not go entirely unnoticed. Aside from lives lost in accidents, the 
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first reports of fog-related deaths concerned not people but animals. On 8 
December, the newspapers reported on the deaths of 11 prize cattle at the Smithfield 
Show at Earls Court, with one agricultural worker telling the Evening Standard, ‘Cattle 
can cope with just a clean country fog and may just get a cough, but this smoke in 
the London fog chokes them.’ In addition to those cows that died or had to be 
slaughtered, it was reported that ‘others breathing heavily were wrapped in blankets 
and had damp sacking filters over their nostrils’.24 By 10 December reports began to 
emerge of the fog taking the lives of Londoners. The Evening Standard wrote that 53 
people had died in Croydon, mostly as a result of bronchial problems, and that 24 
people had collapsed and died in east London.25 The Telegraph reported that over 100 
people had died in the fog, while the Mirror went further and stated that it had ‘killed 
hundreds of elderly people’, and quoted a coroner’s officer from St Pancras as saying, 
‘It’s been like dealing with an epidemic.’26 The fog had not entirely dominated 
headlines between 5 and 10 December (a gangland trial and television plans for the 
Queen’s upcoming coronation were among the stories that received greater attention 
that week), and the health threat had not been at the forefront of the press coverage, 
but by the time the fog lifted there does appear to have been a growing awareness 
that, on top of the disruption and the spike in crime, the event had impacted upon 
the capital’s mortality and morbidity rates. On Friday 12 December the Evening 
Standard reported that during the following week the Prime Minister, Winston 
Churchill, would be asked to set up an inquiry, and the Ministry of Health asked to 
explain the increased bronchial deaths.27 
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Whereas early reports placed figures for deaths in the low hundreds, by the end of 
the following week it was revealed that the impact of the smog had actually been far 
worse. A number of parliamentary questions challenged the government to discuss 
the fog, and initially they were met by unremarkable responses. On 16 December, in 
response to a question by the Labour MP Tom Driberg, the Minister of Health Iain 
Macleod stated that deaths in London from all causes during the fog week had 
increased by around 500 compared with the corresponding week in 1951.28 On 17 
December, Driberg asked whether the government would set up an inter-
departmental committee ‘to inquire into the causes and cure of the London fog’, and 
was told that it would not be happening, as an Atmospheric Pollution Research 
Committee already existed under the Fuel Research Board. 29  However, when 
Macleod faced further questions on 18 December, he gave an astonishing answer. 
Asked about deaths and hospital admissions during the fog, he said that ‘the number 
of deaths from all causes in Greater London during the week ending 13 December 
was 4,703 compared with 1,852 in the corresponding week of 1951’. In addition, ‘the 
number of hospital admissions arranged by the Emergency Bed Service for the week 
ending 12 December was 2,007 compared with 917 [in 1951]’. Macleod noted that 
‘the cold weather had already caused some increase’, but conceded that ‘a large part 
of these increases must be attributed to the fog’.30 
Given that it took the estimated death toll up to almost 3,000 (the figure was of 
course provisional, and in need of further investigation), Macleod’s announcement 
was a sensational one, a fact acknowledged by the Ministry of Health when it 
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described the death rate as ‘spectacular’ in a press release issued on 19 December.31 
The news was picked up in the press, but it should be noted that the level of 
coverage varied across publications. Somewhat surprisingly, the Evening Standard did 
not report on Macleod’s announcement, while the Telegraph only gave it two short 
paragraphs on its front page.32 By contrast, of all the leading British newspapers the 
Mirror would become the one most concerned with the air pollution problem after 
December 1952, and it set the tone for this with a front-page headline on 19 
December that declared that ‘The big fog killed 3,000 people’.33 The Mirror reported 
that the NSAS was planning to ask the government to set up an inquiry, and the 
organisation did indeed do this in a letter to the Ministry of Health on 31 December, 
in which it expressed concern about ‘the abnormally serious consequences of the 
recent London smoke-fog, especially in relation to human health’.34 The Christmas 
recess eased parliamentary pressure for the rest of 1952, but there were reports that a 
number of MPs, including Labour’s Norman Dodds, intended to push for an inquiry 
when the Commons reconvened in the New Year.35 
The political response 
It became a common perception, both at the time and in the historiography, that the 
Conservative government was hesitant and even evasive in its response to the air 
pollution problem after the 1952 smog. Parker describes the government as both 
apathetic and tardy, and suggests that the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) did not provide any real 
leadership on clean air. This was due both to a lack of interest and to a 
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preoccupation with more politically pressing issues, such as the aim of building 
300,000 new houses per year. With the government disinterested, Parker argues that 
it fell to backbench MPs and representatives of the NSAS to keep the issue alive.36 
Similarly, Thorsheim writes that ‘the government attempted to minimise the 
magnitude of the calamity’, and sought to ‘escape blame’ and ‘avoid being pressured 
into stricter controls on air pollution’.37 In Thorsheim’s opinion, it was pressure from 
the public, the media and Parliament that forced the government into setting up an 
investigation, and, even then, the Beaver Committee was largely seen as a means of 
deflecting criticism.38 
There is certainly much evidence to support this account. From as early as January 
1953, the government’s response to the fog attracted criticism both in Parliament 
and in the press. On 22 January, Marcus Lipton, Labour MP for Brixton, asked 
Macleod whether the government, in light of the fact that the December fog had 
brought death ‘on the scale of mass extermination’, would be investigating the issue 
‘as a matter of urgent priority’.39 While Macleod assured Lipton that his department 
was ‘looking into the matter as a problem of the very greatest urgency’, his answer 
clearly did not satisfy the whole House, as on 27 January Norman Dodds accused the 
Minister of Housing and Local Government, Harold Macmillan, of ‘an amazing 
display of apathy’. Dodds pointed out that ‘last month … there were literally more 
people choked to death by air pollution than were killed on the roads in the whole 
country in 1952’, and asked why a major public inquiry was not being held, given that 
‘inquiries are held into air and rail disasters which do not affect so many people’.40 
Such parliamentary criticism coincided with press coverage that presented the smog 
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as a major disaster, and air pollution as a problem that required urgent political 
action. On 23 January the Evening Standard published an editorial in which it 
characterised the smog as the ‘December massacre’, and suggested that ‘the 
Londoner has a malignant enemy of which he sometimes speaks in terms of 
misguided affection’. The death toll, it noted, was ‘comparable with the worst month 
of the Blitz’, and it was therefore imperative that the government ‘should bring all 
possible scientific resources to the task’.41 Similarly, in its editorial on 31 January the 
Manchester Guardian pointed out that the loss of life was ‘greater than that experienced 
in the worst week of the cholera epidemic of 1866’, and expressed a hope that 
‘perhaps at last it will be appreciated that the social cost in death, disease and extra 
burdens on doctors and hospitals is great enough to warrant much larger expenditure 
on prevention’.42 
Such criticism continued throughout the first half of 1953. On 12 February the 
government, having suggested in December that its Atmospheric Pollution Research 
Committee would investigate the smog, was forced into an embarrassing admission. 
Asked by Lipton to explain what further action the Committee had taken, Arthur 
Molson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works, responded, ‘None. The 
Committee is essentially an advisory body concerned with the collection of data on 
atmospheric pollution.’43 Lipton again pressed the government on 19 March, asking 
Macleod whether he realised ‘that the matter is one of considerable urgency’. The 
Minister replied that he agreed that ‘it is a most important matter’, but added that ‘it 
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is precisely for that reason that, in my view, this sort of scientific investigation ought 
not to be hurried’.44 
The most severe parliamentary criticism came on 8 May, when Norman Dodds 
initiated an adjournment debate on the subject of air pollution. Introducing the 
debate, Dodds told the House that there was still ‘an amazing amount of alarm on 
the part of the public about the heavy death roll and widespread sickness following 
the December fogs’. Dodds then went on to suggest that the government’s response 
had worsened the situation: 
This alarm has been greatly increased by the amazing, at least outward, 
apathy of the Government. Most people who have deep feelings about this 
just cannot understand why there has not been a public inquiry after 
thousands of people were choked to death during the December fogs. In the 
case of air and rail disasters, where the death roll may amount to tens and not 
thousands, as in this case, public inquiries are held because the public wish to 
be assured that every care is taken to prevent a repetition. Yet there has been 
no public inquiry at all into the heavy death roll in the December fogs.45 
Dodds pointed out that the attitude of senior ministers betrayed a lack of concern 
about the issue, something he highlighted with reference to the Evening Standard, 
which had quoted Macleod as telling guests at a dinner that ‘anyone would think fog 
had only started since I became Minister’. Such apathy did not reflect the public’s 
feelings, as since Dodd had become an MP he had ‘never had more correspondence 
on any subject than I have had on the question of air pollution’. He concluded that 
the government should set up an exhaustive inquiry into the problem, and suggested 
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that a permanent body should later be established to ensure the thorough 
implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations.46 Responding on behalf of the 
government, Ernest Marples, Parliamentary Secretary to the MHLG, denied the 
charge of apathy, and pointed out that there were more Conservative than Labour 
MPs in the chamber for the debate. Air pollution, Marples said, was ‘a great evil’, and 
‘its effect on health … has been of great concern for many years’. While it was ‘futile 
to think that air pollution can be abolished overnight’, Marples announced that the 
government had decided ‘to appoint a Committee under an independent chairman, 
to undertake a comprehensive review of the causes and effects of air pollution, and 
to consider what further preventive measures are practicable’.47 
Marples’ reply represented the first public announcement of the government’s 
intention to set up the Committee on Air Pollution, which would eventually be 
chaired by Sir Hugh Beaver. Given that it followed months of criticism, it is 
unsurprising that the decision has been characterised as one taken by a disinterested 
government in order to ease public and parliamentary pressure. However, 
examination of the London smog and its aftermath from the perspective of 
government departments reveals a more complicated picture. Although there is some 
evidence of inaction and scepticism on the part of certain actors, the response in 
Whitehall was far less complacent than is usually suggested in the literature. If leading 
figures in the Conservative government took their time in responding to the disaster, 
the same cannot be said of departmental officials. As soon as the fog hit London in 
December 1952, there was discussion within the MOH on the implications for 
mortality and morbidity. On 11 December Dr W.H. Bradley, Medical Officer to the 
Ministry, wrote that the reported rise in unexplained deaths and hospital admissions 
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‘made it clear that there was a prima facie case for investigation’. The decision was thus 
taken ‘to initiate rather extensive inquiries immediately, before material and 
information might be lost’.48 On 17 December, statistics were circulated within the 
Ministry, and it was noted that deaths in Greater London relating to bronchitis and 
pneumonia over the weekend of the fog ‘were greater than ever previously recorded’. 
The report concluded that the incident had serious implications: 
This has been a big show and when the General Register Office figures are 
published [it] may cause quite a stir. Our impression is that infection has 
played a negligible part and that the mortality is directly related to the 
“Smog”. It is not yet safe to conclude that illness and deaths occurred only in 
people with seriously impaired cardio-respiratory function. People who 
would ordinarily consider themselves to be reasonably healthy have been 
seriously infected, or died.49 
Therefore, while it was alleged that government was apathetic in response to the 
smog incident, it is clear from departmental documents that there was significant 
concern among officials within the MOH, and efforts were made by mid-December 
to investigate the matter further. As Thorsheim notes, medical and scientific 
investigation was crucial to the identification of smog as a significant problem. ‘The 
ability to “see” the fog of 1952 as a disaster,’ writes Thorsheim, ‘depended crucially 
on the collection and interpretation of statistical data’.50 This was a complex process 
that involved the analysis of data relating to a wide range of medical conditions, and 
the determination of whether the smog could have played a role in the deaths of 
patients with pre-existing illnesses (particularly lung or bronchial conditions). The 
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initial estimate of 2,851 deaths was revised upwards to approximately 6,000 in 
January 1953.51 At one stage, the government’s air pollution scientist, E.T. Wilkins, 
produced an estimate of 8,000, although the government would eventually settle on 
the lower estimate of approximately 4,000.52 Whereas Thorsheim downplays the 
effectiveness of government, it should be recognised that the MOH played a central 
role in such investigations. By the end of February 1953 a Departmental Committee 
on Fog Deaths had been established under Professor S.P. Bedson, with the aim of 
compiling evidence and making ‘definite suggestions on the prevention of future 
incidents’.53 Expert scientific and medical knowledge, particularly within the MOH, 
ensured that air pollution was established as a problem that had to be investigated 
and addressed. 
One of the problems for government in the immediate aftermath of the smog was 
that responsibility was divided between several departments. The MOH was 
responsible for handling the statistical investigations into mortality and morbidity, 
and the implications for health policy, but such responsibility as existed for 
controlling air pollution lay with the MHLG. Additionally, domestic fuel policy was 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, which also shared the 
coordination of pollution research with the Ministry of Works. Parker agues that this 
division of responsibilities goes some way to explaining ‘the delay and the resistance’ 
of the government when it came to addressing the problem.54 However, the official 
documents reveal that the various departments were cooperating within weeks of the 
smog disaster. Officials from the MOH and the MHLG were in touch from early 
January 1953 and, while there was initially some reluctance within the MHLG to 
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accept that the fog was definitely responsible for the deaths (there were suggestions 
that the cold and damp weather should be considered as a cause), by early February 
the two departments were working together on the issue.55 On 5 February, S.G.G. 
Wilkinson of the MHLG described his department as ‘acutely interested in the 
Ministry of Health’s investigations into the causes of the deaths which occurred 
during the fog’, and wrote that ‘we have clearly got to intensify our efforts, if we can, 
to abate smoke’.56 
By the end of February there was close cooperation between the relevant 
departments. On 24 February a meeting was convened by the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power, attended by officials from the MOH and the MHLG. The chairman, Sir 
Harold Roxbee Cox, explained that the meeting had been arranged because of ‘the 
anxiety of the Ministry of Fuel and Power that the problem of atmospheric pollution 
should be tackled with drive and coordination’, and it was agreed by all present that 
the problem ‘merited a vigorous and concerted attack’, involving ‘more effective 
machinery’ and the ‘formation of some body actively to pursue the reduction of 
pollution’. The meeting appears to have been the first time that an ‘Inter-
departmental Committee with comprehensive terms of reference’ was suggested, and 
the MHLG agreed to take the next steps towards the establishment of such a 
committee.57 Although it would be some months before the Beaver Committee was 
actually set up, it is clear that the departments were paying attention to the issue 
during the spring of 1953. The MHLG and MOH were in touch throughout March 
and April, with the MHLG arguing that there was ‘an urgent need for a 
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comprehensive review of the problem’.58 At the end of April, the MHLG convened 
an inter-departmental meeting at which it noted that ‘the problem of air pollution 
had assumed increased importance’, and suggested the establishment of an 
investigative committee under an independent chairman.59 This was the proposal 
announced in Parliament on 8 May, and it would lead to the formation of the Beaver 
Committee in July. 
As the government departments discussed the issue during the first half of 1953, one 
of the recurring themes was the need to satisfy public opinion around the problem of 
air pollution. This was particularly emphasised by officials from the MHLG, who 
argued that the formation of a committee ‘would help to allay public disquiet about 
the dangers of fog’.60 They also requested that the committee should produce an 
interim report in order to reassure the public about ‘what has been and is being 
done’.61 This attentiveness to public feeling was based less on concrete measurements 
of opinion (the Gallup polls, for example, asked no questions about air pollution 
during this period) than on a more nebulous sense of what the public wanted, 
gleaned in part from criticism of the government in Parliament and the press. Yet, 
vague as it may have been, the perception of public opinion loomed large over the 
decision-making process. As the winter of 1953 approached, there was concern at 
Cabinet level that another major smog could prove a source of public panic, and 
ministers discussed how best to allay such fears. For Macmillan, the key was to show 
the public that the government was taking action. When the Beaver Committee 
submitted its interim report in the autumn of 1953, and the Cabinet had to decide 
																																																								
58 TNA: HLG 55/79, Letter from H. Symon to I.F. Armer, 28 March 1953 
59 TNA: HLG 55/79, Notes of Meeting on Air Pollution, 23 April 1953 
60 TNA: HLG 55/79, Letter from H. Symon to I.F. Armer, 28 March 1953 
61 TNA: HLG 55/79, Minute by I.F. Armer, 24 April 1953 
	
 116 
how to respond, Macmillan advised his colleagues that the establishment of a 
Cabinet committee would help to satisfy public opinion: 
Today everybody expects the Government to solve every problem. It is a 
symptom of the Welfare State. Governments are judged by their apparent 
ability to take the initiative in matters like ‘smog’. For some reason or 
another, ‘smog’ has captured the imagination of the press and the people. All 
yesterday my Public Relations Officer was rang up with this question, “What 
is the Government going to do about the ‘smog’? Ridiculous as it appears at 
first sight, I would suggest that we form a Committee. Committees are the 
oriflamme62 of democracy. … We cannot do very much, but we can seem to be 
very busy – and that is half the battle nowadays.63 
Macmillan expressed a similar view in a letter to the Home Secretary, David Maxwell 
Fyfe. ‘I believe,’ he wrote, ‘that this is one of those things, like the floods, by which 
the efficiency of the Government is judged. There is nothing very much that we can 
do, but we can look as if we were doing it’.64 While his opinion prevailed and a 
Cabinet committee was appointed to consider the interim Beaver Report, Macmillan 
did meet with some opposition from Macleod, who argued that such a committee 
would ‘just excite press interest in the problem’.65 He made a similar argument with 
reference to the prescription of ‘smog masks’ on the National Health Service, which 
Macmillan also advocated keenly ahead of the winter of 1953. Whereas Macmillan 
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was ‘strongly of the view that we ought to issue masks through the Health Service to 
those who might most benefit’, largely due to the effect the measure could have in 
reassuring the public, Macleod wrote to the Prime Minister to point out that the 
masks would have little practical benefit, and argued that there was a risk of exciting 
rather than allaying public panic.66 In the end he backed down, and conceded that, 
while the masks would be little more than a symbolic gesture, prescribing them 
would be worthwhile as the government stood ‘in very great danger of criticism if 
last year’s tragedy occurs again and we have done nothing about it’.67 
Such internal governmental discussions reveal a great deal about the path towards 
firmer regulation of atmospheric pollution. Macmillan’s comments and actions are 
particularly illuminating. He displayed scepticism towards the post-war welfare state 
(i.e. the responsibility of government for protecting the physical health and material 
well being of all citizens, exemplified by the reform of the Attlee governments), 
complaining that the government was expected to solve every problem, and 
suggested that the best that could be done was to give the impression of acting, 
notably through the provision of useless masks. Yet in reality, the action that 
Macmillan took amounted to far more than gesture politics. Masks may have been 
useless, but by appointing the Beaver Committee to conduct a thorough 
investigation, Macmillan initiated a process that was likely to lead to the 
recommendation of new, tighter regulations on air pollution. Macmillan disliked the 
supposed expectation that the state should solve every problem, but at the same time 
he could not escape the fact that such problem solving had become a part of political 
reality. In the face of a public health problem such as air pollution, the logic of post-
war politics was towards greater state regulation, and even for a Conservative 
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government that had been elected in 1951 with a manifesto committed to loosening 
state controls, that logic was difficult to resist. In the era of the welfare state, the 
parameters of government had shifted. A national problem, highlighted by a very real 
disaster in December 1952, called for a national solution, and this combined with a 
perception among ministers that the public expected government to act. 
Furthermore, the structure of Whitehall ensured that civil servants, particularly the 
medical specialists within the MOH, set about investigating the problem almost as 
soon as it arose. Even if the Conservative government had wanted to ignore the 
problem, the political circumstances of the 1950s meant that it would have been 
incredibly difficult for it to do so. 
The full report of the Beaver Committee would come in 1954, but in the meantime 
its interim report was published in December 1953, almost one year after London’s 
great smog. The interim report began by stating that medical opinion left no doubt 
that smog posed a real threat to health, and stressed that there was no ‘quick and 
easy’ solution – ‘full remedial measures will take time’. 68  The Committee’s 
investigations were to continue, but in the meantime it made some recommendations 
for immediate action. The BBC was to issue fog warnings when necessary, and the 
government was to take measures to improve stocks of smokeless fuels. Steps should 
be taken to educate the public about the contribution to air pollution made by 
domestic smoke, and householders were urged to burn a mixture of coal and 
smokeless coke, and limit their fuel usage during fogs. Vulnerable people were urged 
to stay indoors as much as possible in the event of smog, and to cover their mouths 
and noses when venturing outdoors.69 
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The government emphasised those short-term recommendations when it published 
the interim report, and stressed that it was giving the problem its ‘earnest attention’.70 
The hope was that the interim report would offset criticism of government inaction, 
but the press response was fairly hostile. In an editorial headlined ‘Sloth in the 
Smog’, the Evening Standard described the interim report as a ‘disappointing 
document’, and asked why it offered mere palliatives, rather than proposals for a 
‘radical attack on smog’. ‘How much longer,’ the editorial asked, ‘must Londoners 
wait while committees and Government departments dawdle at their leisure?’71 The 
Manchester Guardian was also critical, pointing out that, while the short-term measures 
the report proposed were ‘sensible enough’, they did not excuse the slow pace of 
more fundamental reform.72 The Daily Mirror, too, was derisive, noting that ‘after 
four months of deliberation’ the best recommendation the Committee had come up 
with was for people to burn less coal when it was foggy.73 
Therefore, having faced significant criticism during 1953, it appeared unlikely that 
the government would be able to avoid the issue of air pollution in 1954. The 
publication of the interim Beaver Report gave the government the opportunity to 
propose some short-term remedies, but as the Committee continued with its 
investigation, it was clear that more detailed measures would need to be put forward 
in the near future. 
The Committee on Air Pollution 
As has been noted, the decision to appoint a Committee on Air Pollution was taken 
by the government in the spring of 1953, and announced in Parliament on 8 May. In 
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June, Macmillan approached Sir Hugh Beaver to ask if he would chair the 
Committee.74 Beaver agreed, and was joined on the Committee by 11 other members, 
who included local authority housing managers and medical officers, an economist, a 
professor of public health, a fuel technologist, a chemical engineer, a lawyer and a 
meteorologist. Additionally, a panel of assessors was appointed, comprising 
representatives of the relevant government departments. The Committee was given 
the following terms of reference: 
To examine the nature, causes and effects of air pollution and the efficiency 
of present preventative measures; to consider what further preventative 
measures are practicable; and to make recommendations.75 
As the Committee began its work in July 1953, the government made clear what it 
expected from it. In internal correspondence prior to its establishment, MHLG 
officials had expressed their hope that the Committee would be realistic, and that it 
would not make ‘pious exclamations about energetic action and smokeless zones 
without thought for the wherewithal’.76 Concern was expressed that representatives 
of the NSAS, among whom there were ‘a good many fanatics’, would unduly 
influence the Committee. Given that existing studies, particularly Thorsheim’s, have 
credited smoke abatement activists with driving forward the case for clean air 
measures, it is important to note the hostility within government towards the 
NSAS.77 The organisation was a small society that enjoyed some elite support among 
peers and Commons backbenchers, and while it certainly played a role in raising the 
profile of the smoke pollution problem (particularly by assisting the Conservative 
MP Gerald Nabarro with a private member’s bill in 1954, which is discussed later in 
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this chapter), its importance should not be exaggerated. The voice of the NSAS was 
one of many urging action, and the archival evidence does not suggest that 
government gave particular priority to its views. 
This message to be realistic was relayed to the Committee on Air Pollution by 
Geoffrey Lloyd, the Minister of Fuel and Power, when he spoke at its first meeting 
on 29 July: 
I should like if I may to emphasise the word ‘practicable’ as it appears in your 
terms of reference. We all want to see air pollution abolished. We should like 
there to be not merely more smokeless zones but one smokeless zone 
covering the whole county. But we cannot suddenly bring industry to a 
standstill or stop people lighting fires in their houses. We have to recognise 
that there are practical limitations, so the problem before us is to decide in a 
realistic way what steps can best be taken to reach our objective.78 
However, while the Committee was urged to be practical, this did not lead to it 
holding back in its investigation of the air pollution problem. Its intentions were laid 
out in its interim report, which stressed that ‘the means of averting at least the worst 
evils of air pollution by smoke and grit are within practicable reach’. The report 
stated that the Committee would be embarking on a detailed study and making 
detailed recommendations, and pointed out that such work would only be 
worthwhile if there was ‘general acceptance of the fact that the cure will require 
heavy expenditure and full cooperation of all persons and all interests’.79 From the 
outset, it was made clear that action against air pollution could not be taken half-
heartedly. 
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The Beaver Committee approached the problem from two main angles. On the one 
hand, it explored the effects of air pollution on public health, while on the other it 
investigated the financial implications. In relation to health, it left little doubt that 
pollution had a significant negative impact. While gathering evidence, the Committee 
spoke to a range of medical experts and organisations, each of which stressed the 
detrimental effects of smoke pollution. The Society of Medical Officers of Health 
noted that its members had ‘striven against great difficulties to bring about a cleaner 
atmosphere’, and argued that ‘smoke is a social nuisance [that] should be regarded, 
by the very fact of its existence, as a legal nuisance’. 80  The Socialist Medical 
Association told the Committee that ‘the air we breathe is as important as the water 
we drink’, and suggested that ‘the air over cities should be looked upon as a water 
main and not as an open sewer into which effluents, however harmful, are poured’.81 
The Medical Research Council referred to air pollution as the ‘last and greatest 
environmental evil as yet unconquered’, and called both for further scientific research 
and for drastic preventative action.82 
In its final report, the Committee was unequivocal. While the scientific evidence was 
incomplete, the report noted that ‘enough is known to make it abundantly clear that 
[air pollution] is injurious to both physical and mental health. It fosters disease and 
can cause death.’ To underline the point, the Committee provided some shocking 
statistics. In England and Wales in 1951, death rates from bronchitis per 100,000 
people were 107.9 for men and 62.7 for women. By contrast, in Denmark they were 
2.2 for men and 1.9 for women, and in Sweden 5.0 for men and 4.0 for women. In 
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addition, disparities could be identified between urban areas and rural areas. In 
heavily urbanised and industrialised Clydeside in 1952, 11.7 per cent of all male 
deaths and 9 per cent of all female deaths were due to respiratory disease, compared 
with 7.5 per cent and 5.6 per cent in the rest of Scotland. Pollution was also seen to 
be harmful because of its obscuring of sunlight, which ‘reduces resistance to 
infection and retards recovery from illness’. It was also thought that ‘reduced light 
and sunshine’ had a detrimental effect on mental health. ‘There can be no doubt, the 
Committee concluded, ‘that the effect of air pollution on health is wholly bad.’83 
On top of the health effects, the Committee carried out a detailed investigation into 
the financial cost of pollution. A sub-committee was established under the 
Cambridge economist S.R. Dennison, which took evidence from a range of local 
authorities, businesses and interest groups. The findings of the sub-committee were 
highly significant, as they undermined any economic arguments against stricter 
controls on air pollution. Not only was smoke shown to damage the health of the 
British people; it was also shown to damage the British economy, at a time when the 
country could ill afford unnecessary waste. Tighter pollution regulations would be 
expensive to implement, and would carry a financial cost for certain industries, but in 
the long term they would result in significant savings for the economy, and go hand-
in-hand with the modernisation of industry and the raising of national living 
standards. The final report of the Beaver Committee estimated that the annual cost 
of air pollution was £250 million, a figure it divided into direct costs and costs 
resulting from ‘loss of efficiency’.84 By direct costs it meant ‘items of expenditure 
needed to repair the damage caused by, or to offset the effects of, pollution’. That 
could include the costs of laundry, building repair, additional lighting and medical 
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services. Loss of efficiency referred to issues such as working days lost to sickness, 
disruption to transport, or the impact of pollution on agriculture.85 Additionally, the 
Committee estimated that between £25 million and £50 million was wasted annually 
through the inefficient combustion of fuel.86 
In generating its estimate, the sub-committee covered a wide range of costs. It was 
told by the Ministry of Agriculture that pollution impaired the growth of crops and 
could cause fluorosis in livestock, and that it was thought that the problem was 
costing agriculture up to £10 million per year.87 For the transport industry, the sub-
committee heard that pollution led to a variety of costs, including those arising from 
the corrosion of rails and buildings, and the financial losses incurred due to 
disruption caused by smog.88 Local authorities explained how pollution increased the 
cost of maintaining council housing and public buildings. Sheffield City Council 
noted that houses at a site on the edge of the city required external painting once 
every five years, compared with once every three years at a site in the city centre.89 
Detailed information was provided by the department store chain Marks and 
Spencer, which estimated that air pollution was costing it over £60,000 per year 
through its impact on buildings, stock and ventilation. It noted that stone shop 
fronts in non-industrial areas required cleaning every seven to ten years, whereas in 
industrial areas cleaning was required twice as often. During the London smog of 
December 1952, Marks and Spencer experienced a ‘phenomenal rise in the amount 
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of goods soiled by dirt’, incurring losses of £30,000.90 Laundry was integral to the 
estimate of the cost of air pollution, with the sub-committee placing a figure of £25 
million per year on the money wasted by both homes and businesses.91 Additionally, 
a figure was also placed on deaths caused by pollution, with the Deputy Government 
Actuary valuing the lives of the 4,000 Londoners that died as a result of the 1952 
smog at £1,000 per person.92 
Having considered the cost of air pollution to health and the economy, the Beaver 
Committee concluded that the time had come for stricter regulation: 
Enough has been said to prove that air pollution as it occurs in this country 
today is a social and economic evil of the first magnitude. It not only does 
untold harm to human health and happiness, it is also a prodigal waste of 
material resources. Expenditure on curing it would be a fraction of the 
savings which would result from the cure. The case for preventive action is 
overwhelming.93 
The question, then, was what specifically could be done. First, the Committee made 
it clear that existing regulations were inadequate. There were no provisions in 
existing legislation for local authorities to set up smokeless zones, except through a 
special act of Parliament, and while there were regulations against ‘black’ smoke from 
industrial facilities, this was ill defined and difficult to enforce. The burden lay with 
complainants to prove that smoke was a nuisance, and it was a defence for the 
person responsible to simply show that ‘the best practicable means’ had been taken 
to try and reduce the smoke. Worst of all, existing legislation contained no provision 
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for regulating smoke from domestic chimneys, which the Committee noted was 
responsible for half of all smoke pollution. It argued that ‘no cure can … be found 
for the heavy smoke pollution of our cities and towns unless the domestic chimney is 
dealt with’, and pointed out that it would be unfair to clamp down on industry 
without acting against domestic fires.94 
What was required, the Committee argued, was for clean air to be declared a national 
policy, and recognised as an essential part of the domestic fuel strategy. It 
recommended that new legislation should be introduced, addressing pollution from 
both industrial and domestic sources. The emission of dark smoke, clearly defined, 
was to be prohibited in industry, and financial penalties were to be substantially 
increased. Local authorities were to be given the power to declare smokeless zones 
and smoke control areas, and to be required to produce annual reports on their 
progress. Crucially, such smoke control measures would cover domestic chimneys, 
and householders would receive financial contributions from the state towards the 
conversion of their appliances for the burning of smokeless fuels. A 50 per cent 
grant was to be made by the Exchequer, with a further contribution by local 
government. It was recommended that a national Clean Air Council should be 
established to coordinate smoke abatement efforts.95 The objective of the policy 
would be to reduce the emission of smoke in populated areas by 80 per cent within 
ten to 15 years. The Committee acknowledged that this was ambitious, but stressed 
that it was a necessity. The time had come to tackle air pollution ‘with the same 
conviction and energy as were applied one hundred years ago in securing pure water’, 
and while doing so would be challenging and costly, it would ‘secure happier and 
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more healthy living conditions for millions of people’, and cost ‘far less than the 
national loss in allowing the evil to continue’.96  
Towards the Clean Air Act 
The final report of the Committee on Air Pollution was published on 25 November 
1954. In the press, the response to the report was broadly positive. The Times called 
air pollution ‘an unnecessary evil’, and noted that prevention was ‘a field in which 
initiative must be taken by the Government’. With the Beaver Report providing a 
practical programme for action, The Times argued that the government had ‘no excuse 
for further delay’.97 The Manchester Guardian praised the report for setting out a clear 
plan ‘to eliminate the causes of … the deadly pollution that persists day in and day 
out, year after year, sapping our vitality, squandering our resources, and depressing 
our spirits’, and pointed out that ‘the important thing is that the committee puts the 
onus where it belongs – on the polluters … and on the policymakers in so far as 
what they do or fail to do helps or hampers, compels or prevents remedial action’.98 
The Economist also welcomed the report, although it struck a note of caution that 
would feature throughout the debate around clean air legislation. While the case for 
remedial action was ‘overwhelming’, the ‘introduction of penal legislation both on 
industry and the householder … would represent a substantial addition to the 
control of the individual by the authority’. The question for the public would be to 
decide ‘how high on the list of desirable, but expensive, social improvements it really 
puts clean air’, and ‘how much trouble it is prepared to undergo to achieve an 
amenity of which it has had little experience yet’.99 
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For its part, the government was keenly aware of the positive reception that the 
Beaver Report received. In a memorandum to the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee, 
the Minister of Housing and Local Government, Duncan Sandys (who had replaced 
Macmillan in October 1954), and the Minister of Fuel and Power, Geoffrey Lloyd, 
noted that ‘the reactions of the Press to the Beaver Report have been universally 
favourable and there is no doubt that the public expects the Government to take 
action on the lines recommended’. The memorandum advised that the government 
should adopt a ‘Clean Air Policy’, and put forward legislation accordingly.100 At 
Cabinet, Sandys argued that ‘the Government had no alternative but to accept’ the 
Beaver Committee’s recommendations, and suggested that the government should 
announce its acceptance of them in ‘broad terms’. In the discussion, it was noted that 
‘it could not be assumed that there would be no opposition to some of the measures 
recommended by the Beaver Committee’, particularly restrictions on householders’ 
burning of coal, and therefore the government would ‘be well advised to be cautious 
in committing themselves’. 101  Sandys announced the government’s position in 
Parliament on 25 January 1955, telling the House that it had been ‘decided in 
principle to adopt the policy recommended by the Beaver Committee’.102 
While the government had bought itself time, and left significant room for 
manoeuvre, it continued to come under pressure in Parliament, particularly from 
backbench MPs. Even before the publication of the Beaver Report, MPs had 
attempted to press the government to act. In March 1954, Herbert Williams, 
Conservative MP for Croydon East, used a debate on the City of London Bill to 
raise the issue of air pollution. In the debate, the government faced criticism for the 
																																																								
100 TNA: CAB 129/73 Cabinet Memoranda (1955), Memorandum by the Minister of Housing and 
Local Government and the Minister of Fuel and Power, 22 January 1955 
101 TNA: CAB 128/28 Cabinet Conclusions (1955), Cabinet Conclusions, 24 January 1955 
102 HC Deb, 25 January 1955, vol. 536, col. 40 
	
 129 
pace of action, with Barnett Stross, Labour MP for Stoke-on-Trent Central, arguing 
that it had moved too slowly and had been ‘rather lukewarm about the problem’, and 
Ellis Smith, Labour MP for Stoke South, suggesting that attempts to address the 
issue had met with ‘complacency, inertia and frustration’. 103  Later in 1954 the 
Conservative MP for Kidderminster, Gerald Nabarro, a longstanding advocate of 
smoke abatement, won the ballot to present a private member’s bill to Parliament, 
and opted to put forward a Clean Air Bill. In preparing the bill, Nabarro received 
funding and assistance from the NSAS, and the eventual parliamentary debate 
revealed that there was significant cross-party support for the introduction of stricter 
clean air measures.104 
Introducing his bill for the second reading on 4 February 1955, Nabarro outlined the 
historical background of the problem, and drew particular attention to the economic 
aspect of the Beaver Committee’s investigations. He suggested that the 
implementation of his bill, which he described as ‘nearly the whole of Beaver, 
practically nothing but Beaver’, would cost £50 million per year, a sound investment 
when set against the £250 million that was being lost annually because of air 
pollution. Added to this, Nabarro noted, was the wastage of coal, a vital issue at a 
time when ‘this nation’s coal position is critical’. With annual coal production falling, 
and the government resorting to the importation of foreign coal, a policy that would 
reduce the amount of coal wasted through incomplete combustion would not only 
benefit public health, but also make economic sense. Nabarro informed the House 
that he and the supporters of the bill were serious in their promotion of the 
legislation, but pointed out that the main purpose was to spur the government to 
action. If the government agreed that it would introduce a bill of its own ‘to give full 
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effect to a policy of clean air on the general lines recommended by the Beaver 
Committee’, he would be willing to withdraw the private member’s bill at the end of 
the debate.105 
In the lengthy debate that followed, numerous members spoke in support of 
Nabarro’s bill. Labour’s Alfred Robens, MP for Blyth, noted that ‘we are within 
measurable reach of having clean air in this country’, and pointed out that the policy 
enjoyed support on both sides of the House. Like Nabarro, he linked the issue to 
Britain’s economic efficiency, arguing that ‘this country can maintain its position in 
the world as a great industrial nation only so long as it has a plentiful supply of fuel 
and power’. Clean air was the correct policy ‘from the human standpoint’, but it was 
also clear that ‘from the country’s economic standpoint, we cannot afford not to 
have a Bill of this kind’.106 Other contributors to the debate focused more closely on 
the health aspect of air pollution. Barnett Stross suggested that the 1952 smog could 
have killed as many as 8,000 people, while Ellis Smith noted that statistics showed 
Britain to be ‘the most backward in the world’ on air pollution. It was, he said, a 
‘national scandal’ that action had not been taken long ago and, now that the Beaver 
Report had caused ‘a quickening of public consciousness’, the time had come to 
finally address the problem’.107 
While the debate did reveal much cross-bench support, it was not entirely 
consensual. Angus Maude, Conservative MP for Ealing South, sought to defend the 
government from criticism, pointing out that the Beaver Committee was only able to 
produce its report because the government had set it up in the first place.108 Michael 
Higgs, Conservative MP for Bromsgrove, took it upon himself to introduce a word 
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of caution about the types of measures that Nabarro was proposing. Noting that 
there was ‘a grave danger that … the House will find itself unanimous’, and that such 
unanimity ‘always makes speeches monotonous, however well conceived they may 
be’, Higgs said that he had ‘an instinctive reaction against a bill which invades 
people’s houses’. Did householders realise, he asked, that the bill would not only 
‘condemn them eternally to the use of either gas or electric fires, or of smokeless 
fuels’, but also compel them to allow officials to ‘enter their houses and inspect what 
is going on there’? The Beaver Report was a technical document, produced by 
technical experts, and ‘we know the intolerance which the expert feels towards the 
point of view of the common man’. Higgs concluded by acknowledging the ‘grave 
importance of the problem’, but cautioned against the introduction of ‘premature or 
panic legislation’.109 A different kind of objection was made by R.E. Winterbottom, 
Labour MP for Sheffield Brightside, who argued that it was unfair to force residents 
and local authorities in so-called ‘dirty’ areas to bear the cost of cleaning up the air, 
when the rest of the country benefitted from the industrial production that caused 
much of the pollution in those areas.110 
Such objections, however, were outweighed by contributions in favour of the bill. 
Nabarro received the support of Enoch Powell, at that point still a backbencher, who 
stated that the debate represented the first time that he had found himself in 
disagreement with Higgs. Powell suggested that Nabarro’s bill was ‘in the line and 
tradition of our most successful public health legislation and of those successive 
great measures which have dealt with the working and living conditions of our 
people over the last 100 or 120 years’. Powell argued that the great public health 
reforms of the nineteenth century had involved three key steps. First, a ‘definite evil’ 
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was identified, ‘to the continuance of which public opinion is strongly adverse’; 
second, it was determined that ‘avoidance and prevention [had] become practicable’; 
and, finally, the evil was ‘defined and a prohibition imposed upon it by legislation’. In 
Powell’s view, air pollution fulfilled those criteria. It was a definite evil, both in terms 
of health and economics, and there was ‘real public demand for it to be terminated’. 
It would involve far-reaching measures, but preventing it was practicable – as a long-
term policy, it was both affordable and achievable to convert homes to the use of 
smokeless fuel. As a representative of a Black Country constituency, Wolverhampton 
South-West, Powell noted that he was all too familiar with smoke pollution, and 
argued that ‘the time is ripe now for a drastic step’. By passing clean air legislation, 
Parliament could ‘lay the foundations of the last stage in this process of social 
improvement’.111 
The government had decided ahead of the debate that it would agree to introduce its 
own clean air legislation. Sandys told the House that the debate was one of the best 
he had attended in a long time, and acknowledged the extent of agreement, both in 
Parliament and beyond, ‘about preventing, as far as possible, the pollution of our 
atmosphere’. He argued that the government had not been dragging its feet, and 
expressed its ‘warm support’ for the objectives of Nabarro’s bill. While the 
government would not be advising that the House adopt the private bill, it would in 
due course be introducing a ‘comprehensive measure’ of its own, which would 
‘follow the general lines of the Beaver Committee’.112 Speaking for the opposition, 
Philip Noel-Baker, MP for Derby South, agreed that Labour, if it won the next 
election, would not interrupt the passage of the bill, provided that it lived up to 
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Sandys’ promise. The debate ended with Nabarro withdrawing his private member’s 
bill.113. 
The government introduced its Clean Air Bill to Parliament in July 1955, and it had 
its second reading in the Commons on 3 November. While the government 
presented the bill as ‘a big step forward in combating the scourge of air pollution’, it 
received significant criticism for not going far enough.114 Particularly contentious 
were a clause that gave industry seven years to comply with the prohibitions against 
dark smoke, compared with three years in Nabarro’s bill, and a loophole that 
required industrialists to comply only ‘so far as practicable’.115 In the view of Edith 
Summerskill, Labour MP for Warrington, the government had been far ‘too lenient 
with the industrialists’, and if it was really ‘passionately anxious to clean the air’, it 
‘would not have produced this kind of Bill’.116 Nabarro himself was highly critical, 
describing the bill as ‘ill-drafted’ and ‘too leisurely’, and suggesting that ‘the hand of 
the Federation of British Industries is writ large between the lines’. If the bill was to 
be effective, Nabarro argued, it would need ‘a very great number of teeth that it does 
not at present possess’.117 
Nabarro was correct to suggest that the government had consulted with industry in 
drafting the Clean Air Bill. The Federation of British Industries lobbied the MHLG 
to secure exemptions for industries already covered by the Alkali Acts, and Sandys 
offered his support in opposing tighter restrictions put forward in amendments to 
the bill by Nabarro and his parliamentary allies. However, the government did not 
give in entirely to the demands of industry. Sandys worked to achieve a compromise 
with parliamentary advocates of clean air, and ultimately informed industrial lobbyists 
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that he would only go so far in accommodating their reservations towards the bill. 
The ‘so far as practicable’ loophole was included in the legislation as an alternative to 
the outright exemptions requested by industry.118 It should also be noted that the 
Federation of British Industries was just one organisation among many that were 
consulted during the drafting and passage of the bill. Much of the consultation was 
between government and local authorities, and medical organisations and anti-smoke 
activists were also given the chance to offer their views on the provisions of the 
proposed legislation.119 
While the government may have diluted elements of the policy to satisfy industry, 
this was arguably necessary, as the support of both industry and local authorities 
would be essential in order for the legislation to succeed.120 If the Clean Air Act did 
not go as far as Nabarro’s private member’s bill, it still significantly tightened the 
regulations against air pollution, and reflected the recommendations of the Beaver 
Committee in a number of important respects. It made it an offence for factories to 
emit dark smoke, and introduced a colour scale with which such smoke could be 
identified. It also required factories to replace equipment to allow the burning of 
smokeless fuels, although the seven-year grace period and the ‘as far as practicable’ 
get-out clause represented important concessions to industry. In relation to domestic 
smoke, the provisions of the act were unprecedented. Local authorities were given 
the power to declare all or parts of their district to be ‘smoke control areas’, within 
which the emission of smoke, monitored by inspectors, would be an offence. 
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Financial provisions were made for the replacement of fire grates in smoke control 
areas, with the state paying 70 per cent of the cost. As the Beaver Report had 
recommended, a Clean Air Council was established, and charged with advising local 
authorities and reviewing their progress.121 
Initially, progress towards fulfilling the Clean Air Act was slow. The MHLG took 
until 1959 to identify the ‘black’ local authorities that were to move forward with 
establishing smoke control areas, and even then local authorities responded by 
dragging their feet. Supplies of smokeless fuels hampered progress, and it took until 
the late 1960s for local authorities to introduce smoke control in significant numbers. 
Nevertheless, major progress was made in the twenty years after the passage of the 
Clean Air Act. By 1971, five million homes were covered by smoke control orders, 
and domestic smoke emissions had fallen to 0.55 million tonnes per year, down from 
1.35 million in 1956.122 In London, a quarter of homes were covered by smoke 
control orders by 1962, and in that year the city suffered its last major smog. 
Although vehicle emissions would present a new challenge in the decades that 
followed, the air over Britain’s towns and cities was arguably much cleaner in the 
1970s than it had been in the 1950s. While the 1956 Clean Air Act cannot be held 
solely responsible – the shift from coal to gas and electricity, and the decline of the 
steam train played their part, for example – it is likely that the legislation made a 
significant contribution to this improvement.123  
Conclusion 
In January 1955, The Economist expressed concern that ‘an alarming number of 
normally far-sighted people from both parties’ supported the measures that had been 
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set out in the Beaver Report and replicated in Gerald Nabarro’s private member’s 
bill. In particular, it was sceptical about proposed new controls on domestic coal use, 
and it urged the Conservative government to think very carefully before supporting 
‘a measure that might introduce a Gestapo to our grates’.124 While The Economist’s 
invocation of the Gestapo was hyperbolic (it is worth noting that the eventual 
legislation did not give smoke inspectors the right to access people’s homes), its 
choice of words does serve to underline the significance of the 1956 Clean Air Act. 
At a time when the question of government control and intervention had become a 
key line of cleavage in British political debate, the air pollution measures represented 
a major extension of the state’s power to regulate the environment. The fuel that 
people burned, not only in industry but also in their own homes, and the smoke that 
was emitted into the atmosphere became the subject of legal controls in order to 
maintain the quality of the air in Britain’s towns and cities. While the planning and 
National Parks legislation discussed in chapter two represented different forms of 
environmental regulation from the control of air pollution, there was nevertheless 
continuity in terms of the government’s willingness to extend its powers to protect 
and preserve people’s surroundings. In the 1940s, the state intervened to improve the 
rural environment in the name of preservation, heritage and leisure, and in the 1950s 
it intervened to improve the urban environment through the provision of clean air. 
As is discussed in the following chapters, the state would continue to expand its 
responsibilities for providing clean and amenable surroundings in both rural and 
urban areas, culminating in 1970 in the creation of the Department of the 
Environment, and the formalisation of the ’environment’ as a defined field of 
government policy. 
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It is important to ask why it was that the Clean Air Act was passed in the 1950s, 
rather than earlier, or indeed later. It is not sufficient to ascribe it to the fact that air 
pollution was a problem in the 1950s – it had probably been at its worst in the 1890s, 
but no significant action was taken at that time. Undoubtedly, one specific event, the 
London smog of December 1952, played a key role. It was a dramatic event in visual 
terms, and even more dramatic in terms of its impact on the health of Londoners. 
With an estimated 4,000 killed (and perhaps more, depending on the estimate), the 
smog forcefully underlined the risks posed by air pollution, and made the problem 
difficult to ignore. As Thorsheim points out, medical and scientific understanding 
had advanced since the nineteenth century, and such expert knowledge played an 
important role in ensuring that the smog was recognised as a disaster.125  
In the aftermath of the smog, media pressure and the work of backbench MPs 
ensured that the government could not simply ignore the problem. The contribution 
of the latter is particularly worthy of note. On an issue that was tangential to the 
standard party political battles, backbenchers on both sides of the House of 
Commons drew attention to air pollution, and pressured the government to act. With 
the press also highlighting the issue, a perception arose within government that 
public opinion desired clean air measures. Opinion on the problem was not subject 
to measurement, but official documents reveal that there was sensitivity within the 
Churchill government to what the public appeared to desire, and this played a role in 
the formulation of policy. As later chapters demonstrate, sensitivity to perceived 
public opinion was crucial to shaping environmental politics, and by the late 1960s 
both the Conservative and Labour parties had come to view the protection of the 
environment, linked to the enhancement of ‘quality of life’, as having potential 
electoral saliency. 
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However, the response to the 1952 smog should not simply be viewed as a case of a 
reluctant Conservative government being forced to act as a result of media, public 
and backbench pressure. The relevant departments actually reacted quickly to the 
London smog, at least once it became apparent that it had resulted in a significant 
rise in mortality and morbidity, and it is important to recognise the role of civil 
servants in advancing the case for clean air. In particular, the Ministry of Health, a 
department that had grown in both human and financial resources since the 
foundation of the National Health Service, took the lead in investigating what had 
happened, with officials bringing their medical and scientific expertise to bear upon 
the problem. There was a degree of hesitancy, particularly within the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government, where officials initially hoped to attribute the 
deaths to cold rather than the smog, but on the whole the departmental documents 
show that there was a realisation within Whitehall that new, tighter regulations on air 
pollution would be required. 
Elected politicians within government may have been slower to react than civil 
servants, but nevertheless it would be wrong to portray Conservative ministers as 
entirely reluctant. As is noted throughout this thesis, the development of 
environmental policy was to a great extent shaped by the work of elected 
governments and prominent actors within both main political parties. In explaining 
why the Clean Air Act was passed, it is important to acknowledge the political 
context of the 1950s. The Conservative government had been elected in 1951 on a 
manifesto that pledged an unravelling of state regulation, but, as is well established, it 
did not undo all of the work of its Labour predecessor. Its approach to air pollution 
was in keeping with its wider approach to the welfare state, and was exemplified by 
the remarks and actions of the Minister of Housing and Local Government, Harold 
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Macmillan. In referring to the perceived public desire for the regulation of air 
pollution as ‘a symptom of the Welfare State’, Macmillan displayed scepticism 
towards the value of government intervention, but he nevertheless took action to 
address the problem. The establishment of the Committee on Air Pollution could be 
viewed simply as a means for deflecting criticism, but the reality is that it was given 
the mandate and resources to conduct a thorough investigation into the problem of 
air pollution. If the government was reluctant, this did not prevent it from initiating a 
process that was always likely to lead to detailed recommendations for clean air 
legislation, and prompt further public and political pressure for action. 
Crucially, the air pollution problem had two dimensions – public health and 
economics – that combined to create favourable conditions for governmental action. 
As noted, the 1952 smog deaths had shown that something needed to be done, and 
the shocking evidence of the Beaver Committee, particularly the comparisons 
between Britain and other European countries, further underlined the health risks. 
With its direct impact on life and death, air pollution was ripe for comparison with 
the public health reforms of the nineteenth century, particularly those relating to 
sewerage and clean water. As Enoch Powell skilfully noted during the debate on the 
Nabarro bill, there were plenty of precedents for such action, and if it was possible to 
solve the problem of air pollution then the state had a responsibility to do so. That 
tradition of public health reform would combine with the interventionist politics of 
the welfare state to create favourable conditions for clean air legislation. In such a 
political climate, counter arguments relating to laissez-faire economics and the 
personal freedom of householders only ever received a limited hearing. As chapter 
two also shows in terms of the perceived benefits of outdoor recreation, when public 
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health was considered to be at stake, the likelihood increased that government would 
display a willingness to enact environmental policies. 
Furthermore, cleaning up the air was given an economic rationale. The investigation 
into the costs of air pollution was a key element of the Beaver Committee’s work, as 
it made action highly attractive. In the context of the 1950s, when Britain was 
recovering economically and struggling to maintain its global status, a policy that had 
the potential to save £250 million per year in unnecessary waste made rational sense. 
It even offered a means for preserving coal resources at a moment when British coal 
production was falling. Clean air could be seen as another step in the country’s 
modernisation – like the town and country planning discussed in the previous 
chapter, it could form a part of the ‘rationalisation of development’. 
Ultimately, the Clean Air Act was passed because, from the perspective of both 
public health and the economy, it dovetailed with the Conservative government’s 
political priorities. Government did require encouragement, particularly from the 
press and Parliament, but it was willing to act because it was practical to do so – it 
urged the Beaver Committee to be realistic when it was appointed, and it was 
eventually handed a report that set out a programme of achievable reform. The Clean 
Air Act of 1956 demonstrated that when a problem captured sufficient attention, and 
its resolution did not conflict too far with the pursuit of economic growth, the 
British government was likely to take action and extend state regulation of the 
environment. Alongside the other cases explored in this thesis, air pollution is an 
example of how environmental policies took shape in Britain as solutions of 
governance enacted within a modern, technological nation. However, it is important 
to note the limits of environmental politics. As the following chapter shows with 
reference to the nuclear power programme of the 1950s and early 1960s, when the 
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case for the protection of the environment did not sit easily alongside dominant 




Nuclear Power and the Preservation of the Countryside 
In February 1955 the British government announced a plan for establishing the 
country as a world leader in the use of atomic energy for civil electricity generation. 
The scheme, detailed in the White Paper A Programme for Nuclear Power, was highly 
ambitious.  The government proposed to construct ten nuclear power stations over 
the course of ten years, with the aim of meeting a quarter of the UK’s electricity 
requirements by 1965.1 (Ultimately, the plan was too ambitious – nuclear accounted 
for 10 per cent of UK electricity production by 1965, and the figure only reached 25 
per cent in the 1990s.2) 
While the White Paper made the case for nuclear in raw economic terms, noting that 
‘the country’s great and growing demand for energy … is placing increasing strain on 
our supplies of coal and makes the search for supplementary sources of energy a 
matter of urgency’, atomic energy was presented as more than simply an alternative 
to depleted coal resources. As the introduction to the White Paper made clear, the 
establishment of a civil nuclear power programme was seen as a vital step in 
humanity’s scientific and technological advancement: 
Nuclear energy is the energy of the future. Although we are still only at the 
edge of knowledge of its peaceful uses, we know enough to assess some of 
its possibilities. 
																																																								
1 Ministry of Fuel and Power, A Programme for Nuclear Power (Cmd. 9389, 1955), pp. 6, 8 
2 House of Commons Library, ‘Nuclear Energy Statistics’, 9 September 2013, 
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn03631.pdf (accessed 27 April 2016) 
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Our future as an industrial country depends both on the ability of our 
scientists to discover the secrets of nature and on our speed in applying the 
new techniques that science places within our grasp.3 
This futurist discourse, with its emphasis on the conquering of nature for the benefit 
of humanity, was prevalent throughout discussion of the potential of nuclear power 
during its early development in the 1950s. As Ian Welsh notes, it was in this period 
that ‘the discourses that “civilisation was based on power”; that nuclear energy 
provided a brave new future for Britain … and that this was a bold new frontier 
became firmly established in the public realm’. 4  Such discourses point to the 
relevance of the nuclear power programme in the wider context of post-war British 
politics. At a time when reconstruction, full employment and rising affluence were 
key priorities for both Conservative and Labour governments, the nuclear power 
programme was proposed on the grounds that it would involve the application of a 
great technological discovery in order to drive British economic growth and expand 
access to the rising living standards of the period, either indirectly through the 
provision of electricity or directly through the provision of jobs at the new power 
stations. 
Early official discussion of nuclear energy had characterised the technology as ‘the 
most important step taken by man in the mastery of nature since the discovery of 
fire’, and that view was reflected in the opening by the Queen of the world’s first 
large-scale civil nuclear power station at Calder Hall, Cumbria on 17 October 1956.5 
Having performed the symbolic task of connecting the station to the electricity grid, 
																																																								
3 Cmd. 9389, p. 1 
4 Ian Welsh, Mobilizing Modernity: The Nuclear Moment (London, 2000), p. 66 




the monarch gave a speech that placed the moment in the context of the remarkable 
scientific and technological developments of the preceding century: 
In this turbulent century we have seen one technical revolution succeed 
another with astonishing speed. Within the span of a few generations our 
way of life has been transformed beyond anything our forefathers could have 
imagined. The age of steam was succeeded by an age of such startling 
achievement that we who are close to it can hardly realise that so short a 
period encompassed the invention of the motor car, the wireless, the 
aeroplane, and much else besides, which we now take for granted. 
So quickly have we learned to accept the pace of modern development that 
we have been in danger of losing our sense of wonder. That sense has been 
dramatically restored by the advent of the atomic age.6 
Such rhetoric demonstrates how nuclear technology became emblematic of post-war 
modernity. As Becky Conekin shows in her work on the 1951 Festival of Britain, the 
Attlee governments had emphasised the importance of progress and stressed the role 
that science and technology would play in building a better Britain, and that was a 
message that was retained under the Conservative governments of the 1950s.7 In 
their push to establish Britain as the world’s leader in civil nuclear power, the 
governments of Churchill, Eden and Macmillan were undoubtedly promoting the 
modern, as seen in their adoption of a discourse that emphasised the transformative 
potential of atomic energy. The technological enthusiasm for peaceful nuclear power 
was paralleled in defence, as Britain pushed to develop an independent hydrogen 
bomb (it would explode its first thermonuclear device in 1957). The British 
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government’s desire to lead the world in civil nuclear technology reflected its 
emphasis on innovation in armaments, where the aim was to outpace US weapons 
development.8 
The unique risks posed by the new technology of nuclear energy, and the need to 
exercise caution on account of relative inexperience among experts, placed the 
programme into direct conflict with the case for the conservation of the 
environment. Official policy required nuclear power stations to be constructed away 
from densely populated areas, and this safety requirement, together with the need for 
stations to be sited adjacent to large bodies of water for cooling purposes, meant that 
the installations were proposed for some of the country’s most picturesque rural 
areas.9 Under the 1947 and 1957 Electricity Acts, the Minister of Fuel and Power 
(Minister of Power from 1957) was required to consider objections lodged against 
proposed stations, and was given the power to hold public inquiries if deemed 
appropriate.10 In keeping with post-war governmental attention to the protection of 
the countryside, the 1957 Act contained an ‘amenity’ clause that required the Minister 
to have ‘regard to the desirability of preserving natural beauty’, and to ‘take into 
account any effect which [power station] proposals would have on the natural beauty 
of the countryside or on … flora, fauna, features, buildings or objects’.11 
 Between 1955 and 1963 the Central Electricity Authority (Central Electricity 
Generating Board after 1957) sought consent from the Minister of Power to build 
eight new nuclear power stations at the following locations in England and Wales: 
Berkeley, Gloucestershire; Bradwell-on-Sea, Essex; Hinkley Point, Gloucestershire; 
Trawsfynydd, Merionethshire; Dungeness, Kent; Sizewell, Suffolk; Oldbury, 
																																																								
8 David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 231-32 
9 Cmd. 9389, pp. 8-9 
10 Electricity Act, 1947, sec. 66; Electricity Act, 1957, sec. 34 
11 Electricity Act, 1957, sec. 37 
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Gloucestershire; and Wylfa, Anglesey. Of the eight, the Minister decided to hold 
public inquiries at Bradwell, Trawsfynydd, Dungeness, Oldbury and Wylfa. 
Additionally, a public inquiry was held in Scotland into the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board’s proposal for a station at Hunterston, Ayrshire. There was also an 
inquiry at Winfrith Heath, Dorset, into the proposed construction of a nuclear 
research facility by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). 
At each of these locations the case for nuclear power was considered alongside 
arguments relating to landscape preservation and nature conservation, and the 
inquiries became arenas in which the advantages of technology were weighed against 
emerging environmental concerns. As remote locations, positioned, with the 
exception of Trawsfynydd, on stretches of coastline, the proposed sites were widely 
considered to be beauty spots, popular with local residents, holidaymakers and nature 
enthusiasts, and this inevitably raised the question of whether they were suitable for 
the construction of major industrial installations. It was asked whether British 
technological innovation, and the need for increased electricity generation, 
outweighed the aesthetic beauty and recreational utility of unspoiled sections of the 
countryside. The question loomed particularly large at Trawsfynydd, where the 
proposed power station would be situated in the Snowdonia National Park, placing 
the nuclear power programme into direct conflict with the government’s own 
National Parks and nature preservation policy. The National Parks Commission 
appeared as an objector at the Trawsfynydd inquiry, while the Nature Conservancy 
objected at Dungeness, owing to the area’s status as a nature reserve. The 
involvement of the two state conservation agencies underlines how the planning 
legislation of the post-war period had created the political conditions for 
environmental opposition to industrial and technological projects. Other objectors at 
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the siting inquiries included private individuals, some of whom lived locally and 
others whom travelled from further afield, and representatives of several of the 
leading conservationist and outdoor organisations of the period, including the 
Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE), the Council for the 
Preservation of Rural Wales, the Ramblers’ Association and the Youth Hostels 
Association. The case in favour of the projects was advanced by the electricity board, 
with assistance from the UKAEA, but support did not only come from central 
government bodies. Private individuals spoke for as well as against the power 
stations, as did representatives of local authorities, trade unions and political parties. 
The case of nuclear power underlines the complexity of environmental politics in 
post-war Britain. While on the surface the conflict over the siting of power stations 
might be characterised, in line with the work of Bill Luckin, as a clash between 
‘triumphalist’ state-backed supporters of scientific advancement and ‘traditionalist’ 
preservationist campaigners, analysis of the inquiries reveals that both sides sought to 
reconcile technological and economic development with the preservation of the rural 
landscape.12 As has already been shown in this thesis with reference to National 
Parks and clean air, and as will be demonstrated with reference to pollution and 
traffic in towns in later chapters, while post-war governments were committed to the 
growth of the economy and the development of Britain’s technological capacity, 
both the Conservative and Labour parties simultaneously supported the extension of 
state powers to protect both urban and rural surroundings. The legislative measures 
of the 1940s and 1950s, discussed in chapters two and three, demonstrate that, amid 
significant post-war enthusiasm for technological progress, there were attempts by 
conventional political actors to control what Anthony Giddens characterises as the 
																																																								




‘juggernaut’ of modernity.13 At the same time, objectors to specific power station 
sites rarely expressed their views in terms of outright opposition to the nuclear 
power programme. As with earlier calls for the introduction of National Parks, the 
appeal for the protection of the rural landscape was presented as being compatible 
with the pursuit of development. Objectors were keen to express their enthusiasm 
for growth and progress, but at the same time they asked whether development had 
to necessitate the absolute triumph of the new at the expense of the old, and whether 
the preservation of the old – both in terms of the country’s natural environment and 
of its man-made heritage – could itself become a component of British modernity. 
Ultimately, however, it is important to note how the case of the nuclear power 
programme demonstrated the limits of environmental politics in the post-war period. 
While it is clear, as is shown throughout this thesis, that government was willing to 
enact environmental policies when they were considered to be compatible with 
dominant political priorities, nuclear power highlights what happened when such 
policies could not be squared with the imperative of development. While 
governments were attentive to environmental concerns in the post-war period, their 
key priority was the maintenance of Britain’s status as an economic power and a 
technological nation, and as such preservationist concerns were, in the end, easily 
overridden by the commitment to nuclear energy. 
The proceedings of the nuclear power inquiries are traced here through the records 
of the Ministry of Power, the UKAEA, the National Parks Commission and the 
Nature Conservancy, which are all held in the National Archives. Additionally, 
reference is made to the papers of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which 
are held in the Archives and Special Collections at the London School of Economics. 
The chapter also draws on national and local newspaper sources.  
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The official case 
As we have seen, the 1955 White Paper established two core justifications for 
pursuing a large-scale nuclear power programme. On the one hand, nuclear power 
was portrayed as essential to Britain’s economic wellbeing and continuing prosperity, 
while on the other it was presented as an exciting modernist leap into a bright 
technological future. In applying for permission to build the nuclear installations that 
would fulfil the ambitious programme, the electricity board employed both those 
narratives as justification.  
At each inquiry that took place between 1955 and 1963, proceedings began with a 
presentation of the official case by the counsel representing the electricity board. At 
the first inquiry, at Bradwell in May 1956, Harold Willis QC opened the case for the 
Central Electricity Authority by emphasising the wondrous potential of nuclear 
energy: 
For many years, scientists have dreamed of tapping the huge store of energy 
locked up in the atom, but it was not until 1939 that the secret of “nuclear 
fission” was discovered. It was immediately realised what great potentialities 
this new source of power provided for commerce and industry.14 
The realisation of that potential was portrayed as vital to Britain’s economic future. 
Speaking at the Trawsfynydd inquiry in February 1958, S.B.R. Cooke outlined the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) case in numerical terms. In England 
and Wales, demand for electricity was doubling every ten to 12 years, and coal 
supplies were no longer sufficient for meeting that growing demand.15 Called as a 
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witness at Dungeness in December 1958, Donald Clark, chief planning engineer for 
the CEGB, made the argument that the continuation of the economic growth 
enjoyed by Britain during the 1950s depended on the fulfilment of the nuclear power 
programme. ‘It seems to us that it is vital to the future prosperity of the country,’ 
Clark told the inquiry. ‘If as a nation we are going to support fifty million people with 
a steadily rising standard of living, then the industrial output [of electricity] per head 
of the population must increase.’16 
With such statements the electricity board representatives were echoing the 
arguments of those charged with leading Britain’s drive to establish itself as a world 
leader in nuclear energy. Speaking in 1956, Sir John Cockcroft, head of the Research 
Group at the UKAEA, suggested that living standards would fall if the nuclear 
programme were unsuccessful: 
Without the introduction of nuclear energy as a source of power there would 
not, twenty years from now, be enough of the ordinary present-day fuels to 
go round. The rise in our standard of living would come to a halt and in time 
even slip back. With atomic energy we can be fairly confident that our 
standard of living will go on improving.17 
Thus, the electricity board and the UKAEA, in line with the case presented by the 
government in its White Paper, made a compelling pitch for the construction of 
nuclear power stations. If they were to enjoy success, opponents of projects 
connected to the programme would require arguments capable of outweighing a case 
that portrayed atomic energy as integral to Britain’s future as a prosperous economic 
power and a pioneer of technological modernity. 
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Risk and radiation 
Before analysing in detail the conflict that did arise over the proposed nuclear power 
stations, it is important to highlight what did not play a central role in the argument. 
From our present vantage point, it is tempting to assume that objections to nuclear 
power would centre on the potential dangers arising from the use of radioactive 
materials. Certainly, this applies to public opposition to the technology since the 
1970s, with anti-nuclear campaigns in a range of countries focusing on the risk of 
accidents and the problems of radioactive waste disposal.18 In his study of the 
reception of nuclear power in Britain, Ian Welsh draws on the published reports (but 
not the archival records) of two nuclear power inquiries from the 1950s – Bradwell 
and Hunterston – to argue that ‘unequivocal public acceptance of the nuclear 
moment has never been forthcoming’.19 For Welsh, evidence of public ambivalence 
towards nuclear power in the 1950s can be found in expressions of concern around 
radiation in the early public inquiries. In his view, the inquiries show that ‘nuclear-
specific issues were part of the public consciousness from the very earliest days of 
the nuclear enterprise’, and while the government and the electricity boards expected 
nuclear energy to be greeted with adulation at the inquiries, it was in fact met with 
‘suspicion, distrust and open hostility’.20 
Welsh is correct to note that concerns over radiation did play a role in the inquiries 
of the late 1950s and early 1960s, but focusing on this issue draws attention from 
conflicts that played a far greater role in proceedings. Certainly, some of those who 
appeared at the inquiries or lodged written objections were concerned about 
radiation. Ahead of the Dungeness inquiry, an individual objector named C. Vaughan 
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Saunders wrote to the Ministry of Power to express concern that birds roosting close 
to the station might become contaminated by radiation. ‘The prospect of so many 
winged messengers of death going inland from Dungeness,’ wrote Vaughan 
Saunders, ‘is not one to be relished.’21 At Bradwell, there was discussion of the 
potential impact on oyster stocks of the cooling water that was to be discharged from 
the power station into the sea. The News Chronicle reported that fishermen along the 
Blackwater Estuary were ‘worried … over the prospect of catching “atomic oysters”’, 
while the Daily Sketch wrote that ‘radioactive oysters may soon be dredged at 
Bradwell-on-Sea’. 22  At Trawsfynydd, the counsel representing the North Wales 
(Hydro-Electricity) Protection Committee noted that the discharge of water would 
raise the temperature of the lake beside which the power station was to be built, and 
asked whether ‘sufficient forethought’ had been given ‘to what result will be brought 
about by heating up the lake’. It might not be long, he suggested, ‘before some 
humourist slips a baby crocodile or two into the lake’, and locals found themselves 
‘being snapped at by radioactive crocodiles’.23 
Concerns over contamination were echoed, albeit in less sensational terms, by the 
National Farmers’ Union (NFU), which passed a resolution opposing Dungeness on 
account of ‘the possible risk to the health of the population and that of the large 
numbers of livestock kept here and also to crops and water supplies’ arising from 
radiation. Throughout the inquiries, it was the NFU that most consistently expressed 
the fears we have come to associate with opposition to nuclear power. In outlining 
its objections at the Oldbury inquiry in April 1960, the union pointed to ‘a natural lay 
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concern at the ever rapid stepping up in the production of a potential Frankenstein 
monster, full control of which did not appear to be guaranteed’.24 
However, while concerns relating to radiation did feature in the nuclear power 
inquiries of this period, what is striking in the documentary records is the extent to 
which such fears were absent from the discussions. It was even pointed out that 
nuclear power had the potential to be a far cleaner source of energy than coal. At the 
Trawsfynydd inquiry, Clark of the CEGB was asked by the counsel for his own side 
to ‘deal with the impact that the construction and operation of [the station] would 
have on the environment’. While he acknowledged that it would be impossible to 
establish such an installation ‘without having some impact on the environment’, 
Clark pointed out that, unlike a coal-fired power station, a nuclear facility would 
produce little noise, and would not expel smoke or ash into the atmosphere.25 
Similarly, when Clark was asked to do the same thing at the Dungeness inquiry, he 
said that nuclear power had ‘the advantage of being clean – there is no coal store, no 
need for an ash disposal mound, there are no chimneys, no smoke, no smell’.26 
Even after the fire at the military reactor in Windscale, Cumbria in October 1957, 
which highlighted the potential risks of nuclear technology, the radiation issue did 
not play a dominant role in the proceedings of the nuclear power inquiries. At the 
Trawsfynydd inquiry, which took place just four months after the Windscale 
accident, the Farmers’ Union of Wales asked for reassurance that a similar accident 
could not occur at a civil nuclear power plant, and when its counsel was assured that 
it could not, he stated that he was ‘quite happy about that’. 27 Similarly, when 
representatives of Kent County Council asked for such an assurance at Dungeness, 
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the transcript of the inquiry indicates that they had no objection to the CEGB’s 
response.28 
Further evidence for the limited effect of Windscale can be found in the records of 
the public relations department of the UKAEA. The fact that the Authority felt that 
it required a PR department demonstrates an awareness that public perceptions of 
nuclear energy required careful management, but the department’s internal 
discussions suggest that this was carried out with significant success during this 
period. In a public relations policy document drafted in March 1961 (which discussed 
the public relations impact of the incident, rather than the technical question of any 
actual pollution released by the fire), the UKAEA praised itself for the way in which 
it had handled the incident in Cumbria: 
Although the Windscale accident agitated the “apprehension pendulum” 
quite markedly in 1957, it did not (as it might have done) generate a national 
campaign for calling a halt to the further building of nuclear installations. 
There is no doubt that we emerged from this period with comparatively little 
damage because of the enlightened way in which the Authority accepted the 
responsibility of full and frank day-to-day exposition of what was 
happening.29 
Safety concerns, then, did not pose a significant obstacle to the construction of 
nuclear power stations in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, it was more common at the 
inquiries for objectors to call for the safety regulations governing the siting of 
stations to be relaxed. When given the opportunity to cross-examine the head of the 
UKAEA’s Reactor Safety Division at the Dungeness inquiry, Max Nicholson, a 
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leading conservationist and director of the Nature Conservancy, pursued a line of 
questioning that focused on determining how many years it would be before stations 
could be built closer to densely populated areas, and thus away from areas of natural 
beauty.30 Similarly, in objecting to Sizewell in 1959, the Ipswich and District Natural 
History Society argued that the station should be built in an area that had been 
‘already spoilt’ by industrial development. 31  At Bradwell, this was a common 
argument. A list of objections taken to the Minister of Fuel and Power in February 
1956 shows that safety was a low priority, appearing fifth out of six items on the list, 
and throughout the inquiry process calls were made for the construction of the 
station in a more populated area.32 In a letter to The Times in January 1956, the former 
MP for Maldon, Tom Driberg, called for a relaxation of the siting rules, while an 
editorial column in the Essex County Standard in March of that year described the 
policy as a ‘foolish idea’ designed to ‘placate the quite unfounded fears of 
uninformed people’. 33  In an internal report on proceedings at Bradwell, the 
UKAEA’s director of public relations, Eric H. Underwood, expressed concern that 
the public were too confident about nuclear power. ‘The facts of the situation were 
received so calmly,’ wrote Underwood, ‘that there would appear to be a danger of 
public opinion underrating the risk and pressing for a siting policy less cautious than 
the one we have adopted.’34 
Therefore, while there was discussion of the risks relating to radiation at the nuclear 
power inquiries, and such risks did play an important role in the arguments of some 
objectors, the issue should not be presented as integral to reservations around atomic 
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energy in this period. In fact, the nature of the central conflict that arose at the 
inquiries can be discerned in the arguments of those who thought that the safety 
regulations governing the siting of nuclear power stations were too strict. As we shall 
see, what was contested at the inquiries was whether industry and economic 
development should be prioritised over the preservation of the countryside. 
‘Bread versus Beauty’ 
The complaints that arose at the first inquiry at Bradwell set the tone for the 
objections at later inquiries. At Bradwell, 313 people filed formal objections, and 
their primary concern was put to Aubrey Jones, the Minister of Fuel and Power, by a 
deputation that visited him on 26 February 1956. Bradwell represented the ‘last piece 
of unspoiled coastline within 50 miles of London’, and as such ought to have been 
protected from such development. In the view of Joan Wolf, an objector from 
Wickford, Essex, ‘the ancient peace of that whole area, hitherto untouched by the 
onrush of civilisation,’ would be shattered and the area would ‘doubtless be made 
hideous with new roads and buildings’.35 For M.G. Carney, also of Wickford, the 
proposal at Bradwell was a symptom of a wider malaise: 
Scarcely a month goes by but another part of this once beautiful country is 
irretrievably destroyed. There are many Englishmen who hold the country of 
their ancestors more dear than anything in life, and for these, as each fresh 
instance is reported, the sickness in their hearts grows heavier to bear. Most, 
from a conviction of helplessness, keep silent, as I have until this moment. 
But now this malignant growth which has already so much of the body in its 
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grip is threatening the last untainted piece of healthy flesh in 50 miles from 
the country’s heart.36 
Such concern was echoed at subsequent inquiries. Speaking with reference to the 
building of the atomic research establishment at Winfrith Heath, Sir Patrick 
Abercrombie, the esteemed town planner and honorary secretary of the CPRE, 
argued that all areas of the countryside were threatened by such developments. 
‘Every county,’ he said, ‘which has an unspoilt area, has a danger of some use being 
found for it for these modern essential purposes.’37 At Dungeness, the objectors’ case 
rested on the area’s status as a ‘unique tongue of land and shingle, unmatched in 
character and at present unspoilt by modern development’. In a letter to the Minister 
of Power, N. Bower, an official at the Nature Conservancy, appealed to him to spare 
Dungeness and choose an alternative site that would ‘avoid encroachment of 
conspicuous industrialism on one of the few undeveloped stretches of coast in south 
England’.38 A similar argument was made in objection to Sizewell – it was ‘one of the 
nearest stretches of unspoiled beautiful coastline to London’, and as such was an 
unsuitable location for a nuclear plant.39 At Oldbury, the CPRE argued that a station 
would represent ‘an incongruous invasion of a peaceful, beautiful and unspoilt 
riverside landscape’, and at Wylfa in 1961 a private objector, A.D. Kudwell, protested 
against ‘the desecration of one of the few spots in the British Isles which have so far 
escaped the twentieth-century process of uglification’.40 
However, while such objections played a prominent role in the debate over the 
construction of the stations, it is important to acknowledge that the nuclear power 
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programme was greeted with enthusiasm by a significant portion of those involved in 
the inquiries. The national discourse that surrounded nuclear power, which presented 
it as a symbol of modernity and progress, and as a potential driver of economic 
growth, had considerable purchase at the local level. In Bradwell, a vote taken at a 
parish meeting on the eve of the inquiry recorded 115 people in favour of the 
construction of the station, with 32 against.41 At Trawsfynydd, a similar meeting 
apparently saw no objectors to the scheme at all, and Thomas William Jones, the 
Labour MP for Merionethshire, told the inquiry that he had ‘never known such 
unanimity in Wales’ as had been shown in favour of the nuclear power station. 
Jones’s point was supported by Thomas Evan Jenkins, chairman of Merionethshire 
County Council, who explained that the Council had passed a unanimous resolution 
in favour of the construction of a nuclear research facility or power station in the 
area, stating that they were ‘prepared to take all steps in their power’ to encourage 
such a project.42 In the view of D.W. Jones-Williams, clerk to Merionethshire County 
Council, local enthusiasm could be attributed not only to the fact that a power 
station would bring new employment opportunities, but also to the fact that such a 
station was representative of progress: 
[We] feel very strongly that this station is something of the future, and we 
have lived in this county for far too long looking to the past, without any 
hope for the future. I think that is why the coming of this nuclear power 
station signifies more to us than some similar industry which would employ 
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300 people. It is the fact that it is an atomic station; it is a smell of the future. 
That is what we are looking forward to.43 
Evidence of similar levels of local enthusiasm can be found elsewhere. Close to 
Dungeness, the majority of members at the annual general meeting of the New 
Romney and District Ratepayers’ Association voted in favour of the project.44 At 
Wylfa it was pointed out that there was overwhelming support from the people of 
Anglesey – the County Council highlighted that, from a total population of over 
50,000 people, only 42 local residents had filed objections to the scheme.45 In a 
report from Anglesey ahead of the inquiry, the Guardian noted that ‘the active 
opposition is surprisingly small for a place which has remained comparatively 
untouched by industrial expansion’.46 
The positive reception of nuclear power by many local people fitted with the 
assumptions of the UKAEA, whose public relations section had tried to predict how 
the public would react to projects involving nuclear technology. In a paper on public 
relations policy written in May 1955, Eric H. Underwood noted that while the British 
public had ‘a deep antipathy to the new colossally destructive weapons’ developed 
for military use, the power programme was well thought of on account of being a 
‘technical [advance] likely to bring economic benefits’. He added that facts about 
nuclear power ‘are exciting in a Wellsian way and are favourably received’.47 Such 
enthusiasm is well illustrated by the stance of anti-nuclear weapons campaigners at 
the time. While it has since come to combine opposition to military technology with 
opposition to civil atomic energy, in the late 1950s and early 1960s it was common 
																																																								
43 TNA: POWE 14/1244, Trawsfynydd Inquiry Transcript, Day Three, p. 71 
44 TNA: POWE 14/1125, Letter from A.J. Bess to Lord Mills, Minister of Power, 12 December 1958 
45 TNA: POWE 14/1252 Proposed Nuclear Power Station at Wylfa, Ang: Public Inquiry, Inspectors’ 
Report (1961), p. 31 
46 Guardian, 15 February 1961 
47 TNA: AB 6/1415 Publicity: General Policy (1954-56), ‘Paper on Public Relations Policy and 
Organisation’, 13 May 1955 
	
 160 
for the anti-nuclear weapons movement to advocate electricity generation as a 
positive alternative use for nuclear science. For example, a resolution passed in 1957 
at the inaugural conference of the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear 
Weapons Testing, the precursor of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 
called on the government to ‘pursue urgently the application of the new scientific 
knowledge of nuclear power to peaceful purposes’.48 This commitment continued 
after the formation of the CND. A 1958 event entitled ‘Scientists on Trial’ featured a 
session on ‘Atoms for Peace’, while a vigil held in Whitehall in June 1958 appealed 
for Britain’s atomic power stations to be used only for the generation of power and 
not for the manufacture of weapons.49 The Youth CND membership card featured a 
charter listing the arguments against nuclear weapons, and this included the assertion 
that ‘the waste of money, manpower and materials on nuclear arms is crippling 
Britain as an industrial atomic nation, which should be developing the peaceful uses 
for the benefit of mankind’.50 
Often, even those that voiced objections to individual power station projects were 
keen to stress their broader backing for the nuclear power programme. Throughout 
the inquiry process, objectors prefaced their arguments with expressions of support, 
adopting the discourse of atomic energy as an emblem of modernity and 
technological progress. One objector to Bradwell, Louise Dawson of Chelsea, noted 
that ‘we must, of course, have atomic power stations’, before objecting on grounds 
of location, while another, Geoffrey Barber of Didcot, began his letter by stressing 
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that ‘my relations and I are not against progress, and newer devices’. Quinton Winch 
of Colchester acknowledged that nuclear power had put Britain on ‘the doorstep to a 
new age and new hope’, but asked whether the power station could be built 
elsewhere. For R.N. Gilbey of Bishops Stortford, the point was that ‘this part of 
Essex is surely too good to sacrifice – even upon such an important altar as that of 
nuclear power’.51 This was echoed by Driberg, who wrote: ‘it is in the national 
interest that there should be an improved supply of electricity, but it is surely not less 
in the national interest that some stretches of coast and country should be left 
unspoiled’.52 
Such arguments were repeated with reference to other locations. At Trawsfynydd, 
the North Wales (Hydro-Electric) Protection Committee emphasised that none of 
the objectors were arguing about ‘whether or not there should be a nuclear power 
station in North Wales. Of course there should be. What they are arguing about is 
whether this is the right place to put it.’ This was a view shared by the National Parks 
Commission, whose counsel, Roderic Brown QC, used his closing speech at the 
inquiry to point out that ‘the Commission is certainly not expressing any opposition 
to the development of nuclear power stations. In Britain as a whole there is no 
argument as to the national need for them.’53 Likewise, in a letter to the Minister of 
Power regarding Dungeness, Lord Hurcomb, President of the Council for Nature, 
noted that ‘the Council of course recognises that developments in the form of new 
nuclear stations are required in the economic and scientific interest of the country’, 
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before outlining his objections to the chosen site.54 In their letter objecting to 
Sizewell, the Ipswich and District Natural History Society wrote that they ‘realise that 
nuclear power stations have now become a necessary part of a programme for 
increasing electricity supplies’, but added that they ‘very strongly disagree with them 
being sited in attractive and undeveloped areas’.55 
While we must allow for the possibility that the expression of support for the nuclear 
power programme stemmed from the tactical considerations of objectors (i.e. the 
government was more likely to listen to site-specific concerns than it was to 
objections that rejected the entire programme), the frequency with which those 
appearing at the inquiries acknowledged the national need for atomic energy suggests 
that the refusal to accept power stations in particular locations did not form part of a 
broader rejection of technological modernity. The official narrative of nuclear power 
– that it was one of humanity’s crowning technological achievements and that it 
pointed the way to a bright and prosperous future – was accepted by the objectors to 
individual power stations just as it was by supporters. As with the arguments for 
National Parks and town and country planning discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis, any Romantic inclinations tended to be tempered by an acceptance of the 
desirability of economic development. 
Objectors were content to admit that there was much to gain from technological 
progress, but they also asked how much needed to be lost. It was a concern 
succinctly outlined by M. Corley, who represented the Cruising Association at the 
Bradwell inquiry. In Corley’s view, Bradwell constituted a test case. ‘To what extent 
in the new Industrial Revolution,’ he asked, ‘is the impersonal scientific judgement of 
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the technologist to override the preservation of values of a more intangible and 
essential character?’56 Anthony Wagner, who wrote on behalf of the National Trust 
to object to the power station at Sizewell, stated that economic growth made it 
imperative that unspoiled countryside was preserved. ‘The point has to be made,’ he 
argued, ‘that industrial development and the growth of the population have put a 
previously un-thought of value on places where loneliness can be found in 
combination with nature and natural beauty.’57 At Wylfa, the North Wales (Hydro-
Electric) Protection Committee argued that ‘industry, while providing the means of 
enjoying the fruits and beauty of the world, is fast destroying that which it is intended 
to make available’. The process had the potential to devastate the landscape, but ‘by 
careful planning and by restraint, industry could serve to open the world for our 
fulfilment without destroying it’.58 
In the opinion of Max Nicholson, representing the Nature Conservancy at 
Dungeness, many in Britain possessed a ‘split personality’: 
[We] are all consumers of electricity; we all have an interest in the success of 
the very fine work which is being done by the [electricity] board. We also 
wish to leave something of what we have enjoyed to our children, and we 
wish to have access to wild places and so on. […] 
What we are discussing here is the collision between the two sides of that 
personality, the one which wants economic development and a higher 
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standard of living, the other which wants science to advance, which wants the 
intangible values of our civilisation to be upheld and preserved.59 
That collision of personalities – the conflict between progress and preservation – was 
thrown into sharp relief at Trawsfynydd, where the site of the proposed power 
station lay within the boundaries of the Snowdonia National Park. On account of the 
special status of the area, the National Parks Commission appeared as an objector at 
the Trawsfynydd inquiry. Under the terms of the National Parks Act, it was the 
responsibility of the Commission to make recommendations to the government ‘as 
to any proposals for the development of land in a National Park’ that appeared to be 
‘inconsistent with the maintenance of the area as a Park’.60 In the opinion of Lord 
Strang, Chairman of the Commission, there was no doubt that a nuclear power 
station was inconsistent with Snowdonia’s status as a National Park. ‘The 
Commission think that an installation of this scale and magnitude would be out of 
place in a National Park,’ Strang told the Trawsfynydd inquiry. ‘No one reading the 
National Parks Act would expect to find an atomic generating station within its 
boundaries.’ He added that ‘there must be the strongest presumption against the 
erection of a large-scale industrial installation in a National Park’.61 Strang pointed 
out that this had been the position of the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan during 
his time as Minister of Housing and Local Government in Winston Churchill’s 
administration. Speaking in the House of Commons in July 1952, Macmillan 
discussed the difficulties ‘in deciding between economic and industrial development 
on the one hand, without which the country would fade away altogether, and the 
claims of amenity upon the other’. With reference to the planning responsibilities of 
local authorities in National Parks, he stated that ‘in those areas which are designated 
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as National Parks, amenity and access are to be given an overriding position’. It was 
that consideration, Macmillan concluded, that distinguished National Parks from 
other areas of the country.62 
Those arguing in favour of the scheme at Trawsfynydd vehemently rejected the 
argument that National Parks should be free from industrial development. Thomas 
William Jones MP told the inquiry that, while those present had ‘heard a great deal 
about the preservation of natural beauty in North Wales’, he, along with his fellow 
Welsh Labour MPs, was ‘concerned about the preservation of something of far 
greater importance, that is, the preservation of the Welsh way of life’. For Jones and 
others pushing for the construction of the station, the key concern was the high rate 
of unemployment in the area, and associated depopulation as people left to seek 
employment elsewhere. A nuclear power station at Trawsfynydd was seen as offering 
employment opportunities during the construction period, and 300 permanent 
positions upon completion. The 26 Labour MPs representing Welsh constituencies 
were so enthusiastic about the potential of nuclear power that they sent a deputation 
to the electricity board and, in the words of Jones, ‘pleaded that Wales should be 
represented in this advanced scientific project’.63 
The enthusiasm of the MPs was shared by Tom Jones of the Transport and General 
Workers Union, who argued that the station would contribute to the alleviation of 
Merionethshire’s severe unemployment problem, and help to preserve the cultural 
identity of one of the heartlands of the Welsh language. As to the area’s status as a 
National Park, Jones suggested that the local economy had to take priority. ‘I think it 
is morally wrong,’ Jones told the inquiry, ‘that this cultured Welsh community should 
be sacrificed to the gods of scenic beauty, and that they should rot in unemployment 
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or be forced to leave the land of their fathers in order to find employment.’ Inverting 
the Book of Genesis and the idea that man was given dominion over the earth, Jones 
concluded that the ‘vital factor in this situation’ was ‘that we do not allow the earth 
and its beauty to have dominion over man’.64 
At the centre of the arguments made by local politicians was deep suspicion of 
National Parks, and their effect on local life. Appearing on behalf of Merionethshire 
County Council, D.W. Jones-Williams called as a witness the town planner J.S. Allen, 
who was asked for his view on whether industrial development should be permitted 
in National Parks. He argued that without schemes such as that proposed for 
Trawsfynydd, regions designated as Parks ran the risk of economic stagnation. ‘Life 
within National Parks must go on and be subject to change,’ he said, ‘for without the 
willingness to change to meet contemporary needs they would die and become 
museum pieces.’ Jones-Williams underlined this point, suggesting that if 
developments such as the Trawsfynydd station were opposed, ‘the people here will 
leave, and the place will become derelict. I think there can be no greater 
disfigurement to the countryside than derelict villages and desolate towns.’65 
The nature of the conflict at the Trawsfynydd inquiry was neatly summarised by 
Mervyn Haigh of the Council for the Preservation of Rural Wales. It was, he told the 
inquiry, a dispute that is ‘popularly expressed by “Bread versus Beauty”’, a conflict 
‘between two kinds of human claim, two kinds of civil rights, two kinds of national 
interest’. While the local politicians and trade unionists that appeared at the inquiry 
clearly believed in prioritising the economic wellbeing of the local population, for 
those opposing the station the preservation of natural beauty was considered to be of 
equal importance, as integral to the experience of modernity as the continuation of 
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technological development. In the view of Percivale John Clarke, President of the 
Youth Hostels Association, protection of the landscape was so vital that it ought to 
be considered alongside economic development when judging national progress and 
prosperity: 
National Parks are themselves symbols of a high standard of living, and, 
more important, of civilised restraint. They can exist only where a society is 
so far in command of its natural urges as to deny itself certain obvious 
satisfactions in order to preserve or make possible the enjoyment of some 
thing which is felt to be good and precious. They imply an attitude of respect 
for an admired landscape and for the complex association and traditions 
which have gathered around it; they imply a will to pass it on unscarred to 
succeeding generations, and a realisation that only by deliberate acts of will, 
constantly renewed to meet new temptations, can anything worthwhile 
survive the passage of time.66 
In discussing Trawsfynydd, it is important to recognise local context. Clearly, Welsh 
nationalism played a part in the inquiry, and this does not apply to the other 
locations, with the exception of Wylfa. While this nationalism was implicit in local 
politicians’ appeals for the preservation of ‘the Welsh way of life’, at times it rose to 
the surface. For instance, when Pauline Dower, the Deputy Chair of the National 
Parks Commission, was cross-examined by Philip Davis of the Farmers’ Union of 
Wales, Davis had to be interrupted by the inspector chairing the inquiry when he 
began attacking her for being English, saying ‘I want to say that, as a patriotic 
Welshman, I resent the coming of this good lady into Wales…’67 At Wylfa, Eirwyn 
Gwynn, appearing for Plaid Cymru, stated that she was ‘most strongly objecting to 
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the presence of English organisations of people, who presume to tell us in Anglesey 
what to do’. 68  Alderman Robert Roberts, chair of the County Employment 
Committee, took a similar view. ‘I don’t want to be rude,’ he told the inquiry, ‘but I 
must say that we do not want cranks and busybodies from other parts of the country 
who have never been subjected to the hardships and the poverty we have 
experienced here between the two wars.’69 In his evidence to the inquiry Cledwyn 
Hughes, MP for Anglesey, stated that he wanted ‘to emphasise that Anglesey exists 
primarily for the people of Anglesey’. Outsiders were welcome to visit, but ‘there are 
times when some people show more concern for scenery than they do for the 
wellbeing of the people’.70 
While Welsh nationalism played a role in proceedings at Trawsfynydd and Wylfa, it 
formed part of a broader conflict over who stood to gain from the construction of 
nuclear power stations. As we have seen, there was much discussion at Trawsfynydd 
around the potential of the nuclear station to alleviate the local unemployment 
problem, and such arguments were replicated at Wylfa. The County Planning Officer 
told the inquiry that the local council had passed a resolution urging the electricity 
board to build a station in Anglesey, as such a project ‘would constitute a major step 
towards the relief of unemployment in the county’. This was echoed by Alderman 
Robert Roberts, who said that he hoped the station would be ‘the solution to the 
unemployment problem’, and who noted that the scheme was ‘wholeheartedly 
welcomed by trade unionists and all members of the working class’. 71  While 
employment did not play as great a role in the inquiries in England, perhaps owing to 
the more severe levels of unemployment in North Wales at the time, it was still used 
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as an argument by supporters of the projects. Because of its potential for providing 
jobs, the proposal for a nuclear research establishment at Winfrith Heath received 
the backing of trade unions, the local council and local branches of the Labour 
Party.72 With reference to Bradwell, a letter from Brian Harrison MP to Duncan 
Sandys, the Minister of Housing and Local Government, captured the nature of local 
divisions over the project: 
A number of people like Tom Driberg and John Betjeman would like to see 
this village preserved as a show piece. These people represent entirely the 
weekenders and a limited number of retired persons. Tom Driberg’s gardener 
put the village people’s view very well when he said to Driberg: “It is all very 
well for you but this will probably mean a better school for my children.”73 
At times the arguments of the objectors betrayed an air of elitism, or at least a belief 
that there was a cultural distinction between those who appreciated rural beauty, and 
those who did not. Writing to object to Bradwell, Louise Dawson expressed her 
hope that ‘no more places that are loved by so many discriminating people will be 
used for the purpose’ of nuclear power. For Joan Wolf, the real shock of the 
Bradwell proposal was that it was being developed under a Conservative 
government: ‘One might expect this sort of thing under a Socialist government, but 
that it should be mooted by a Conservative administration is utterly disheartening.’ It 
was common for such objectors to ask why the stations could not be built in urban 
areas, or at least away from cherished sections of the English countryside. ‘Surely it is 
better to use some war-scarred or slum clearance site,’ wrote Louise Dawson.74 It was 
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a view shared by Lady Joan Davidson of Berkhamsted, who suggested that the 
station ‘should be built among the chimney pots which already exist in the urban 
areas of Essex’.75 For the Chairman of the Essex Wildfowlers’ Association, the 
question of an alternative location to Bradwell was a simple one: ‘Why not Wales?’76 
The clash between those that emphasised development and employment, and those 
that emphasised conservation and the appreciation of natural beauty, points to the 
place of the conflict over nuclear power in the broader context of British politics in 
the 1950s and early 1960s. Successive governments promoted economic 
modernisation and sought credit for the newfound levels of affluence made possible 
by the innovations of the time. For those that supported nuclear power in locations 
like Trawsfynydd or Wylfa, the official justifications for the programme had a clear 
appeal – in welcoming atomic energy into their area they were welcoming a symbolic 
technology that bore all the hallmarks of modernity and future progress, as well as a 
new source of employment that had the potential to provide local people with access 
to the rising living standards promised by the governments of the day.  
Yet, amid great enthusiasm for technological development, the post-war years were 
also the period in which the conservation of nature entered the structure of British 
politics. As chapter two of this thesis shows, the Labour and Conservative parties 
had supported the introduction of National Parks in the 1940s with the aim both of 
protecting areas of the countryside from the ongoing processes of urbanisation and 
industrialisation, and of providing greater recreational opportunities for the British 
people. A hard-working population was seen as deserving leisure and the opportunity 
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to escape from busy urban life, and in order to make this possible the government 
moved to protect the more beautiful parts of the countryside.  
National Parks were made necessary by the pace of industrial and urban 
development, but they were not an attack on modernity. Rather they were a measure 
designed to improve the British people’s experience of modernity. This rationale was 
captured in the judgement of C.D Buchanan, the inspector representing the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government at the Trawsfynydd inquiry, who opted to abstain 
from recommending that his Minister should support the project (he stopped short 
of advising the Minister to oppose it). In the inquiry report, Buchanan argued that 
National Parks were becoming increasingly valuable ‘as more and more people get 
holidays-with-pay, as more people acquire motor-cars, and as open-air pursuits 
attract a wider following’. Their value, he added, 
must increase as open-air amenities in other parts of the country are affected 
by industrial and urban developments (many perhaps quite unseen at the 
moment) which are demanded by advancing technologies and are needed to 
survive as a great industrial nation. I have heard it suggested that our efforts 
to survive in this way could produce a country not worth surviving in. That is 
doubtless a very gloomy view, but to some people there is at least a 
discernable tendency in that direction. I would have thought the National 
Parks ought to stand as indestructible bulwarks against such a danger 
however remote it may seem at present.77 
National Parks, then, were a product of economic development, intended as a 
counterbalance to its perceived excesses. As modernisation continued apace in post-
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war Britain, conservation entered formal politics, not as an attack on modernity, but 
as part of its negotiation by those living through it. The increasing political visibility 
of environmental concerns was apparent during the nuclear power inquiries, not least 
at Trawsfynydd and Dungeness, where two recently-formed government agencies, 
the National Parks Commission and the Nature Conservancy, went head-to-head 
with another, the Central Electricity Generating Board, in opposing a major 
infrastructure project. The imperative of technological progress was accepted at the 
nuclear power inquiries, but there remained questions over exactly what the future 
would entail. In the words of one private objector at the Wylfa inquiry, ‘just how far 
are we, as a nation, willing to go in our chase after higher standards of living?’78  
Conclusion 
It must be noted that all of the nuclear power stations proposed during the late 
1950s and early 1960s were built – none of the objectors at the inquiries were 
successful in preventing the construction of a station. However, despite this apparent 
failure, the debates around the nuclear power programme provide evidence of a 
significant development in post-war British politics, central to the argument of this 
thesis. With the town and country planning and National Parks legislation discussed 
in chapter two, the Attlee government made the preservation of the countryside a 
matter of state policy. ‘Amenity’ had become a necessary consideration in planning 
decisions, and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act had set up two 
government bodies, the National Parks Commission and the Nature Conservancy, 
that were intended to promote the cause of conservation. Once conservation was 
established as part of the administrative framework of planning, local and central 
government did not have the option of simply ignoring it. When the siting of nuclear 
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power stations came up for discussion in the 1950s, the Conservative government’s 
own electricity legislation required it to take account of amenity, and the protection 
of the rural landscape necessarily became a central point of debate during the public 
inquiry process. Representatives of the National Parks Commission and the Nature 
Conservancy took their responsibilities seriously, showing a willingness to mount 
opposition to projects that were advanced by the British state, despite their own 
status as statutory bodies. Although government policy was dominated by the 
priority of maintaining Britain’s status as a leading economic and technological 
nation, the cases examined throughout this thesis, from countryside preservation to 
pollution and traffic in towns, demonstrate that the protection of the environment 
was not entirely neglected. The environment was taking shape as a field of policy 
during the post-war period, and becoming a factor in the decisions taken within 
Whitehall. 
While they cannot provide us with a true measure of national opinion, the nuclear 
power inquiries offer a snapshot of the range of public views around technological 
development and the preservation of the countryside. On the one hand, as was seen 
in particular in North Wales, the desire of many people for economic security 
outweighed any interest in conservation, and measures such as National Parks were 
seen as frivolous when set against the prospect of jobs and growth. On the other side 
of the argument, large numbers of objectors emphasised the vital need to protect 
rural beauty, and asked whether the destruction of the countryside was a price worth 
paying for economic development. It appears that there was a class dimension to this 
difference of opinion, with trade unions and Labour MPs speaking up for jobs, while 
predominantly middle-class conservationist organisations played a prominent role in 
opposing the power stations. This is a split that invites reference to Ronald 
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Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism – it was only once economic security had been 
achieved that individuals could turn their attentions to the luxury of protecting the 
rural landscape. 
The division, however, was not a binary one. As Nicholson suggested at the 
Dungeness inquiry with his reference to a ‘split personality’, it is possible that many 
people in Britain were pulled in both directions, desiring the fruits of affluence and 
the trappings of modern life, as represented by nuclear-generated electricity, while 
also wishing to preserve the countryside for future generations. Frequently during the 
inquiries process, it was argued that progress and preservation could occur side-by-
side, with National Parks representing the conscious effort of an affluent society to 
control its own excesses. The position of the majority may have been best summed 
up in the Liverpool Daily Post in reference to Wylfa, when the newspaper criticised 
both the ‘lunatic fringes’ of the objectors, ‘who wish Anglesey to remain forever an 
island full of simple rustics tilling the soil or drawing the dole’, and the more fervent 
advocates of nuclear power, ‘the industry-at-any-price section’, who would sacrifice 
too much ‘for rateable value and jobs’.79 This underlines a theme that is present 
throughout this thesis. While calls for the protection of the environment, both urban 
and rural, increased during the inter-war and post-war periods, they were often 
expressed alongside enthusiasm for economic and technological development, and 
did not represent an expression of an ‘anti-industrial’ spirit or a radical backlash 
against growth. 
Ultimately, however, the nuclear power programme demonstrated the limits of 
environmental politics in the 1950s and early 1960s. While conservation had acquired 
a position within decision-making structures, it was by no means dominant, and it 
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did not have sufficient influence to prevail over a symbolic project that government 
presented as vital to Britain’s future economic and technological prowess. The 
nuclear power programme was considered by government to be a mater of national 
interest and, as was made clear at Dungeness, ‘special minority interests’ would not 
be allowed to take precedence over ‘the interests of the public as a whole’.80 In order 
for environmental concerns to prevail in the post-war period, it was necessary that 
they did not conflict with dominant political priorities. As is shown in chapter three, 
clean air legislation was passed in 1956 because it was deemed to be in the national 
interest, both in terms of public health and economics. When set against nuclear 
power, the preservation of the countryside was not able to fulfil that requirement. 
The government’s own National Parks policy was intended to prioritise conservation 
over industrial development, but at Trawsfynydd the commitment to the atomic 
energy programme ensured that this provision was easily overridden. 
Nevertheless, environmental politics would continue to develop. As the next chapter 
shows, during the 1960s government was unable to ignore a range of problems, each 
of which arose as unwanted effects of modernisation and affluence, and the state 
increasingly stepped in to regulate the rural and urban environments. Crucially, 
environmental policies were presented as complementary to growth and prosperity, 
offering a means for facilitating the enhancement of the ‘quality of life’ of the British 
population.
																																																								




The Creation of the Department of the Environment 
In October 1970, the Conservative government of Edward Heath established the 
Department of the Environment (DOE), combining the functions of the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government (MHLG), the Ministry of Transport and the 
Ministry of Public Building and Works. Headed by the Secretary of State for the 
Environment, a position held by Peter Walker from 1970 to 1972, the department 
unified the three former ministries on the principle that it was ‘increasingly accepted 
that maintaining a decent environment, improving people’s living conditions and 
providing for adequate transport facilities all come together in the planning of 
development’. While the Secretary of State was given overall control and final 
responsibility for the decisions of the new department, junior ministers were given 
responsibility for Local Government and Development, Housing and Construction, 
and Transport Industries. The department’s powers largely applied to England, with 
responsibility for environmental administration in Scotland and Wales remaining 
with the Scottish and Welsh offices.1 
The DOE was a creation of the Heath government, but it is important to note that 
Harold Wilson’s Labour government had been planning similar measures before 
losing power in the general election of June 1970. In October 1969, Wilson gave 
Anthony Crosland the new post of Secretary of State for Local Government and 
Regional Planning, with responsibility for coordinating the work of the MHLG and 
the Ministry of Transport. Crosland’s new department was focused on meeting the 
environmental challenges posed by town and country planning and the development 
of transport infrastructure, and Crosland was asked by Wilson to investigate how the 
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policy areas could be further integrated. This followed a number of administrative 
developments over the latter half of the 1960s, including amendments to town and 
country planning laws and the extension of National Parks legislation in 1968, and 
the creation of a standing Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in 
December 1969. The UK government also became increasingly involved in 
international discussions of environmental issues as the 1960s drew to a close. 
Whereas existing studies have played down the importance of the DOE, it is the aim 
of this chapter to demonstrate that its creation was a significant moment in the 
development of environmental politics in Britain. While it could be seen simply as a 
functional change to the organisation of the civil service and the machinery of 
government, the establishment of the department reflects deeper shifts within British 
politics in the years leading up to 1970, and marks the culmination of the increasing 
state attention to the protection of the environment that is traced throughout this 
thesis, beginning with National Parks and town and country planning policy in the 
1940s. Essentially, the creation of the DOE was an attempt to come to terms with 
two challenges that dominated discussion of the environment during the 1960s. First, 
how the continuing advance of motorised transport, and particularly private car 
ownership, could be squared with the aim of planning a healthy and pleasant urban 
environment, and second, how the problem of pollution to land, air and water could 
be addressed at levels ranging from the local to the international. In addition, 
government attention continued to fall on the challenge of protecting the 
countryside from development, advancing the work begun in the inter-war and post-
war years, and that responsibility passed to the DOE on its creation in 1970.  
During the 1960s, those challenges were increasingly viewed as ‘environmental’, and 
the term became established as the label for the policy areas that would eventually be 
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covered by the new department. Crucially, the ‘environment’ in British politics was 
conceptualised as comprising both rural and urban surroundings. While the country 
planning discussed in chapters two and four of this thesis continued to present 
problems, and was addressed through the passage of the Countryside Act in 1968, 
the spotlight in the 1960s was firmly upon urban planning, in particular the difficulty 
of incorporating the car into towns and cities. A clear link was made between 
improving the quality of surroundings, both in town and country, and improving the 
standard of living of the population. When the term ‘environment’ was used in 
British politics in the 1960s, it was usually with reference to the broad aim of raising 
the ‘quality of life’ of the British people. By the end of the decade, both the Labour 
and Conservative parties were increasingly speaking the language of the 
‘environment’ and ‘quality of life’. This did not represent a dramatic conversion to a 
new ecological politics, but rather a response to long-term and ongoing policy 
problems, and a reaction to individual events that highlighted the need for greater 
governance of the relationship between society and its natural and built 
surroundings. There was a connection to rising levels of affluence, as both main 
parties came to the view that the public expected government to do more than 
simply guarantee basic levels of material security and sanitation. Public health 
mattered, as it had when the Clean Air Act was passed in the 1950s, but so did 
aesthetics, mobility and the ability to enjoy leisure time. There is little evidence of 
government responding to a growing environmental social movement during the 
1960s, but there is much evidence of a perception within government that the public 
increasingly demanded environmental policies that would raise their quality of life. In 
line with the central arguments of this thesis, the creation of the DOE demonstrates 
how environmental politics took shape in Britain not as part of an ‘anti-industrial’ 
reaction against the circumstances of modernity, but as an attempt to apply the 
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expertise of the state to the management of the problems associated with industrial 
and urban development. Where public demand fed into the process, it was in terms 
of a desire to enjoy the benefits of affluence, rather than a wish to curb the 
advancement of science and technology. In doing so, this chapter makes the case for 
reconsideration of the link between the 1960s and the politics of the environment in 
Britain, arguing that the key development of the decade was not the rise of radical 
activism, but rather the crystallisation of the ‘environment’ as a unified field of public 
policy, covering the problems of governance explored throughout this thesis. As in 
other chapters, the state and conventional political actors are repositioned at the 
heart of the story. 
This chapter begins by analysing the approach of both Conservative and Labour 
governments to town and country planning in the early 1960s, particularly with 
reference to the challenge of traffic in towns. The focus in this chapter is on the 
implications of the problem for the machinery of central government, with the 
practical impact of motor vehicles on urban centres receiving more detailed coverage 
in chapter six. Next, the chapter turns to the problem of pollution, analysing 
developments at the official level alongside a more general rise in concern around the 
degradation of the environment. Here, it is shown how pollution events, particularly 
the Torrey Canyon oil spill in 1967, played a role in awakening public opinion and 
governmental concern. While government and political parties responded to public 
opinion, they also sought to shape it to their own advantage through adoption of the 
anti-pollution cause, and by the end of the decade environmental policies were seen 
as carrying potential electoral benefits. Within government, attention to the 
environment increased not only within domestic departments, but also within the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which played an active, if cautiously 
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sceptical, role in the shaping of an international environmental agenda. Finally, the 
chapter looks at how the governments of both Wilson and Heath responded to the 
environmental problems of the 1960s by making changes to the organisation of 
Whitehall departments. While political calculation naturally played a role, it is argued 
that the measures taken by both Labour and the Conservatives represented genuine 
attempts to address pressing environmental issues, and reflected personal concern 
among leading political actors that the environment was becoming a key challenge as 
the 1960s gave way to the 1970s.  
The challenge of planning in the early 1960s 
As the 1960s began, planning retained its position as a central, if often loosely 
defined, principle within mainstream British politics. As Glen O’Hara notes, both 
Labour and the Conservatives placed their confidence in comprehensive, long-term 
planning, whether in terms of economic planning, the planning of health and welfare 
provision, or the continuing development of town and country planning 
mechanisms.2 While the Conservatives had loosened the regulations on development 
charges in 1952, the party remained committed in principle to physical planning, 
establishing the concept of protected ‘green belt’ land as national policy in 1955, 
while Labour returned to power in 1964 committed to setting up a Land 
Commission with the purpose of collecting tax on profit made on land transactions, 
and facilitating the development of land for housing.3 
In the countryside there was continuity with the themes examined in chapters two 
and four of this thesis, with the focus remaining on balancing development and 
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leisure with the preservation of the landscape and nature, while in towns and cities 
planning policy aimed to accommodate the needs of housing, commerce and 
industry, and secure a standard of living in keeping with rising post-war expectations. 
By the end of the 1950s, it was clear that the greatest challenge to successful urban 
planning was posed by one of the key symbols of rising affluence: private motor car 
ownership.  The impact of the car will be expanded upon in chapter six, but for the 
purposes of the present chapter it should be noted that the problem had begun to 
preoccupy central government by the beginning of the 1960s. On 10 December 
1959, Labour’s transport spokesman, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, moved a motion 
in the Commons criticising the Conservative government for failing to tackle the 
growing problem of traffic in urban areas. Describing urban congestion as ‘a 
problem which we all recognise to exist in the most critical form in all our cities’, 
Benn called on the government to increase investment in transport, and to ensure 
that transport infrastructure was considered as one of the crucial components of the 
wider challenge of urban planning.4  
Responding to Benn, the Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples, admitted that the 
problem worried him ‘a great deal’, and acknowledged that transport needed to be 
tackled as part of town planning more generally. ‘This is not merely a road 
engineering problem,’ Marples told the House. ‘It is a design for living in the fourth 
quarter of this century. We must come to terms with the motor car without letting it 
destroy our way of life. We cannot allow it to grind the amenities out of existence.’ In 
order to investigate long-term solutions to the problem, Marples announced that he 
would appoint a study group ‘to go not merely into the road programme, but to 
consist of architects and town planners, embracing both roads and amenities, to see 
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which way we are going and how we can come to terms with this problem’. This 
would be done ‘before it is too late, and disaster overtakes us’.5 
In the summer of 1960, Marples appointed the respected town planner Colin 
Buchanan to lead a Working Group ‘to study the long-term development of roads 
and traffic in urban areas and their influence on the urban environment’.6 Alongside 
Buchanan’s Working Group, a Steering Group was appointed under Sir Geoffrey 
Crowther, and given the task of making public policy recommendations based on the 
eventual report. Buchanan’s investigations took three years, and when the report, 
Traffic in Towns, was finally published in November 1963, its author was unequivocal 
about the implications of traffic for British towns and cities. Describing the problem 
as ‘one of the most extraordinary facing modern society’, Buchanan wrote that, 
unless a solution was found, ‘either the utility of vehicles in towns will decline 
rapidly, or the pleasantness and safety of surroundings will deteriorate 
catastrophically’.7  
In making recommendations for how towns and cities could be remodelled to 
accommodate mass car ownership (those recommendations will be covered more 
fully in chapter six), Buchanan argued that the town and country planning system 
lacked ambition and was failing to address the impact of vehicles in urban areas. As 
things stood, ‘few of the statutory development plans really face up to the future 
problems of traffic and transport’, yet ‘the main creative opportunities for dealing 
with motor traffic will come in conjunction with the enormous task of urban 
reconstruction and expansion which faces this country’.8 The policy implications 
were expanded upon by Crowther’s Steering Group, which argued that planning 
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needed to be conducted on a regional, rather than local, basis, with Regional 
Development Agencies coordinating the plans of local authorities, ensuring ‘that they 
are added up to a comprehensive and practical scheme for reconciling the car and the 
city – that is, for making it possible for traffic to move while keeping the city as a 
good place to live in’.9 
Traffic in Towns received widespread media coverage, and prompted intense political 
debate. The Times described it as ‘a work of fundamental importance not only to this 
country but to every other … where the growth in traffic threatens to destroy the 
urban environment’, and argued that Britain had no choice ‘but to embark, belatedly, 
on the creation of a new and better urban environment’.10 At the political level, 
discussion centred on how the planning machinery could be adapted to meet the 
challenge of traffic, and there was acknowledgement that transport and town-
planning policies required closer integration. On the day of the report’s publication, 
Marples noted that ‘planning of traffic and planning of land use must go together’, 
and announced that an Urban Planning Group had been created within Whitehall 
with the aim of closer cooperation between the Ministry of Transport and the 
MHLG. 11  When the Commons debated the Buchanan Report in detail on 10 
February 1964, both the Conservative and Labour parties expressed their support for 
greater integration between transport and town planning. Marples told the House 
that the government accepted Buchanan’s analysis ‘that a balance must be struck 
between the needs of traffic and the other needs of urban life’, and stated that the 
MHLG and the Ministry of Transport would work together with local authorities to 
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bring about ‘a fantastic programme of development and redevelopment in Britain’s 
towns and cities’.12 
Speaking for Labour, George Strauss described the Buchanan and Crowther reports 
as ‘brilliant and exciting documents’ that had ‘changed the thinking on one of the 
burning social problems of the day’. In expressing the opposition’s support for the 
reports’ recommendations, Strauss criticised the government’s record on dealing with 
the traffic problem, and denounced its decision not to act on Crowther’s 
recommendation of establishing Regional Development Agencies to coordinate 
planning within regions covered by multiple local authorities. ‘The best way in which 
the government can show that they mean business,’ Strauss argued, ‘is to set up 
immediately the necessary planning machinery and provide it with the necessary 
power’, yet that was the one thing the government had refused to do.13 The Minister 
of Housing and Local Government, Keith Joseph, rejected this criticism, countering 
that Regional Development Agencies would ‘shatter the integrated approach to land 
use and traffic planning which was preached by Buchanan throughout his Report’. 
They would, Joseph argued, be ‘remote from local conditions, indirectly impersonal 
and would deaden local government initiative’.14 
The debate over the impact of motor vehicles on towns and cities was central to the 
development of environmental politics in the early 1960s. Indeed, it was in this 
context that the word ‘environment’ began to acquire political currency, as it was 
used within discussion of the traffic problem to describe urban surroundings, and by 
extension the desirability of improving them. In his report Buchanan wrote of the 
need to find a ‘convenient term’ to ‘convey the idea of a place, or an area, or even a 
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street, which is free from the dangers and nuisances of motor traffic’. While noting 
that it was ‘clumsy’, Buchanan suggested that ‘the expression that immediately comes 
to mind is to say that the area has a good “environment”’, and settled on it as the 
best term to use in his report.15 Once the report became the subject of political 
discussion, the term ‘environment’ became common shorthand for what was at stake 
in seeking to reconcile the city and the car. In the February 1964 Commons debate, 
Marples spoke of the need ‘to strike the right balance between traffic and 
environment’, and argued that ‘what is at stake is the sort of environment the 
majority of us should have in the future’, while Joseph questioned the compatibility 
of ‘universal access by car and a civilised urban environment’, and stated that ‘we 
have to balance the degree of accessibility by car against the degree of urban 
environment that we retain’.16 
With the arrival of the 1964 election, the challenge of traffic in towns found its way 
into the party manifestoes. Labour promised that ‘urgent attention will be given to 
the proposals in the Buchanan Report and to the development of new roads capable 
of diverting through traffic from town centres’, while the Conservatives, in placing 
emphasis on improving ‘quality of life’, pledged to ‘apply the principles of the 
Buchanan Report to comprehensive campaigns of town replanning’.17 Following 
Labour’s victory, the government of Harold Wilson began adjusting planning 
machinery in line with one of the key recommendations of Traffic in Towns, 
establishing regional Economic Planning Councils and Economic Planning Boards 
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under the umbrella of a new Department of Economic Affairs.18 Meanwhile, the new 
Minister of Housing and Local Government, Richard Crossman, showed a keen 
interest in addressing the challenges of urban planning. In early 1965, Crossman 
appointed an advisory group on the subject chaired by the architect Richard 
Llewelyn-Davies, which reported that improved research into urban planning was 
required in order to meet ‘both the need and the opportunity for a complete re-
appraisal of our concepts of cities and urban living’. With towns and cities facing 
‘tremendous stresses under the impact of a population explosion, combined with a 
remorseless increase in traffic, rising standards of living, and rapid technological 
change’, the advisory group argued that there was an ‘urgent need for research in 
depth as a basis for the massive building [programme] which is now inevitable’.19 
Together with the report of the Heyworth Committee on Social Studies, which 
recommended in June 1965 that planning research should be dealt with by a Planning 
Research Council, the report of Llewelyn-Davies’s advisory group appears to have 
prompted Crossman to mount a strong push for improved research into urban 
planning. As his diaries make clear, Crossman seized upon interest by the Ford 
Foundation in putting money into a UK-based institute for urban planning research, 
and he arranged a conference at Churchill College, Cambridge in August 1965, at 
which politicians, civil servants, planners and academics met to discuss ‘what form of 
planning research agency was needed’.20 The outcome of the Cambridge conference 
was a commitment by the Ford Foundation to provide 40 per cent of the funding for 
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a new institute, on the condition that the Exchequer provided the remaining 60 per 
cent.21  
Having received the Ford Foundation commitment, Crossman set about convincing 
his Cabinet colleagues that the project was worth supporting. In a letter to the 
Minister of Economic Affairs, George Brown, Crossman wrote that he had ‘long 
been convinced that entirely new arrangements’ were required for research into the 
‘built environment’. Citing ‘the housing programme, the building of new cities and 
towns, [and] the impact on the built environment of a fast growing, mobile 
population’, Crossman argued that ‘the enormous scale of the physical tasks facing 
us’ demonstrated the need for new research arrangements, and asked Brown to lend 
his support to the proposal for a Ford-sponsored Centre for Environmental Studies. 
The Centre, which would be independent of government, would facilitate research 
and discussion around environmental planning, with its activities ‘heavily 
concentrated on urban problems’.22 Crossman succeeded in gaining the support of 
Brown’s ministry, which noted that urban planning was ‘an area in which we are 
generally backward and one where there was an urgent need for more work’, as well 
as the support of Barbara Castle, the Minister for Overseas Development, who noted 
that the Centre could prove useful in serving the needs of developing countries.23 
In March 1966, having secured the 60 per cent Treasury grant to complement the 
Ford Foundation’s 40 per cent (he described this in his diary as ‘the million-pound 
show I got out of the Treasury and Ford’), Crossman announced publicly that the 
Centre for Environmental Studies was being established, under the chairmanship of 
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Llewellyn-Davies.24 He told the Commons that new arrangements were ‘urgently 
needed to give an impetus to research in the environmental field’, as ‘the tasks of re-
shaping existing towns, building new cities and meeting the needs of a fast-growing, 
mobile population all demand a vigorous, comprehensive and sustained research 
programme’.25 The Centre received guaranteed funding for five years, and began its 
work in April 1967. It was based at the University of London, with Llewelyn-Davies 
as director. One of the Centre’s first acts was to set up a working group on 
‘developing patterns of urbanisation’, in order to study ‘cultural, social, economic and 
geographical aspects of urbanisation, as well as developing patterns of transportation 
and administration’.26 The Centre continued its work until the early 1980s, when the 
Thatcher government withdrew its funding.27 
Crossman’s active interest in the establishment of the Centre for Environmental 
Studies is evidence of the direction in which political consideration of the 
environment was moving in the early and mid-1960s. The Buchanan Report had 
placed urban planning firmly on the political agenda in 1963, and it is significant that 
a figure as influential as Crossman was grappling with the issues covered by the 
report during his tenure as Minister of Housing and Local Government. The name 
of the new research centre points to how problems of urban planning were 
increasingly being conceptualised as ‘environmental’, and it is clear that transport had 
come to be seen as the key challenge in the management of the urban environment. 
The shift towards the integration of transport and urban planning as areas of 
government policy was underlined by the publication of a Ministry of Transport 
White Paper in 1966, which presented the transport policy challenge in terms of 
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solving a paradox: while the rapid development of the motor car had brought 
‘immense benefits to millions of people’, it had also brought ‘severe discomforts’ and 
it posed ‘a threat to our environment in both town and countryside which, if it 
continues unchecked, will ensure that the pleasure and benefit for which we use the 
car will increasingly elude us’. The answer, the White Paper suggested, lay in no 
longer approaching transport and planning in isolation – ‘town planning and 
transport planning must go hand in hand’.28 
At the 1966 general election, both main parties went to the polls pledging to tackle 
the problems of town and country planning. The Labour Party placed ‘Building a 
New Britain’ at the heart of its manifesto, and promised to address the fact that 
‘many of our urban centres are ill-designed and choked with motor traffic’, while also 
pledging to strengthen the protection of the countryside for recreation and leisure.29 
The Conservatives, meanwhile, committed themselves to addressing the urban 
transport problem and promised to ‘plan the coast and countryside in such a way as 
to increase their natural beauty’.30 While it would be excessive to suggest that the 
environment had risen to the status of a major electoral issue, the presence of town 
and country planning in the 1966 manifestoes illustrates that environmental issues 
were growing in importance by the time Wilson’s government began its second term, 
and that trend would continue as the problem of pollution captured widespread 
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The fight against pollution 
As previous chapters have shown, the regulation of environmental pollution in 
Britain long pre-dated the mid-1960s. However, it was at that time that pollution 
began to acquire significant purchase as a headline political issue. As is well 
documented in the literature on the global rise of environmentalism, the emergence 
of pollution as a political problem coincided with a discernible increase in public 
concern. It is common to view the publication in 1962 of Silent Spring, a polemical 
study of the environmental effects of the pesticide DDT by the American marine 
biologist Rachel Carson, as a key catalyst in awakening public opinion on pollution, 
and, certainly for opinion in the United States, it would be difficult to deny the 
book’s impact. More than a million copies were sold in the US by the time of 
Carson’s death in 1964, and the book’s success, which saw it featured heavily in the 
US media, led to Carson testifying before a Senate subcommittee and President 
Kennedy’s Science Advisory Committee.31  
Beyond the US, Silent Spring was translated into 12 languages during the 1960s, and 
was published in Britain in 1963. Described in The Times as ‘eloquent, sincere and 
alarming’, the book captured the attention of politicians, and prompted a lengthy 
debate in the House of Lords in March 1963.32 Having written a foreword for Silent 
Spring, along with the biologist Julian Huxley, Lord Shackleton called on the 
government to increase expenditure on research into the effects of pesticides, and ‘to 
show themselves much more concerned than they have been hitherto’.33 Responding 
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for the government, the Minister for Science, Viscount Hailsham, noted that there 
was ‘practically no way in which man has not altered his environment’, and warned 
that pollution was ‘one of the permanent and serious dangers of a scientific and 
technological society and one against which a scientific and technological society 
must learn to erect substantial defences’. While acknowledging that the use of 
pesticides was ‘a most serious matter, to which all governments would be wise to pay 
continuous and serious attention’, Hailsham defended the British record, arguing that 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had been regulating pesticides 
effectively since the 1950s. He pointed in particular to the activities of a Working 
Party chaired by the government’s Chief Scientific Adviser Sir Solly Zuckerman, 
which had been established two years prior to the publication of Silent Spring in order 
to investigate the issue.34 
While Silent Spring did serve to highlight the problem of environmental pollution in 
Britain, it was not until later in the 1960s that the subject truly rose to political 
prominence. In the British context the most high profile environmental event of the 
decade was the sinking of the Torrey Canyon, a Liberian-registered tanker which ran 
aground on the Seven Stones Reef, close to the Isles of Scilly, on 18 March 1967, and 
the resulting oil slick that polluted the beaches of Cornwall throughout the spring of 
that year. As the American author Richard Petrow notes in his contemporary 
account of the disaster, ‘never before in history [had] any nation been confronted 
with an oil slick as large as the one that flowed from the Torrey Canyon’. At the time of 
her sinking, the Torrey Canyon was the 13th largest merchant vessel in the world, 
measuring 974 feet in length and 152 feet in width and carrying 120,000 tons of 
crude oil.35 The ship was part of a new generation of ‘super tankers’, built to meet the 
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rising demand from booming American and European markets for crude oil from 
the Persian Gulf. As Edward Cowan, another contemporary chronicler of the 
disaster, points out, by the mid-1960s more than half of the cargo at sea around the 
world was crude oil, carried in ever-growing vessels, and with this came the increased 
risk of pollution in the event of an accident.36 As long as such accidents did not 
occur, the risk remained abstract, but the sinking of the Torrey Canyon and the 
pollution of some 120 miles of Cornish (and, it must be noted, 50 miles of French) 
coastline served as a stark reminder of the danger posed to the environment by 
technological activity.  
The Torrey Canyon spill was a major media event, dominating headlines over the week 
of the disaster, and remaining in the news during the following months, as the clean-
up operation continued on the Cornish beaches. In its front-page headline on 28 
March 1967, the Daily Telegraph called the Torrey Canyon slick the ‘Greatest peace time 
menace to Britain’, and the sense of the spill as a significant threat to the British 
coastal environment pervaded the national press during the first days and weeks of 
the crisis.37 As it became apparent that the spill was serious and that the clean up 
would become a long-term challenge, attention turned to the actions of the Wilson 
government. In a brief section on the Torrey Canyon in his memoirs, published in 
1971, Wilson acknowledged that the incident had posed a unique challenge, but 
suggested that ultimately all those involved in responding to the disaster ‘did a great 
job’.38 This was not necessarily a depiction Wilson’s contemporaries would have 
recognised – many at the time suggested that the government’s response was hesitant 
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and confused, and that criticism would prompt a debate over the country’s ability to 
deal with unexpected environmental disasters. 
From the beginning, the government’s response was marked by indecision. The 
incident was first discussed in Parliament on Monday 20 March, when the Secretary 
of Defence Denis Healey appeared on behalf of the government. It was during this 
parliamentary debate that the Labour MP for Falmouth, John Dunwoody, first raised 
‘the possibility of setting fire to the wreck and destroying the oil on the reef’, and he 
was told by Healey that the interests of the Torrey Canyon’s American-based owners, 
the Barracuda Tanker Corporation, would need to be taken into consideration. ‘We 
are not in a position to be able to set fire to the ship,’ Healey informed Dunwoody, 
‘until they give their agreement that this can be done.’39 The government would later 
claim that the decision to bomb the Torrey Canyon, which was eventually taken on 28 
March, was not delayed by legal considerations. In an April 1967 White Paper 
explaining its response to the incident, the Home Office insisted that ‘neither legal 
nor financial considerations inhibited Government action at any stage’.40  
However, that assertion is contradicted by Cabinet papers, which show that such 
considerations contributed to indecision around the bombing. Deliberating several 
options on 23 March, the Cabinet considered the advice of the Attorney General, 
who concluded that ‘the legal position was complex’ and suggested that ‘it would be 
desirable to seek the concurrence of the foreign governments concerned’ before 
deciding on the appropriate course of action. In the same Cabinet meeting, the Prime 
Minister also stated that ‘action in respect of the oil at sea would remain the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Defence’, while ‘the Minister of Housing and Local 
Government would be responsible for answering questions in the House of 
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Commons’.41 That would change on Saturday 25 March, when Wilson put the Home 
Secretary Roy Jenkins in charge of the Torrey Canyon operation. 
As it struggled to bring the disaster under control, the government came under 
intense criticism from opposition MPs, who suggested that hesitation was 
endangering Cornwall’s coast. John Nott, the Conservative MP for St Ives, 
questioned whether, if a British tanker had run aground near New York, the 
American president Lyndon Johnson ‘would still have been negotiating with the 
British owners ten days later’, while the Liberal MP for Bodmin, Peter Bessell, said 
that ‘the government has shown too much regard for legality and precedent’.42 The 
media, meanwhile, played a leading role in propagating the idea that Wilson and his 
Cabinet had dithered. On 21 March the Daily Mirror noted that ‘no single 
government department seems to be responsible for fighting the oil pollution battle’, 
and on 31 March its leading article asked why the decision to bomb the ship had 
been taken so late.43 On 22 March the Telegraph described the government response 
as ‘pathetic’, while on 27 March the Guardian said that ‘there is this constant feeling 
that the Government has fluffed the issue’.44  
Despite its protestations to the contrary, it is clear from the documentary evidence 
that the government acted with a degree of confusion and hesitation in the 
immediate aftermath of the Torrey Canyon accident. It was not apparent which 
minister or department was in charge of the response, and a number of 
considerations, including legal concerns, delayed the decision to bomb the tanker. 
There was certainly no formal plan in place for dealing with such an incident. 
Speaking in the Commons on 10 April, John Nott pointed out that the disaster 
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should have been foreseen, had the government heeded the ‘many warnings of the 
dangers of such pollution in the past’.45 But Torrey Canyon was not foreseen, and the 
fact that there was no plan in place would suggest that, while pollution had been 
gaining increased attention over the course of the 1960s, at the time of the spill in 
1967 it was not high on the political agenda and was not a key consideration in 
organising the machinery of government. 
However, this would change in the late 1960s, as Torrey Canyon exposed weaknesses 
in governance and prompted prolonged reflection on the political procedures for 
tackling pollution problems. The Wilson government, while defensive of its handling 
of the Torrey Canyon crisis, showed an awareness that changes needed to be made in 
order to ensure that the country was better prepared for future environmental 
disasters. In November 1967 it set up a House of Commons Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, and in December 1967 a sub-committee was appointed to 
consider the issue of coastal pollution. The Committee’s report, published in July 
1968, began with a general condemnation of coastal pollution, stating that ‘to use the 
oceans as though they were the waste-pipe of the world ... ever capable of absorbing 
more oil and other noxious substances, is an unethical abuse of the natural 
environment which man shares with the flora and fauna’. The Committee expressed 
concern that the increasing size of oil tankers made further accidents more likely, 
unless ‘new methods ... can be found to diminish the hazards, and the best modern 
practices are more widely adopted’. The Committee was particularly critical of the 
lack of preparation for an oil spill as severe as the Torrey Canyon, expressing surprise 
that ‘no pre-laid plans were in existence in March 1967 for dealing with a disaster of 
the scale that then occurred’ and stating that ‘what now concerns us is to ensure that 
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all reasonable steps are taken to forestall the next disaster – the likelihood of which 
continues to be very great’.46  
The Committee was critical of the confusion at Cabinet level around the incident. It 
noted that Zuckerman, the government’s Chief Scientific Adviser, had made ‘the 
astounding assertion that he could not name a single Minister who had the 
responsibility’ for implementing changes in contingency planning following the 
disaster, and it recommended that in future ‘one Minister should be designated to 
take immediate charge of any major oil tanker disaster requiring emergency action by 
the Government’. It also advised that the government should work through the 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) to bring about 
international action on tanker safety. The report concluded with a strong 
environmental message, describing ‘the land, the sea, the river and the estuaries’ as 
‘part of that inherited treasure which each generation holds in trust for its own 
posterity’, and expressing hope that the report ‘may at least provide some 
reinforcement to the efforts of those who seek the fullest opportunities for Man to 
enrich and enjoy his environment’.47 
In its official response to the Committee, published in January 1969, the government 
was defensive, arguing that ‘much of the criticism is ill-founded’. It reiterated its 
determination that ‘the lessons to be drawn from the incident should be learnt and 
applied’, and pointed out that action was being taken on three fronts – ‘international 
negotiations; domestic planning; and research’. Internationally, it stated that in May 
1967 it had called ‘a special session of the Council of the IMCO to study problems 
arising from the disaster’, and noted that a number of issues were ‘now under study 
																																																								
46 Select Committee on Science and Technology, Coastal Pollution: Report (London, 1968), pp. 8-9, 26-
27 
47 Ibid., pp. 27-28, 43-44 
	
	 197 
by sub-committees of the IMCO’.48 At the domestic level, the government said that 
it had taken steps to improve planning, both nationally and locally, and pointed out 
that a Ministerial Committee on Emergencies, chaired by the Home Secretary, had 
been established in April 1967. It rejected criticism of the multi-departmental 
approach to the Torrey Canyon disaster, insisting that ‘it is important to retain 
flexibility in the methods for dealing with emergencies’. Concluding its response, the 
government stated that ‘the Torrey Canyon marked the opening of a new chapter in 
the endeavours of this and other countries to deal with the problem of oil pollution’, 
and promised that it would ‘continue to give close attention to the problem of 
coastal pollution’.49 
Despite the government’s guarded response to criticism, it seems clear that the Torrey 
Canyon crisis shocked it into action on pollution, and genuine progress was made in 
relation to oil at sea. As John Sheail notes, at the international level it was successful 
in bringing about change through the IMCO.50 In October 1969 amendments were 
made to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil, which tightened regulations on the routine discharging of oil by tankers, while in 
November 1969 a Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage was 
adopted, clarifying issues of legal responsibility for pollution at sea.51 Domestically, 
there is much evidence to suggest that the Wilson government became more 
attentive to pollution in the years following the Torrey Canyon disaster, with a number 
of individual ministers taking a lead on the issue. One who took an active interest 
was Wayland Young, Lord Kennet, who served as Parliamentary Secretary in the 
																																																								
48 Home Office, Coastal Pollution: Observations on the Report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology 
(Cmnd. 3880, 1969), pp. 3, 8-9 
49 Ibid., pp. 11, 16-18 
50 John Sheail, ‘Torrey Canyon: the political dimension’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 42, no. 3 
(2007), p. 503 
51 Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide, International Conventions, 
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/interconv.html (accessed 1 October 2015) 
	
	 198 
MHLG and was the son of Edward Hilton Young, the Conservative Minister of 
Health who had played a prominent role in the promotion of the preservation of the 
countryside in the 1930s (see chapter two). In July 1968, Kennet wrote to the 
Minister of Housing and Local Government, Anthony Greenwood, to suggest ‘the 
possibility of having some sort of enquiry into the adequacy of our arrangements for 
controlling the pollution of the human environment, right across the board’. It is 
difficult to measure public opinion on pollution during this period, but it is clear that 
there was a perception within government that the public demanded action. Citing 
the impact of Torrey Canyon, as well as concern over pesticides, agricultural fertilisers, 
industrial cyanide in rivers, and ‘possible changes in macroclimate caused by the 
heating of the atmosphere due to industry’, Kennet noted that ‘the public disquiet 
which is building up on this front can be seen week after week’, and argued that the 
government should appoint a wide-ranging public inquiry, perhaps in the form of a 
Royal Commission.52 
In November 1968, Greenwood wrote to the Prime Minister to assure him that his 
Ministry was paying close attention to the problem. Greenwood informed Wilson of 
Kennet’s suggestions of a commission to review governmental arrangements, and 
added that he was in agreement. 53  By February 1969 an investigation into 
departmental responsibilities around pollution was being led by Zuckerman, and 
Anthony Crosland, at that point President of the Board of Trade, wrote to 
Greenwood to express his approval, stating that ‘the question is of such 
overwhelming importance as to justify setting up a really high-powered independent 
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Committee of Inquiry’. 54  Crosland received support from Edward Short, the 
Secretary of State for Education and Science, who agreed that ‘the question is of very 
great importance and merits consideration in the way [Crosland] suggests’.55  
In November 1969, both Crosland, who by then had been appointed Secretary of 
State for Local Government and Regional Planning, and Fred Peart, Lord President 
of the Council, recommended the establishment of an independent commission.56 At 
the beginning of December, Wilson agreed that a Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution should be established, alongside a central coordinating unit, 
staffed by government scientists, and an interdepartmental committee of civil 
servants, chaired by the Chief Scientific Adviser.57 On 11 December, the Prime 
Minister informed the House of Commons of his decision, stating that the Royal 
Commission would be a permanent body that would ‘advise on matters, both 
national and international, concerning the pollution of the environment; on the 
adequacy of research in this field; and the future possibilities of danger to the 
environment’.58 
In the press, the establishment of the Royal Commission was viewed as a sign that 
politicians were paying increasing attention to environmental problems. The Daily 
Telegraph argued that Wilson’s announcement was ‘another indication that all political 
parties are going to make the “quality of life” and the measures they are proposing to 
improve it, a major feature of their election manifestoes’, while the Conservative MP 
Bill Deedes, who would later become editor of the Telegraph, noted in a column that 
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‘Environment has become an “in” word. What man is doing in his surroundings, and 
what sooner or later these surroundings may do to him is moving to the forefront of 
social policies, national and international.’59 The evidence suggests that this was a fair 
interpretation. The institutional developments that had occurred by the end of 1969, 
including the creation of the Royal Commission and the central coordinating unit 
within Whitehall, reflected growing interest among influential figures within the 
Labour government, including the Prime Minister. At the Labour Party Conference 
in the autumn of 1969, Wilson used his speech to identify the environment as a 
problem ‘moving to the centre of the political stage’. He told his party that the 
challenge was two-fold: ‘to remove the scars of nineteenth-century capitalism ... that 
still disfigure so large a part of our land’ and to ‘make sure that the second industrial 
revolution through which we are now passing does not bequeath a similar legacy to 
future generations’.60 For Wilson, this marked a noticeable shift in emphasis from the 
theme of ‘scientific revolution’ and ‘white heat’ that characterised the early years of 
his administrations.61 Speaking at a party rally in Swansea in January 1970, the Prime 
Minister told his audience that pollution represented one of the key challenges of the 
new decade: 
In the sixties the emphasis was on mounting the technological revolution so 
that Britain could pay her way. And that technological revolution will go on. 
In the seventies our task must be to deal with the effects of technology’s 
noxious by-products. Only this approach can make decent living possible.62 
At Swansea, Wilson also set his position on pollution in terms of curbing the abuses 
of large industrial corporations. While ‘the polluters are powerful and organised’, ‘the 
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protesters, the anti-pollution lobby, are less organised, less powerful’, and therefore 
‘the community must step in to redress the balance’.63 Writing in the New Statesman, 
Anthony Howard expressed cynicism regarding Wilson’s conversion to the cause of 
pollution control, suggesting that the Prime Minister ‘didn’t lose much time in 
hopping on to President Nixon’s anti-pollution bandwagon’, a reference to the US 
President’s call in his 1970 State of the Union Address for more action to tackle 
pollution and secure the ‘quality of life’.64  
While Howard’s scepticism may have had some justification, it should be noted that 
Wilson took umbrage, and instructed his staff to rebut the suggestion that he was 
merely following Nixon, urging them to cite his words and actions on pollution over 
the course of 1969 and 1970.65 The Prime Minister was also defensive of his record 
on the environment when he responded at length to a report by the Standing 
Committee of The Countryside in 1970, the body behind a series of conferences on 
conservation and the environment that took place between 1963 and 1970. The 
report had argued that ‘the machinery of Government for securing proper regard for 
the environment and the conservation of amenity needs improvement’, a suggestion 
the Prime Minister objected to in a letter to the Committee’s chairman, Lord Hayter: 
My recent speeches will have left you in no doubt of the Government’s firm 
determination to tackle the problems of the environment vigorously. A great 
deal has been done in the past in this country, and this is sometimes 
forgotten when people read of troubles in other parts of the world and the 
action which has to be taken there to catch up. There is a great deal more to 
be done in this country; but the controls we already exercise through, for 
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example, our clean air and town and country planning legislation have put us 
well in advance of many other industrialised nations.66 
While pointing to his establishment of the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution, Wilson also highlighted the passage of the Countryside Act of 1968, 
which, in addition to extending the powers of the National Parks Commission and 
renaming it the Countryside Commission, included a section that made it a statutory 
duty that ‘every Minister, government department and public body shall have regard 
to the desirability of conserving the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside’.67 
In the wider Labour Party, there is evidence that the problem of pollution was 
growing in importance. Kennet played a leading role in promoting the issue, and in 
November 1969 he delivered a lecture on ‘Controlling our Environment’ to the 
Fabian Society, which was published as a Fabian pamphlet in 1970. Kennet suggested 
that ‘pollution of the environment has in the last few years begun to assume the look 
of world problem number one’, and argued that state action was the only option, 
unless society was ‘to turn away with a curse against industrial progress and 
democratic government’.68 Kennet ended by placing pollution in the context of 
Labour politics, arguing that ‘since we care for the existence, the health, and the 
spiritual and emotional well-being of mankind, we must take this issue very 
seriously’.69 That perspective was echoed in a pamphlet produced in 1970 by the 
Annual Conference of Labour Women, which pointed out that while the Labour 
Party had ‘always stressed the importance of economic development, we have never 
failed to lay equal stress on the social consequences – and opportunities – of that 
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development, and on its impact upon the quality of the human environment’.70 The 
report concluded that ‘the protection and enhancement of the environment [should] 
be treated as a major priority area for action and expenditure at all levels of 
government, and one that should not be deferred on the basis of untenable 
arguments concerning the balance of payments’.71 
For its part, the Wilson government made efforts ahead of the 1970 election to 
portray itself as committed to tackling environmental pollution. In May 1970, Wilson 
asked Crosland to push forward with a planned White Paper on pollution so that it 
could be published before the dissolution of Parliament.72 The Prime Minister took a 
personal interest in the White Paper, chairing a special ministerial meeting on 21 
May, at which it was agreed that the document should be titled The Protection of the 
Environment: The Fight Against Pollution.73 It was published on 28 May, with Crosland 
telling the press that ‘pollution of the environment is one of the most serious and 
urgent problems which face our contemporary society’: 
We have already done much in Britain to limit and control it; this White 
Paper shows intense Government activity over a very wide field. But unless 
we do more, the problem must worsen with the continuous growth of 
industrialisation, population and living standards. … It will cost money, it will 
require stricter controls over the polluters; and it will take time. This is not a 
problem which can be solved by rhetoric or simple dramatic gestures. It will 
be a long and protracted campaign, but one which I am sure a determined 
Government, backed by an informed public opinion, can win. 
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Following the White Paper’s publication, New Scientist magazine described it as 
‘historic’, on account of it marking ‘the first time that government policy in any 
major field has been placed in a solid ecological framework’.74 That framework was 
set out in the paper’s introduction: 
This White Paper is about man’s impact on his environment, and specifically 
about the pollution of his environment. The degree of control we can exert 
over that pollution is a major factor in the quality of our civilisation. To exert 
a proper control, three things are needed. First, scientific and technological 
knowledge – knowledge of ecology, which is the science of the way the 
animal and vegetable worlds interact with each other and with the physical 
environment; and knowledge of the technology to control pollution at 
source. Secondly, we need the right framework of economic analysis and 
economic priorities. Thirdly, we need the right legal and administrative 
framework to translate priorities and decisions into action.75 
Notably the White Paper, which outlined what the government was doing to regulate 
pollution of the air, land, rivers, lakes and sea, did not adopt an unquestioning stance 
on economic growth. It pointed out that the ‘increase in material goods brings with it 
certain “diseconomies” in terms of health, amenity and the attractiveness of the 
environment’, and argued that ‘society must … make a value judgement on how 
much it is prepared to spend on preserving and protecting the environment’. It 
concluded that pollution was not only an issue in cases where it endangered human 
health, but also where it undermined ‘amenity and the enjoyment of life’.76 
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In the press, reaction to the White Paper was mixed. The Times called it ‘a balanced 
account of what is being done and what needs to be done’, but The Economist 
criticised it for lacking concrete policy proposals, and described it as a ‘pre-election 
offering’ that bore ‘a distinct resemblance to the Labour Party’s manifesto, published 
the day before’.77 Given Wilson’s keen interest in publishing the White Paper before 
the election, The Economist surely had a point, and if it was indeed a piece of 
electioneering, it is significant that the Labour Party believed that pollution and the 
environment were issues on which votes could be won. The Daily Telegraph described 
‘environment’ as one of the catchwords of Labour’s 1970 manifesto, which was 
entitled ‘Now Britain’s Strong – Let’s Make it Great to Live In’.78 As Robinson has 
noted, 1970 was the first election at which all three major parties mentioned the 
environment as a policy area in their manifestoes.79 Labour promised ‘a cleaner 
Britain’, arguing that ‘we must take far better care of our physical environment’, 
while the Conservatives devoted a whole section of their manifesto to the subject of 
‘A Better Environment’, expressing a desire to build ‘a society in which material 
advance goes hand in hand with the deeper values which go to make up the quality 
of life’, and acknowledging that ‘the effects of technological change can sometimes 
lead to a deterioration in the natural environment’.80 While it is highly unlikely that 
the environment had a significant impact on the outcome of the 1970 election – as 
The Economist predicted, it would be decided by ‘brass, not muck’ – opinion polling 
did suggest that the parties were correct to appeal to the electorate’s concerns about 
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pollution.81 A February 1970 poll for the Sunday Times by the Opinion Research 
Centre found that 57 per cent of the British electorate were ‘in favour of taxes or 
prices going up if that was the only way to keep town and country clean and quiet 
and pleasant to live in’. Among the middle-classes, the proportion rose to two-thirds, 
which may reflect a postmaterialist dimension to rising interest in quality of life.82 
As Britain went to the polls in June 1970, environmental pollution occupied an 
increasingly prominent place on the political agenda. The events of the 1960s, most 
noticeably the Torrey Canyon oil spill, had highlighted the risks of pollution, and, in 
parallel with increased public concern and media coverage, government was 
increasingly taking steps to address the problem. In their pitches to the electorate, 
both the Labour and Conservative parties were consciously speaking the language of 
the ‘environment’ and pollution control. However, pollution was not simply a 
national challenge – as has been noted, concern was growing on a global level, and 
the British government’s involvement in international discussion of the environment 
would contribute to its emergence as a domestic political issue. 
The international dimension 
Towards the end of the 1960s, environmental problems emerged as a major subject 
for diplomatic discussion. The post-war period had seen the creation of a number of 
important international organisations concerned with nature conservation, including 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (1948) and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (1961), both of which received backing from Julian Huxley, the first 
director-general of UNESCO.83 United Nations (UN) interest in conservation and 
the environment grew during the 1960s, with the organisation first of a UNESCO 
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Conference on Man and the Biosphere in 1968, followed by the planning of a major 
UN Conference on the Human Environment, scheduled for Stockholm in 1972. 
There was also intergovernmental interest in the environment at a European level – 
in 1966 it was announced that 1970 would be designated European Conservation 
Year, with member states of the Council of Europe encouraged to organise their 
own events around the theme, as well as take part in a European Conference on 
Nature Conservation in Strasbourg in February 1970. In Britain, there was some 
scepticism within government departments as to the usefulness of these international 
initiatives, but, nevertheless, analysis of discussions over how to approach the events, 
in particular preparations for the 1972 UN conference, reveals that there was genuine 
interest among ministers and officials, and the FCO played an important role in the 
growth of interest in environmental problems within the British government in the 
late 1960s. 
Ahead of European Conservation Year, members of the Council of Europe were 
asked to produce reports covering the four themes of the Man and His Environment 
conference: the impact of urban conglomeration, the impact of industry, the impact 
of agriculture and forestry, and the impact of leisure pursuits.84 Within the British 
government, responsibility for coordinating the production of the reports fell to the 
MHLG, and while Lord Kennet, unsurprisingly, showed interest, officials were less 
enthusiastic, with one complaining that ‘[the reports] are not very easy to do, the 
length required being too short to enable anything to be said that is not pretty 
shallow, and too long for the normal platitudes’.85 In public the government showed 
enthusiasm for the initiative, with Arthur Skeffington, a junior minister in the 
MHLG, telling the Commons that, as ‘the whole future quality of environment may 
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suffer damaging consequences because of the increasing pressures’, he thought 
‘European Conservation Year 1970 may make a notable mark in man’s endeavour to 
master mass materialism’.86 However, privately there were reservations as to what 
could be achieved. An internal note within the Ministry stated that while the UK 
would ‘continue to endorse and support the original concept of a once-for-all 
European Conservation Year as a means for awakening and focussing public 
interest’, it did ‘not wish sweeping recommendations for continuing Council of 
Europe activities to be endorsed at the conference’.87 
Preparations for the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment prompted 
similar reservations. The conference was proposed by the Swedish government in 
July 1968, partly as a response to concern regarding the effects of acid rain in the 
Scandinavian region.88 At the UN General Assembly in December 1968, Resolution 
2398 was adopted, which noted ‘that the relationship between man and his 
environment is undergoing profound changes in the wake of modern scientific and 
technological developments’, and ‘that increased attention to the problems of the 
human environment is essential for sound economic and social development’. The 
resolution fixed a Conference on the Human Environment for 1972, and requested 
that the UN Secretary-General, U. Thant, should produce a report on environmental 
problems as part of the preparations for the conference.89  
Thant’s report, published in May 1969, provides an indication of the direction in 
which discussion of the environment was moving in the late 1960s. ‘[For] the first 
time in the history of mankind,’ the report stated, ‘there is arising a crisis of world 
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wide proportions involving developed and developing countries alike – the crisis of 
the human environment.’ There were ‘three basic causes’ of the crisis – ‘accelerated 
population growth, increased urbanisation, and an expanded and efficient new 
technology, with their associated increase in demands for space, food and natural 
resources’ – and if those causes were not addressed ‘the future of life on earth could 
be endangered’. It was therefore urgent, Thant wrote, that states worked together to 
‘meet the need for intensified action at the national, regional and international 
level’.90 
When Sweden put forward the idea of a UN conference in July 1968, the British 
response was unenthusiastic. Correspondence between the FCO and the MHLG 
reveals that the UK ‘tried unsuccessfully to deter the Swedes’ from proposing a 
conference to the General Assembly, and the FCO policy was that, while the 
environment was ‘an interesting and important topic’, a UN conference was not ‘the 
most effective approach to the problem’. British delegates to the UN were instructed 
to argue against holding a conference, and the UK only agreed to support the 
proposal once it became apparent that Sweden had significant support from other 
states, including the United States.91 
Britain’s attitude towards the Swedish proposal would suggest that there was little 
enthusiasm for the international discussion of environmental issues, yet the UK had 
actually put forward a similar proposal for a UN conference on the environment in 
the previous year. In March 1967, in response to plans for a UN Conference on the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the FCO decided to propose as an alternative a 
series of UN conferences on the ‘preservation and modification of the 
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environment’.92 In April Sir William Penney, Britain’s representative on the Secretary-
General’s Science Advisory Committee, wrote to U. Thant to advance the UK’s 
suggestion, and in December Lord Caradon, the UK Ambassador to the UN, put the 
proposal to the President of the General Assembly.93 It was the British view, wrote 
Caradon, that the environment was ‘a matter which should be given high priority’: 
My delegation is of the opinion that in order to facilitate coordination and 
focus the interest of member countries on the extremely complex problems 
related to human environment it would be most useful to arrange a 
conference on this matter under the auspices of the United Nations.94 
According to the FCO, the 1967 British proposal ‘aroused little interest’, and was 
eventually dropped.95 
Once the Swedish proposal was adopted, and planning for the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference had begun, there remained some scepticism and caution with the FCO, 
but there is also evidence that there was genuine enthusiasm for tackling 
environmental problems. In keeping with the wider British approach to international 
discussions, much emphasis was placed on the need to protect national interests, and 
UK delegates to the Preparatory Committee for the Conference were instructed to 
‘play a constructive role’ while seeking ‘to prevent the emergence of declarations 
contrary to our political and commercial interests’. Yet, at the same time, there were 
plans within the FCO for Britain to propose a UN Declaration of Principles of the 
Human Environment, as an initiative to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
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founding of the UN, and a draft declaration was drawn up.96 This text recognised 
‘the interdependence of man and his environment’ and made a call for 
intergovernmental action: 
All states have a common interest in the conservation of the natural 
resources of the Earth and in improving the physical and social environment, 
and have a responsibility, both individual and collective, to prevent the 
wastage of these resources and to take all necessary action to improve the 
environment.97 
While the plan for a unilateral UK initiative was dropped when it was realised that 
many other states had the same idea ahead of the Stockholm Conference, work on 
the proposed declaration reflected an increase in activity and interest around 
environmental issues within the FCO.98 In November 1969 a Human Environment 
desk was established within the Science and Technology Department of the FCO, 
with an officer given full-time responsibility for the subject.99 In January 1970 Lord 
Chalfont, an FCO minister, invited a delegation from the Royal Society to discuss the 
subject, and told them that ‘there was now a general recognition that the 
conservation of the human environment … constituted one of the greatest 
challenges to modern society’.100 This view appears to have been shared by the 
Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, who wrote to Crosland in November 1969 
saying, ‘You will know how pleased I am by the priority being given to the problems 
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of controlling environmental pollution.’ Stewart wrote that it was important for 
Britain ‘to play a positive and imaginative role in international discussion of these 
new problems’, and in order ‘to be positive abroad, we must of course be suitably 
organised at home’. He therefore praised the government’s recent attention to the 
problem of pollution at the domestic level.101 
It is therefore clear that, while there was some scepticism towards the UN 
Conference, and much pragmatic consideration of how best to protect British 
interests, there was genuine enthusiasm within the FCO for engaging with the 
environmental efforts that had acquired a prominent position in intergovernmental 
activity by the end of the 1960s. The attitude of the Foreign Secretary and his 
department was in keeping with that of other prominent figures in the Labour 
government, including the Prime Minister. In April 1970, Wilson gave a speech to 
the United Nations Association in York, in which he espoused the virtues of 
international cooperation on the environment: 
We need a new charter of international rights – and obligations. This is how 
it might read. All States have a common interest in the beneficial 
management of the natural resources of the Earth. All States should 
cooperate in the prevention or control of physical changes in the 
environment which may jeopardise the quality of human life, and which may 
endanger the health or the survival of animals or plants.102 
By 1970, the environment had found a place in both domestic and foreign policy, 
and changes enacted by both Labour and Conservative governments would ensure 
that the new policy area became enshrined in the machinery of British government. 
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Towards the Department of the Environment 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, from the late 1950s and early 1960s there 
was growing awareness among British policymakers that town and country planning 
and the planning of the transport network, particularly in relation to roads and the 
effect of traffic on urban centres, posed problems that called for an integrated 
approach within Whitehall. Looking back on her time at the MHLG, where she 
served as permanent secretary between 1955 and 1966, Dame Evelyn Sharp noted 
that it became ‘quite impossible to deal with town planning in isolation from 
transport planning’, as the latter developed into the ‘major preoccupation of the 
land-planner’.103 As has been discussed, the Buchanan report brought the issue to 
public attention in 1963, and Richard Crossman made efforts to promote a more 
integrated approach during his time as Minister of Housing and Local Government, 
but, by the late 1960s, the problem essentially remained unsolved, with responsibility 
for transport planning covered by the Ministry of Transport, and responsibility for 
town and country planning by the MHLG. 
A major step towards integration was taken in October 1969 when Anthony 
Crosland was appointed as Secretary of State for Local Government and Regional 
Planning. While the Ministry of Transport and the MHLG remained separate, 
Crosland was given responsibility for coordinating their work and representing the 
two ministries at Cabinet. This decision followed the publication of the report of the 
Royal Commission on Local Government in England in June 1969, which had 
recommended that ‘one authority should be responsible for land-use planning and 
the whole field of transportation’, in order to ‘tackle the tremendous problems 
created by the rapid growth in personal mobility’. With greater integration, the report 
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concluded, it would ‘be possible for the various problems of the environment to be 
grappled with as a whole’.104 Addressing the Commons on 13 October 1969, the 
Prime Minister noted the report’s ‘clear conclusion that in the modern world … the 
range of decisions concerned with planning, land use and transport, social and 
environmental development cannot, in practice, be separated’, and announced that 
the new Secretary of State would direct a more integrated approach.105 Crosland was 
also given responsibility for coordinating action on environmental pollution, and 
asked to make proposals to Wilson on any changes the government should make in 
that area (this would lead to the creation of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution in December 1969). 
It should be noted that, by this stage, the word ‘environment’ was frequently being 
used as a term that encapsulated the various problems of transport and town and 
country planning, as well as the risks posed by pollution. Once the decision had been 
taken to appoint Crosland in an ‘overlord’ role overseeing the Ministry of Transport 
and the MHLG, there was discussion within Whitehall as to the title that the new 
Secretary of State should be given. In September 1969 the head of the civil service, 
William Armstrong, recommended that Wilson use the title ‘Secretary of State for 
Local Government and Environmental Planning’, as it ‘embraces both the physical 
and infrastructure aspects of the role, and those such as pollution control and 
amenity which touch on the quality of life’.106 This title was adopted in draft press 
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releases announcing the creation of the post, but by 5 October the title had changed 
to Local Government and Regional Planning.107 
The appointment of Crosland did not mark the end of the Labour government’s 
work towards integrating transport and town and country planning. The Ministry of 
Transport and the MHLG were kept separate for the moment, but as part of his new 
role Crosland was asked by Wilson to report ‘on the changes which, in his view, 
should be made at a later date with a view to creating a more integrated 
Department’.108 In February 1970 an inter-departmental group was appointed to 
investigate, and its report, submitted to the Prime Minister in May, concluded that 
the overlap between the Ministry of Transport, the MHLG, and the Ministry of 
Public Building and Works (which had also been added to the review) was so 
extensive that ‘the integration envisaged can be achieved only by investing a single 
Minister with the statutory and other powers and responsibilities over a broad 
functional area’. While the report acknowledged that the challenge of operating a 
large integrated department would be formidable, it concluded that a unified 
department was ‘the only practicable means of achieving the objective’.109 On 17 
June, the day before the general election, Armstrong advised the Prime Minister that 
he should proceed with integration, and proposed three possible titles for the new 
department: the Department of Planning, the Department of Development, and the 
Department of the Environment.110 
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Labour’s defeat at the election, and the arrival of Heath’s Conservative government, 
did not alter the course towards an integrated department. In their manifesto, the 
Conservatives had promised to ‘improve the machinery of government’ in order to 
tackle environmental problems, and Heath quickly pushed ahead with this plan.111 
The Queen’s Speech on 2 July 1970 was the first ever to mention the environment, 
with the monarch telling Parliament that her government would ‘intensify the drive 
to remedy past damage to the environment and … seek to safeguard the beauty of 
the British countryside and seashore for the future’.112 In the debate that followed, 
Wilson, now speaking as leader of the opposition, revealed that he had taken the 
decision while he was Prime Minister to integrate transport, housing, planning and 
local government within one department, and asked the new Prime Minister whether 
he intended to do the same.113 Heath replied that he would be conducting a wide 
review of government departments, and would in time be making an announcement 
regarding ‘ministerial responsibility for the environment’.114 
While it formed part of a wider review of the machinery of government, framed as a 
Conservative exercise in streamlining a government that had ‘been attempting to do 
too much’, the Heath government’s work on the integration of transport and town 
and country planning was essentially a continuation of the process begun under 
Labour.115 In early July 1970, Heath asked Armstrong to conduct a review into the 
machinery of government, and at the end of August a report was submitted to the 
Prime Minister that recommended a merging of the MHLG, the Ministry of 
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Transport and the Ministry of Public Building and Works.116 The report began by 
outlining ‘the concept of the environment as a unified field of policy’. It argued that 
‘governmental responsibility for environmental questions has been accepted for 
many years’, and explained how this had expanded over the years from ‘the relatively 
narrow base of preventing the spread of disease and ensuring minimum standards of 
housing into a wider responsibility for planning the future development of living 
conditions as a whole’. With the rise of the car, ‘the planning of roads [had] become 
a major consideration, just as closely linked with the general future of the 
environment as the public health/housing/town and country planning of MHLG’, 
and as such the integration of departments was ‘the next evolutionary step  … in 
relating the various aspects of the human environment in Britain to each other’. 
While this would obviously involve a reorganisation of Whitehall departments, the 
report argued that it would amount to more than a simple change to the machinery 
of government: 
The desired effect is not a mechanical one but rather a behavioural one: a 
whole range of attitudes and patterns of work and behaviour would be 
affected thereby, and the evolution and operation of a broadly conceived 
environmental policy and a coherent set of programmes in the environmental 
field would become possible.117 
The proposed merging of the three ministries was accepted by Heath, but there 
remained the question of what to call the new department. While the government 
would eventually settle on ‘Department of the Environment’, this did not happen 
without debate. A list provided by the Civil Service Department at the beginning of 
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October suggested 21 possible names for the department, including ‘Environment’, 
‘Infrastructure’, ‘The Physical Environment’, ‘Town and Country’, ‘Housing and 
Development’, ‘Planning and the Interior’, and ‘Urban and Environmental 
Planning’118. At a ministerial meeting at Sunningdale in early October, Heath invited 
his colleagues to suggest ‘a better term than “Environment”’, while on 5 October an 
official attempted to persuade him of its virtues, arguing that, while it was ‘a rather 
technical, jargon-like word’, it was ‘sufficiently imprecise to cover the full range of 
the new Department’s work, and it is tied in conveniently with the fashionable 
concept of “concern for the environment”’.119 The Prime Minister was apparently 
not convinced, as ‘Department of the Environment’ only appears to have been 
settled for on 9 October, just one week before the department’s creation was 
announced publicly, when officials were informed ‘that at present [the Prime 
Minister] has no better ideas on the name’.120 This discussion over possible names is 
worth noting, as while ‘environment’ was clearly becoming widely used an umbrella 
term for describing the policy areas and challenges that would be covered by the new 
department, it was not yet being used without question in political circles. 
On 15 October, the government published a White Paper, The Reorganisation of Central 
Government, which announced the creation of the DOE, as well as a number of other 
changes, including the merging of the Department for Overseas Development with 
the FCO. The White Paper stated that ‘it is increasingly accepted that maintaining a 
decent environment, improving people’s living conditions and providing for 
adequate transport facilities all come together in the planning of development’, and 
explained that, in England, ‘the Ministries of Housing and Local Government, of 
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Public Building and Works and of Transport will be unified in a single Department 
of the Environment, under a Secretary of State’. While the Secretary of State would 
be in charge of the department, his role would be primarily strategic, with the 
everyday functions of the department delegated to a Minister for Local Government 
and Development, a Minister for Housing and Construction, and a Minister for 
Transport Industries. The responsibilities of the department would include the 
correlation of urban and transport planning, housing policy, developing and 
coordinating policies for the control of environmental pollution, and the 
conservation of the countryside.121 
With the formation of the DOE, the environmental anxieties of the 1960s, 
particularly in relation to life in urban centres, became institutionalised in the 
structure of the British government. The problem of how to deal with the impact of 
traffic in towns had occupied both Conservative and Labour governments, and the 
reforms instituted by Wilson, and completed by Heath, were an acknowledgement 
that transport and town and country planning could no longer be treated as separate 
areas of policy. As will be discussed further in chapter six, the development of 
environmental politics in Britain cannot be understood without reference to the 
challenges posed by the onset of near-universal car ownership. 
Conclusion 
When the DOE formally began its work in November 1970, the new Secretary of 
State, Peter Walker, issued a message to all Department staff outlining the challenge 
ahead: 
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The tasks before us are complex and demanding. The reward is to make the 
country a better place for people to live, work and enjoy themselves. … Our 
new Department is the most concerned with improving the quality of living 
in this country. The happiness of each individual family will be very much 
affected by our decisions and by our actions.122 
The concern for ‘quality of life’ that Walker emphasised in his message lay at the 
heart of the development of environmental politics through the 1960s. 
Environmental policies were not exclusively dominated by anthropocentric concerns 
– wildlife conservation played its part in pollution control, for example – but 
ultimately people’s living conditions were the key factor in determining the growth of 
state regulation and alterations to the machinery of government. As the phrase 
‘quality of life’ indicates, this was partly a case of meeting the public’s expectations in 
an era of rising affluence. To put it in terms of Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism, 
it appeared that the public had come to demand more than the satisfaction of their 
basic material needs, and it was expected that government policy would facilitate 
access to greater levels of comfort and convenience. In line with the cases explored 
in earlier chapters of this thesis, such as National Parks, town and country planning, 
and clean air, this did not amount to an ‘anti-industrial’ rejection of modernity and 
materialism, and with it a radical abandonment of the pursuit of economic growth. 
Affluence required continued growth, but its enjoyment was increasingly seen as 
necessitating clean and amenable surroundings. By enacting policies intended to 
secure such surroundings, both in rural and urban settings, the British government 
played a central role in the development of the politics of the environment. Such a 
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picture contrasts starkly with accounts of environmental politics that have 
foregrounded the contribution of radical social movements. 
However, it is important to note that political change was driven not only by 
affluence, but also by serious objective problems. The challenge of traffic in towns, 
for example, may have had its roots in technological progress and growth, but its 
implications were far from trivial, raising serious questions around the future of 
urban life. Similarly, the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill may not have threatened most 
people’s social and economic security (with the exception of those reliant on the 
Cornish tourism and fishing industries), but the sight of beaches covered with crude 
oil was shocking, and efforts to deal with the pollution exposed weaknesses in 
existing structures of government. At the international level, concern around such 
major pollution events played a key role in UN discussions, and tied into a growing 
sense that technological advances and the rise in global population posed a genuine 
threat to the ecosystem. In Britain during the 1960s a range of pre-existing challenges 
came to be conceptualised as ‘environmental’, and the term crystallised as the label 
for a unified field of governance. When the DOE was created, officials in 
government noted that they were making a conscious effort to shape ‘a broadly 
conceived environmental policy’. All of the problems examined in this thesis – 
countryside preservation, the challenge of urban planning, and the pollution of air, 
land and water – were characterised as problems of the environment, and 
responsibility for their regulation fell to the new department. 
By the end of the decade, the environment was established within the political 
mainstream. As its inclusion in both the Conservative and Labour manifestoes in 
1970 suggests, there was remarkably little party disagreement around the rise of the 
environment as a political issue, with both parties accepting that quality of life lay 
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within the purview of the British state. In part, this stemmed from a perception that 
public opinion demanded environmental policies. Ministers and officials frequently 
spoke of the environment as an issue of public concern, a view influenced to a large 
extent by the growth in media coverage of environmental problems. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that there was also genuine interest among some of the 
most prominent political actors of the 1960s. The Conservative Minister of 
Transport Ernest Marples commissioned the Buchanan Report in response to 
growing concern around traffic in towns, and under Labour the issues of transport 
and town planning were picked up by Richard Crossman, who actively pursued the 
goal of establishing a Centre for Environmental Studies. In the second half of the 
1960s Lord Kennet enthusiastically promoted the cause of pollution control within 
the MHLG, and, by the end of the decade, both Harold Wilson and Anthony 
Crosland were paying regular attention to the issue. Wilson’s public statements and 
correspondence point to a keen awareness of environmental problems, and while he 
may of course have been pursuing such issues to satisfy public opinion (an 
accusation that was levelled at him in the press), it would be wrong to discount the 
possibility that his concern was rooted in a sincere conviction that government had a 
responsibility to act. Despite some scepticism, there was also clear interest within the 
FCO, and when the Conservatives returned to power in 1970, Edward Heath 
continued the work that had been begun under Labour. As with Wilson, Heath’s 
political decisions, in particular the creation of the DOE, were in line with his public 
pronouncements. In October 1970, Heath told the third and final conference of The 
Countryside in 1970 that ‘the protection of our countryside, the avoidance of 
pollution, and the striking of a right balance between the needs of conservation and 
development are now among the most important and difficult tasks of government’. 
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Environmental policies, he added, were ‘among the highest priorities of the 
seventies’, and ‘essential for any decent sort of living’.123 
It was by no means clear how effective the state would be in addressing 
environmental problems in the years ahead, but by 1970 both the Conservative and 
Labour parties had indicated that the environment would form a part of their 
approach to governance. That approach was not radical – as Heath’s comments to 
The Countryside in 1970 conference indicated, economic development would remain 
a key priority – but with the creation of the DOE, the third largest Department in 
Whitehall, major policy areas, including transport and town and country planning, 
were to be considered within the framework of ‘the environment’. The emergence of 
that framework was key to the development of environmental politics in the years 
leading up to 1970, as it created the political space for debating the proper balance 
between economic development and the maintenance of clean and amenable 
surroundings. That new political battleground is explored further in the following 
chapter, which focuses on urban motorways and the search for a satisfactory solution 
to the problem of traffic in towns. 
																																																								




Urban Motorways and the Greater London Development Plan 
As was discussed in chapter five, the growth in the number of motorised vehicles on 
Britain’s roads posed one of the most significant environmental challenges of the 
post-war period. As the motor car progressed from being a luxury purchase to one 
that the majority of households aspired to make, demand grew for the construction 
of an improved road network, while anxiety spread over the potential negative 
impact of rising volumes of traffic. In the immediate post-war years, the emphasis 
was upon the need to construct specialised highways, i.e. motorways, to connect the 
country’s towns and cities, but by the early 1960s the public and political focus had 
shifted on to traffic within urban centres, in particular the social and economic 
consequences of serious congestion, and the question of what action could be taken 
to reconcile towns with mass ownership of cars. 
In the previous chapter, the focus was on the implications of this problem for the 
machinery of government. The motor car was key to the realisation that transport 
and urban planning needed to be handled in unison, and, together with pollution, 
traffic played a major role in awakening government to the political saliency of 
environmental issues, leading to the creation of the Department of the Environment 
in 1970. This chapter looks in greater detail at the social and environmental impact of 
traffic, and the specific solutions that were proposed. The problem prompted the 
reorganisation of central government, but it also triggered a broad range of national 
and local discussions concerning the future of towns and cities and the very nature of 
urban life. In the face of the challenge of traffic, politicians, planners, journalists and 
the wider public were required to confront the question of how towns and cities 
could be governed and remodelled in order to accommodate the car, and in doing so 
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they were forced to consider the meaning of the urban environment, and to ask 
whether it was possible for it to endure in any recognisable form. Through the 1960s 
and into the 1970s, ideas as to what constituted a ‘good environment’ and how such 
an environment could be secured were formed in urban Britain in response to the 
challenge of the motor car, and subjected to intense debates involving experts, 
policymakers and members of the general public. By exploring those debates, it is 
possible to trace the conceptualisation of the ‘environment’ as a field of public 
policy, and gain a fuller understanding of how and why environmental problems 
achieved a level of political prominence by the early 1970s. 
In order to explore this subject, this chapter focuses on the challenge of traffic as it 
was confronted in Greater London. As the capital city with a population in the 1960s 
of around eight million, London faced a particularly acute traffic problem, and 
became the subject of a high-profile attempt to achieve a comprehensive solution. In 
1963, the Greater London Council (GLC) was formed through the London 
Government Act, and was required to produce a development plan for the future of 
the Greater London area. The Greater London Development Plan (GLDP), 
eventually submitted to central government in August 1969, featured at its heart a 
plan for the major redevelopment of the road network, with the proposal of 
constructing four concentric rings of motorways around the city. While all four 
proposed motorways were controversial, the most controversial of all was Ringway 1 
(also known as the ‘Motorway Box’), which would encircle the city close to the edge 
of the centre, and pass through many of its inner suburbs, including the affluent 
areas of Hampstead and Blackheath. Owing to large-scale opposition, the 
government was compelled to hold a public inquiry, chaired by the planning lawyer 
Frank Layfield, which at the time became the largest statutory inquiry ever to be held 
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in Britain. Over 28,000 objections were made, and the inquiry sat for 237 days 
between 7 July 1970 and 9 May 1972.1 
In the context of this wider thesis, the conflict around the GLDP underlines the 
importance of the urban traffic problem to the development of environmental 
politics in Britain. It is not possible to understand the process by focussing only 
upon either the rural or the urban. As chapters two and four of this thesis show with 
reference to National Parks and the preservation of the countryside, rural problems 
were crucial, but, as chapter three shows with reference to clean air, and chapter five 
and the present chapter show with reference to traffic in towns, they combined with 
urban challenges to shape the emergence of the ‘environment’ as a unified field of 
policy by the early 1970s. 
In the specific case of the GLDP, John Davis provides a valuable insight by 
identifying that the debate over the London motorways had its roots in two features 
of affluence, namely car ownership and owner-occupation of housing, and this 
chapter builds upon this by demonstrating how affluence gave rise to a conflict over 
the character of the urban environment, and shaped governance at both the local and 
national levels.2 As is shown throughout this thesis, planning was the mechanism 
through which policymakers sought solutions to environmental challenges, and both 
sides in the GLDP conflict invoked the improvement of the environment as their 
primary aim. Simon Gunn rightly notes that the influential town planner Colin 
Buchanan shaped environmental discourse by combining conservation with 
modernism, and it is worth emphasising which side he found himself on in the 
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GLDP debate.3 The GLC’s proposal to profoundly remodel the capital was inspired 
and supported by Buchanan, highlighting how environmental policy did not simply 
tend towards preservation during the period explored by this thesis. Policymakers 
were willing to dramatically reshape entire cities in the name of creating a ‘good 
environment’, and employed the expert technical knowledge of specialists such as 
Buchanan in order to advance their environmental vision. 
As in the cases explored in earlier chapters, both sides in the GLDP debate made the 
argument that it was possible to reconcile progress with conservation, and by doing 
so create an environment that was worthy of a modern, technological nation. Once 
again, the centrality of affluence and modernity to the development of environmental 
politics becomes clear. Even the objectors, who argued that the quality of life in 
London, in terms of pollution, the division of communities and the erosion of peace 
and quiet, was being destroyed by motor traffic, accepted that the car had to have a 
place in the fabric of the city. Quality of life meant the provision of green spaces and 
quiet residential streets, but in a modern, affluent society, even those that invoked 
the declining standard of the environment and argued against the motorways 
acknowledged that it also had to include the freedom to use a car. The objectors at 
the GLDP inquiry did not on the whole express ‘anti-industrial’ sentiments, and they 
rarely showed signs of the environmental radicalism so often associated with the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The case of the GLDP provides evidence of how 
environmental politics in Britain was shaped not by a Romantic reaction against 
modernity, but by attempts to meet challenges of governance within the context of 
rising affluence and on going economic and technological development. 
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Before moving on to the specific case study of the GLDP, this chapter looks briefly 
at the history of motorways in Britain and some of the issues they highlighted during 
the immediate post-war years. It then examines the work of Buchanan, particularly 
his 1963 report Traffic in Towns. Where the previous chapter explored Buchanan’s 
influence on central government and the planning machinery, this chapter provides a 
closer examination of his diagnosis and precisely what he prescribed as the potential 
solution, demonstrating how ‘the environment’ was conceptualised in relation to the 
urban traffic problem. This leads into the question of what happened in London, 
where Buchanan’s ideas proved highly influential. The rationale behind the GLDP 
road proposals is explored, followed by the arguments made by those who opposed 
the Plan. At the heart of the GLDP inquiry was a contested understanding of ‘the 
environment’, with both supporters of and objectors to the motorways invoking 
environmental impact as the primary justification for their case. The chapter 
highlights the fluidity of the concept of the ‘environment’ in the 1960s and early 
1970s, and underlines the centrality of ideas of ‘quality of life’, particularly in an 
urban setting, in shaping the development of environmental politics in Britain. The 
chapter ends by examining the findings of the Layfield Inquiry, and the eventual 
scrapping of the Ringways idea. 
There are rich archival materials through which to explore the challenge of urban 
traffic, particularly in relation to London. This chapter draws extensively upon the 
papers of the GLDP inquiry, held in the archives of the GLC at the London 
Metropolitan Archives. It also makes use of the papers of the Blackheath Motorway 
Action Group and its chairman, the MP for Lewisham North Roland Moyle, which 
are held at the Local History and Archives Centre in Lewisham. This chapter also 
refers to printed studies and reports, and the London press. 
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Motorways in post-war Britain 
In the construction of dedicated highways for motor traffic, Britain was a relatively 
slow starter. At the end of the Second World War, fifty years after cars had first been 
legally allowed on to the roads, the country still had no routes specifically 
constructed and set aside for their use.4 During the inter-war years, advocates of 
motoring had placed pressure on the government to build motorways, with 
significant inspiration taken from the famous Autobahnen of Nazi Germany, but it 
was not until after the war that significant steps were taken towards the construction 
of new inter-city roads.5 In May 1946, the Ministry of Transport announced a ten-
year plan for Britain’s roads, and while this stalled amid the austerity of the late 
1940s, there was a change in attitude under the Conservatives in the early 1950s.6 
Rising car ownership ensured that there was growing demand, backed up by industry 
lobbying in the form of the British Road Federation’s Roads Crusade, and in 1955 
the government announced an Expanded Road Programme that included a London 
to Yorkshire motorway (the eventual M1) and a by-pass around the Lancashire town 
of Preston (which would eventually form part of the M6).7 By the end of the 1950s, 
over 400 miles of motorway were under construction in Britain, and the extension of 
the policy in the 1960s would make it the largest road-building programme in British 
history.8 
The response to the opening of the first motorways speaks to the status of the car as 
a symbol of post-war affluence and modernity. As Peter Merriman notes, motorways 
were presented as a sign of a new era of progress and prosperity – a novel innovation 
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worthy of excitement and celebration.9 Motorists queued to use them on their 
opening days, and leading political figures hailed them as indications of Britain’s 
post-war ambition. Speaking at the opening of the Preston by-pass on 5 December 
1958, the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan said that the country would look upon 
the road as ‘a token of what is to follow’, while at the opening of the first stretch of 
the M1 on 2 November 1959, the Minister of Transport Ernest Marples described 
the event as ‘in keeping with the bold, exciting and scientific age in which we live’.10 
Merriman characterises the M1, the first truly extensive stretch of motorway, as 
having been an exotic space in the late 1950s, ripe for exploration by intrepid 
travellers. More than 3,000 vehicles used the road in its first hour, and during its 
opening week the Observer dispatched the Formula One driver Tony Brooks on a test 
drive. ‘This broad six-lane through-way,’ Brooks wrote, ‘divorced from towns and 
villages, kills the image of a tight little island full of hamlets and lanes and pubs. More 
than anything … it is of the twentieth century.’ For Merriman, Brooks’s words 
highlight how the arrival of the motorways brought ‘an international-metropolitan 
modernity into the English countryside’.11 
Amid the excitement, opposition to the first motorways was muted. Preservationist 
organisations, such as the Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE), 
were willing to support the roads provided that action was taken to design them in 
‘harmony’ with the landscape, and a host of preservationists, including Clough 
Williams-Ellis, served on the Ministry of Transport’s Landscape Advisory 
Committee.12 Nevertheless, instances of opposition did occur. Objections to the line 
of the M1 were lodged by 142 parties in 1955, and overruled by the government 
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without the holding of a public inquiry. In 1958, the proposed route of the M1 
through Charnwood Forest in Leicestershire prompted opposition from 
organisations that included the CPRE, the Ramblers’ Association and the Nature 
Conservancy, resulting in a compromise over the final route.13 Similarly, in the early 
1960s various groups opposed sections of the route of the M4 from London to 
Bristol. However, while these instances of protest do show that there was opposition 
to the motorways, it is important to note that they were always connected to specific 
questions about the routes of the roads. As Derek Wall writes, ‘campaigns that 
rejected the very principle of motorways, let alone the cult of the car, were at the 
time virtually unknown’.14 As the construction of national motorways continued at 
pace in the 1960s, it would be in relation to towns and cities that the consequences 
of mass car ownership and the impact of major road building would become the 
subjects of significant contestation and debate. 
The Buchanan Report and the challenge of traffic in towns 
In order to understand the challenge posed to Britain’s towns and cities by motor 
traffic, it is worth examining the rate at which the number of vehicles on the roads 
grew during the twentieth century. In 1914 there were only 388,860 vehicles in 
Britain, yet by the outbreak of the Second World War there were 3.1 million. By 1956 
there were 6.7 million, with many more expected to appear in the coming years and 
decades.15 The predictions of the 1950s were not wrong – by 1965 there were 11.6 
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million vehicles on the roads, and by 1975 there were 16.5 million.16 By 2013, the 
figure had more than doubled to 35 million.17 
It was this rate of growth that prompted Colin Buchanan to issue a warning in 1958. 
As his book’s title, Mixed Blessing, made clear, Buchanan’s approach was characterised 
by a fundamental ambivalence towards the coming of the motor age. He began his 
book by emphasising the profound impact of the motor car, describing its arrival in 
Britain in the late nineteenth century as a ‘divide in time’, a ‘point at which something 
happened which was destined to change everything over a wide sector of our affairs’. 
While it would not have been recognised at the time, the arrival of the first car in 
1888 ‘marked the point at which many of our social and economic arrangements 
were diverted, gently at first, onto a new course’, and the motor vehicle would ‘come 
to affect the lives of every single person’, and present ‘a tougher series of adjustment 
problems than perhaps any single invention has done in the course of history’.18 
Although he described the car as ‘a Trojan Horse more brutally destructive in some 
of its consequences than any that emerged from the original wooden horse’, 
Buchanan’s perspective was not purely a negative one. The motor vehicle had greatly 
increased people’s personal mobility, and opened up new opportunities for work and 
leisure to the general population that could not have been dreamed of a century 
earlier. Moreover, it had become an integral part of everyday life – for better, or 
worse, vehicles were ‘a vital link in our economic system’, and society’s dependence 
on them was unlikely to be reversed.19 Yet for all the opportunities and everyday 
services that they provided, motor vehicles were also instruments of destruction. 
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Traffic had become a ‘destructive lava welling out from the towns’, bringing with it 
‘death and injury, pain and bereavement, noise and smell, and … vast winding trails 
of serious damage to urban and country amenities’. In Buchanan’s view, only war 
was a more destructive force, yet at the same time the motor vehicle was ‘inextricably 
inserted into all our affairs, a major part of our national livelihood, and to many 
people (including the author), little short of an object of worship’.20 
In his article on the urban traffic debate, Simon Gunn argues that Buchanan 
developed an approach that was simultaneously modernist and conservationist, 
through which he proposed the comprehensive remodelling of towns in order to 
conserve a more traditional form of urban living.21 That is correct, but it is worth 
saying more about just what Buchanan asked his readers to consider in relation to the 
impact of the motor car. In Buchanan’s writing, what loomed large was not simply a 
question of modernisation or conservation, or something in between, but rather a 
question that interrogated the meaning and purpose of urban life, and asked whether 
such a thing could even endure in the face of mass car ownership. In Mixed Blessing, 
he described traffic as ‘a wholesale destroyer of much that we have prized as part of 
civilised living’, and argued that in confronting the problem it was not only the 
movement of traffic that was at stake, but the very survival of ‘civilised town life’.22 
The question of the future of ‘civilised’ urban life was at the centre of Traffic in Towns, 
Buchanan’s 1963 report for the Ministry of Transport. Arising ‘directly out of man’s 
own ingenuity and growing affluence’, the motor car presented ‘nothing less … than 
a threat to the whole familiar physical form of towns’. Buchanan accepted that the 
car was a ‘highly beneficial invention’, and that its widespread use was certain to 
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continue, but argued that its integration into urban life was ‘coming into perspective 
as the supreme social problem of the future’.23 The question was whether it would be 
possible to accommodate traffic while also creating ‘towns which are worth living 
in’.24 A similar case was made in the report of Sir Geoffrey Crowther’s Steering 
Group, which was published alongside Buchanan’s work. Crowther presented the 
problem in terms of achieving a balance between the public’s desire for personal 
mobility and the desire for satisfactory urban surroundings. The car was ‘an 
instrument of emancipation, a symbol of the modern age’, and almost all families 
wished to acquire one, but it was also ‘a menace that can spoil our civilisation’. 
Unless action was taken, ‘all chance of urbane living’ would be defeated.25 
Having diagnosed the problem, Buchanan turned to offering a prescription for what 
could be done. In his view, radical action was required. It was certainly not an option 
to do nothing – if the situation was not addressed, ‘either the utility of vehicles in 
towns will decline rapidly, or the pleasantness and safety of surroundings will 
deteriorate catastrophically’. Buchanan may have been keen to conserve urban life, 
but there was nothing conservative about the methods he proposed – the aim, he 
argued, should be ‘to remould our environment to our liking’.26 In Traffic in Towns, he 
outlined a scheme for fundamentally redesigning urban areas in order to separate 
traffic from centres of population. In doing so he drew a clear link between 
congestion and quality of life, using the term ‘good environment’ to describe ‘a place, 
or an area, or even a street, which is free from the adverse effects of traffic’. A ‘good’ 
urban environment could not be one that received large volumes of traffic or 
suffered from congestion. Buchanan advanced the concept of ‘environmental areas’, 
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or ‘urban rooms’ to describe sections in which residential and commercial life would 
take place free from the nuisance of free traffic. Instead of passing through such 
areas, vehicles would be ‘canalised’ along ‘urban corridors’, i.e. primary roads 
designed specifically for moving large volumes of traffic.27 In order to achieve this, 
comprehensive redevelopment would be required, but in proposing it Buchanan 
challenged decision-makers and planners to be bold. He asked them to imagine what 
a ‘good environment’ and ‘civilised’ urban life should be like, and urged them to take 
action to make that environment a reality. While the traffic problem had the potential 
‘to ruin this island by the end of the century’, an ambitious commitment to 
‘recreating the urban environment in a vigorous and lively way could do more than 
anything to make it the most exciting country in the world, with incalculable results 
for our welfare and prosperity’.28 
As was noted in the previous chapter, Buchanan’s report captured national attention. 
It succeeded in encouraging greater integration of transport and planning policy 
within central government, but it also inspired practical attempts to implement its 
ideas. Buchanan had called for bold decisions to be made on the future of Britain’s 
towns and cities, and his message was heard within the GLC, where a scheme was 
developed to remodel London around the principles put forward in Traffic in Towns.  
The Greater London Development Plan 
In 1963, the London Government Act created the GLC, a new strategic authority 
sitting above the 32 boroughs of inner and outer London. The 1963 Act charged the 
GLC with producing a development plan for Greater London, a requirement that 
reflected a shift in thinking in town and country planning that had taken place during 
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the early 1960s. As discussed in the previous chapter, the problem of traffic in towns 
had led to calls for greater integration of land-use and transport planning. Under the 
Labour government from 1964 there was a shift towards encouraging regional rather 
than localised planning, and in 1965 the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government’s report The Future of Development Plans introduced the notion of 
‘structure planning’, through which plans would focus on ‘the broad pattern of future 
development and redevelopment and [deal] with land use/transport relationships in 
an integrated way’.29 In dealing with housing, transport, population, employment, 
utilities and recreation for the entire Greater London conurbation, the GLDP would 
be the largest structure plan to be produced during this period. 
While the GLDP was broad in scope, the severity of the traffic challenge and the 
extent of the redevelopment that would potentially be required ensured that the 
transport proposals came to dominate discussion of the Plan. Above all, attention 
focused on the proposal to construct the four concentric motorways, or Ringways, 
around the city. In advocating the Ringways, the GLDP built upon the town planner 
Patrick Abercrombie’s famous Greater London Plan of 1944. Abercrombie had 
proposed four rings moving outwards from the centre, and the idea of three rings 
had formed a part of the GLC’s predecessor, the London County Council’s plans 
since 1945.30 Although the GLDP was not presented to central government until 
1969, it was public knowledge from the mid-1960s that the Plan would include urban 
motorways. In March 1965 New Society and the Evening Standard revealed a map of the 
‘£450m plan [that] will change [the] face of London’, with the main element being ‘a 
box-shaped ring motorway … running about four miles from the edge of central 
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London’. The Plan, wrote the Evening Standard, was ‘certain to have a profound 
influence on the future geography of London’.31 
Before turning to the arguments deployed by those who opposed the Ringways plan, 
it is necessary to examine the case that was made by the GLC in favour of the 
motorways. The Council wished to drive four eight-lane highways through many of 
the capital’s inner and outer suburbs, a process that would require years of 
construction and the demolition of up to 30,000 homes, but it proposed to do it in 
the interests of improving London’s environment. What is striking about the debate 
over the GLDP is the manner in which the traffic challenge was conceptualised as 
‘environmental’, and the extent to which a ‘good environment’ became the principle 
to which both sides appealed. For the GLC, the construction of motorways through 
densely populated areas of the capital was an environmental solution to an environmental 
problem, which would lead to improved standards of living for Londoners. 
The starting point of the GLC’s case was that the present circumstances had become 
intolerable. ‘The very vitality of London,’ the GLC argued, ‘has become self-
strangulating.’32 Traffic congestion was presented as the greatest challenge facing the 
city, and the GLC outlined ‘six evils’ with which it was associated, from visual, aural 
and atmospheric pollution, to road accidents, wasted time and the halting of bus 
services.33 Congestion ‘stultifies and limits life’, and as London choked from the 
effects of traffic, there was a question as to how much longer the city’s inhabitants 
would be able to cope.34 Inaction was not an option – something had to be done, as 
the problem would only continue to grow more severe. It was noted that in 1966 
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there were 17 cars for every 100 Londoners, and that by 1981 there would be 29 per 
100.35 Sooner or later, argued the GLC’s counsel Peter Boydell at the public inquiry, a 
large majority of families in London would own a car, and that was a situation that 
had to be planned for.36 If London was to remain an attractive place to live and 
work, the demand for movement had to be met, and any proposals to address the 
problem within the framework of the existing road network could ‘at best be 
considered as palliatives’.37 
The importance of mobility was central to the GLC’s argument. Movement, the 
Council pointed out, was an essential component of city life, not simply as an end in 
itself but as ‘an integral part of human activity serving both social and economic 
development’. In the post-war period, mobility had become more and more crucial. 
A ‘general revolution of expectations’ had taken place, and higher living standards 
had ‘widened the horizons for the vast majority’. In order to meet their raised 
expectations, people expected good standards of personal mobility and, while public 
transport had an important role to play, the GLC argued that the opportunity to 
enjoy the benefits of car ownership was vital. The car was no longer just a status 
symbol, but ‘an important and widely available asset providing accessibility to many 
places that were previously beyond the reach of the average family’.38 As such, the 
GLC had a responsibility to ensure that the GLDP secured this newly acquired 
accessibility. In doing so, the Plan opened up the question of the place of individual 
liberty in urban life. The freedom to move around the city was crucial, yet that 
freedom was causing environmental deterioration and ultimately limiting movement 
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through congestion. At the public inquiry the GLC’s Director for Planning and 
Transportation, Bernard Collins, argued that a balance had to be struck – there could 
not be ‘unbridled licence’ to use motor vehicles, as the consequences were too 
severe, but nor could there be ‘intolerable repression’ of the right to move freely 
about the city.39 
For the British Roads Federation (BRF), the industry lobbying organisation that 
threw its weight firmly behind the Ringways plan, the issue of freedom was even 
more critical. In its evidence to the inquiry, the BRF argued that car ownership had 
become a fact of life, and that it was impossible to put the clock back. Car use would 
continue to grow, and ‘any too great restriction is trying to copy Canute’.40 Now that 
it was a fact of life, the car was integral to personal freedom. ‘If a Londoner wants to 
get his own car,’ the BRF’s counsel argued at the inquiry,  
if he wants to save up for it, if he takes pride and joy in its use, why should 
he not have the same opportunities as everybody else up and down the big 
cities of England? … Why should he have a lower share of the mobility 
which is now an essential feature of life?41 
The BRF even went so far as to argue that the freedom to use a car formed part of a 
‘good environment’. The environment did not only constitute ‘the flowers and the 
trees’ or ‘the birds and the bees’, but also access to the essential services of city life, 
including ‘accessibility and mobility’. This formed part of the ‘total environment’, and 
instead of being treated as ‘lepers or criminals’, drivers were entitled to a ‘reasonable 
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degree of pleasure and use out of owning their car as part of the environment of 
their lives’.42 
The BRF’s characterisation of car use as part of the ‘environment’ underlines the 
flexibility with which the term was used at the time. The ‘environment’ could mean 
almost anything, but invariably its use had some connection to the question of 
‘quality of life’. Having established that congestion was making life in London 
increasingly intolerable, and that the future of the city had to include provision for 
private car use, the GLC built its case for the construction of the Ringways around 
the argument that they would bring significant environmental improvements to the 
capital. At the inquiry, the Council argued that its ‘chief concern’ was ‘with the 
quality of the environment of the Londoner’. By ‘environment’, it was clear that the 
GLC was referring to the surroundings of urban life in their entirety – ‘the great 
single objective of this Plan’, argued Boydell, ‘is to secure an improved total 
environment, and that environment in the Council’s view has many components’. In 
order to improve the ‘total environment’, it would be necessary not only to secure 
standards of housing, recreational opportunities and ‘the state of the general physical 
surroundings’, but also ‘the freedom to move from A to B with relative ease, and in 
some degree of comfort’.43 
Ultimately, it was a matter of securing the quality of life. ‘London’s citizens,’ the 
GLC argued, ‘demand and deserve an environment that is compatible with modern 
concepts of dignity and enjoyable living.’ As the urban environment was largely man-
made, it was clear that the responsibility lay with Londoners to shape it for the 
future. Whereas in the nineteenth century the challenge for government had been to 
tackle basic problems of housing and sanitation, in the second half of the twentieth 
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century the aims were further reaching. The GLDP would not only deal with the 
‘crying scandals of our age, like slums and road deaths, but also with that stunting of 
the human spirit which results from indifference to some of man’s less obvious 
needs’. ‘Beauty and tranquillity,’ the Council concluded, ‘must come with safety and 
cleanliness’.44 
In promising to ‘provide a total new environment for those who live here, those who 
work, and those who just want to enjoy themselves’, the GLC sought to place its 
project in the context of the wider concern around environmental issues.45 To mark 
European Conservation Year in 1970, the Council published a pamphlet extolling the 
environmental virtues of the GLDP. Having established that amid ‘the growing 
international recognition of environmental reality man can no longer shrug off his 
responsibility for conservation and environment’, the pamphlet explained that the 
GLC was committed to making a serious contribution ‘towards a better life and 
future for all London and Londoners’. This would be done through implementing 
the GLDP, which was characterised by its concern with the environment – the aim 
was ‘the conservation of the best coupled with the renewal or improvement of what 
is run-down or inferior’. This would not simply involve preserving the famous 
landmarks and attractions of the capital, but rather ‘conserving and improving the 
environment of the individual family at home, at work, at play, at school and when 
shopping’.46 
How, then, did the GLC argue that the GLDP, and specifically the Ringways, would 
improve the ‘total environment’ of London? In line with Buchanan’s arguments in 
Traffic in Towns, the GLC stated that the segregation of people from traffic was the 
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essential environmental component of the Plan.47 The four concentric motorways 
would comprise a ‘primary road network’ that would provide the ‘canalisation’ 
advocated by Buchanan. According to the Council, the primary network would carry 
half of the city’s main traffic, removing it from populated residential and commercial 
areas.48 With the Ringways carrying that traffic, and an improved ‘secondary road 
network’ reducing traffic volumes further, populated areas could be designated as the 
‘environmental areas’ or ‘urban rooms’ proposed by Buchanan, free from congestion 
and all its associated problems, including the noise and fumes that blighted the lives 
of those living in areas subjected to heavy through traffic.49 The new road network 
would form ‘an integral part of an improved environment’, freeing London from ‘a 
large part of the main nuisance traffic’.50 
As Gunn points out, Buchanan’s work did much to alert both government and the 
public to the environmental challenged posed by cars. Yet if we are to see Buchanan 
as a key figure in the growth of environmental awareness in the 1960s and 1970s, as 
Gunn does, it is important to note that his conception of an improved urban 
environment was very much in line with the thinking of the GLC.51 The Council 
used Buchanan as a consultant as the GLDP progressed through the inquiry process, 
and the proposal to construct the motorways met with his firm approval. In a study 
of the potential impact of the Plan on north east London, Buchanan and his team 
concluded that the Ringways ‘seemed to offer the only practicable means of 
reconciling the pressures for greater mobility with the demand for a better 
environment’. The motorways, Buchanan argued, were ‘an indispensible element of 
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the strategy’ and would ‘make a salient contribution to the environmental success of 
the Plan’.52 In his evidence to the inquiry, Buchanan argued that the failure over the 
course of eight decades to provide London with an adequate road system had 
produced ‘devastating environmental results’, and stated that he ‘saw no reason to 
doubt the basic soundness’ of the GLC’s road-building policy. In his view, the 
Ringways proposal was ‘fairly modest’, and could ‘in no way be regarded as a “sell 
out” to the private car’.53 
For the GLC, that notion formed a central part of the argument for the motorways. 
The Council firmly rejected the idea that the Plan was a ‘sell out’ to the car, with 
Boydell telling the inquiry that it was a ‘myth’ that it was ‘unduly weighted in favour 
of the private motorist’.54 To the contrary, the GLC argued that the GLDP was a 
balanced proposal that offered an answer to a problem that had to be addressed. 
There was no ‘alternative solution which is both feasible and effective’, and it was a 
delusion to think that by not building the Ringways ‘the character of London will be 
maintained’ and ‘all will be sweetness and light’.55 London did not have to face a 
choice between the two extremes of ‘[destroying] itself by congestion and chaos’, or 
allowing ‘planners to destroy it by carving it up into islands of habitations cowering 
under the roaring motorways’. The GLDP was a compromise that would provide the 
city with a new road network and an improved environment. The Council 
acknowledged that some of those whose homes and businesses lay in the path of the 
proposed motorways would suffer, but cited the ‘Benthamite principle’ to argue that 
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the majority of Londoners would benefit.56  Yes, there would be upheaval, but 
London was not a ‘museum piece’, and the disruption had to be weighed against the 
general improvement of the environment.57 
The GLDP, then, was presented by the GLC as the only practical solution to a 
critical environmental problem. By building the new road network, the Council 
argued that an unsatisfactory and deteriorating environment could be revolutionised, 
and that the quality of life of the majority of London’s inhabitants could be secured 
and improved. Unsurprisingly, that was not a perspective that met with universal 
approval, and it is now necessary to examine the arguments of those that opposed 
the Plan. 
The case against the Greater London Development Plan 
As has been noted, the public inquiry into the GLDP was, at the time, the largest 
statutory inquiry to have been held in Britain. With over 28,000 objections 
submitted, the majority of which related to the transport proposals of the Plan, there 
is no doubting that, for all the GLC’s promotion of their supposed benefits, the 
Ringways were the subject of significant opposition. Indeed, while it would take until 
1970 for the arguments to be heard before an inquiry, public opposition to 
motorways in London dated back to the earliest stages of the proposals. In 
Blackheath in south-east London, a local campaign group, the Dover Radial Route 
Committee, was formed in 1962 to oppose a radial motorway that would eventually 
form part of the Ringways plan.58 When the Ringways themselves were announced in 
1965, and it became clear that the proposed Ringway 1 would pass straight through 
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Blackheath, the members of the Dover Radial Route Committee stepped up their 
campaign, and quickly found that they had allies in other areas of London threatened 
by the proposals. In particular, links were formed with the Hampstead Motorway 
Action Group, and the Committee was eventually renamed the Blackheath 
Motorway Action Group (BMAG) to underline the connection with its north 
London counterpart.59 
In 1968 a citywide London Motorway Action Group (LMAG) was formed, chaired 
by the Labour MP for Battersea North, Douglas Jay, in order to bring together the 
local campaign groups distributed around the routes of the Ringways.60 When the 
Layfield Inquiry opened in July 1970, the LMAG, together with an array of local 
groups, played a leading role in presenting the case against the GLDP. Those 
campaign groups were joined by a number of London boroughs affected by the 
motorway proposals, including Greenwich, Croydon, Hounslow and Camden, and 
by national organisations such as the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) and 
the Commons, Footpaths and Open Spaces Preservation Society. The inquiry also 
received a large volume of submissions from individual objectors. 
Between the GLC and the opponents of the GLDP there was one area of clear 
agreement – motor traffic posed a major threat to the urban environment, and a 
solution had to be found. The Blackheath campaigners acknowledged this as early as 
1964, when they referred to a report by the Ministry of Transport that noted that, 
while the prospect of universal car ownership held ‘the promise of greater 
opportunity for personal convenience in travel and enjoyment’, it also posed a 
‘menace [to] the preservation of the traditional beauties and amenities of our cities’. 
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While there was ‘no ready panacea’, the report argued that ‘the right and equitable 
solution is a prize worth striving for’.61 Similarly, campaigners from the Chiswick 
Motorways Liaison Committee recognised that the ‘conflict between the demands 
for increased mobility and preservation and enhancement of the environment is one 
of the major problems facing London’, and acknowledged that some form of action 
had to be taken. 62  Whatever the solution, it would need to involve the 
accommodation of the car – the ‘rise in affluence and the increasing desire for 
mobility’ were not processes that could be halted, and the Chiswick group were well 
aware that ‘in London there is a continual process of change’.63 
Both the GLC and the objectors agreed that traffic posed a severe problem for 
London, and both accepted that cars would need to form a part of any future plan 
for the city. Where they disagreed was on the degree to which private vehicles should 
be accommodated, and on whether a network of urban motorways offered a viable 
solution to the problem. The objectors, like the GLC, took as their starting point the 
need to produce a satisfactory urban environment for the capital. Indeed, in 
opposing the GLDP, objectors were happy to compliment the environmental 
objectives of the Council. At the inquiry, the LMAG pointed out that they were 
largely in agreement with the GLC when it came to the aims of the Plan. To the 
Council’s ‘overall aim to improve the environment’, the LMAG could have no 
objections.64 The problem was that this resulted in a ‘paradox’ – while the LMAG 
agreed ‘with much of the GLC’s current approach and their professed principles’, the 
group objected to the actual proposals. Far from bringing about an improvement, 
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the implementation of the GLDP would in fact ‘greatly damage the environment’.65 
A similar view was expressed by RIBA, which told the inquiry that it was ‘pleased to 
see comments coming from the GLC which indicate a growing awareness of their 
concern for the environment’, but expressed regret that the Council had put more 
thought into traffic and roads than it had into how to improve the environment.66 
Time and again, objectors pointed out that the Ringways proposal did not meet the 
GLC’s environmental objectives. The Chiswick Motorway Liaison Committee noted 
that the Council recognised ‘the importance of the environmental aspects’, but at the 
same time paid ‘too little regard to them’ in the actual development plan proposals.67 
Similarly, objectors in Blackheath argued that the construction of motorways was 
‘completely inconsistent with every declared aim in the Plan in regard to the 
environment’.68 
If the GLC argued that the Ringways would enhance London’s environment, why 
did its opponents believe that the roads would fail to fulfil this aim? At the inquiry, 
the various objectors put forward a number of practical reasons for why the 
motorways would damage life in the city. Most obviously, it was pointed out that 
those living on the proposed routes of the roads stood to lose their homes. It was 
estimated that the construction of the motorways would involve the demolition of 
15,000 to 20,000 houses and require the rehousing of 45,000 people.69 During the 
construction process, those living in the areas through which the Ringways were to 
pass would experience severe upheaval, with all the disruption that came with major 
building work, while prior to construction residents would face ‘planning blight’, 
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whereby property prices stagnated due to the knowledge that the area would 
eventually be host to an eight-lane motorway. The LMAG estimated that a quarter of 
a million people would eventually live within 200 yards of Ringway 1, and pointed 
out that ‘it would be difficult to find many other places in the world where a 30-mile 
motorway would have such an ill effect on so many people’.70 Once the Ringways 
were built, local residents would have to live with the environmental effects of 
having a major motorway passing through their neighbourhood. The Chiswick 
Motorways Liaison Committee argued that the ‘problems of noise, dirt and pollution’ 
would be ‘immense’, while the BMAG stressed that ‘Ringway 1 would subject many 
thousands of families living on the edge of the motorway to an intolerable burden of 
noise, fumes, dirt and vibration’.71 
As an example of the destruction that it was argued the Ringways would bring, 
objectors pointed to the Westway, an elevated section of the A40 that ran between 
Paddington and North Kensington in west London. When the Westway was opened 
in July 1970, the ceremony was disrupted by ‘angry householders who [lived] in the 
shadow of the two-and-a-half mile motorway’, many of whom now had ‘their 
bedrooms less than 50 feet away from the road’. The Evening Standard reported that 
the residents faced ‘noise, dirt [and] danger’ as a result of the road, and would go to 
bed and wake up ‘to the sound of streams of passing vehicles’.72 At the Layfield 
Inquiry, it was suggested that the Westway provided a glimpse of the future that 
would be ushered in by the Ringways. Hounslow Borough Council described the 
road as ‘the worst environmental blunder that planning has committed since the end 
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of the war’, while RIBA noted that the experience of the Westway left them 
extremely sceptical of the GLC’s environmental intentions. 73  This concern was 
underlined by the Chiswick committee, which argued that the Westway was ‘the 
touchstone by which the reality of the GLC’s intentions must be judged’, and urged 
that ‘no credence be given to bland assurances or grandiose proposals until the 
existing areas of misery and squalor caused by motorway construction have been 
rehabilitated to standards which are acceptable in a civilised community’.74 
Ultimately, much of the opposition case rested on the effects that the Ringways 
would have on London’s communities. A key component of the objections was the 
issue of severance – the motorways would physically divide the areas through which 
they passed, with little or no regard for community life. The BMAG argued that 
Blackheath would ‘have the heart of its community torn out’, with Ringway 1 passing 
‘straight through the middle of the village shopping centre’.75 The problem was well 
described by one private objector, E.J. Tagg, who appealed to the GLC not to ‘ruin 
[London’s] attractions altogether by carving it into rings’ and ‘cutting people off from 
each other’.76 Whereas the GLC argued that the Ringways would enhance the quality 
of life in London, the objectors contended that the roads would prove devastating to 
the city’s standard of living. At the heart of the debate was the extent to which the 
motor car could and should be incorporated into the fabric of urban life. In contrast 
to the BRF’s suggestion that a ‘good environment’ should include the freedom to 
drive a car, opponents of the Ringways argued that the accommodation of traffic in 
London had gone far enough. It was not reasonable, the LMAG pointed out, ‘to go 
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on indefinitely destroying the ordinary amenities of the city in the interests of 
mobility’.77 In the view of the Ealing Residents’ Association, ‘the worshipping at the 
shrine of the road vehicle’ had become ‘an obsession which blinds many planners’.78 
In their desire to accommodate the modern development of private car ownership, 
the GLC had lost sight of the true purpose of the urban environment – as the 
BMAG put it, if it succeeded in constructing the Ringways the Council would ‘make 
a desolation and call it progress’.79 
On top of the noise and fumes, that desolation would come in the form of 
disruption to the city’s social functions. The Blackheath campaigners noted that 
‘social responsibility and civic pride’ were ‘valuable ingredients in the making of a 
good environment’, and numerous objectors argued that the urban motorways could 
not be compatible with the maintenance of cohesive neighbourhoods. 80  RIBA 
pointed out that what mattered was not only the relieving of traffic congestion, but 
also ‘the way in which people live in cities’, while two private objectors, Sira Dermen 
and Andrew Crook, told the inquiry that any plan for city development had to derive 
from ‘a conception of urban life’. ‘We, unlike the GLC,’ argued Dermen and Crook, 
‘shall come right out and declare our belief that any city dedicated to the ideals of 
civilised life, physical and mental health, and social justice cannot accommodate 
motorways’. The motorway was not ‘an item that can be harmonised with any of the 
needs of urban life’, because it ‘dominates both physically and emotionally the whole 
environment’.81 Another objector, Jonathan Tyler, expanded that point, arguing that 
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the car was threatening the human scale of the city. Whereas in the past London’s 
built environment had taken ‘a remarkably ordered, sensible and satisfying form’, 
with the motorways the GLDP would introduce into the city structures of ‘inhuman 
proportions’.82 As G.C. Jenkins put it in a further private objection, ‘roads and traffic 
should exist to serve [and] not dominate the community’, but with the Ringways plan 
the GLC had put ‘the apparently insatiable demands of traffic before the interest and 
well-being of the residents who actually have to live with the results of their 
planning’.83  
Once the motorways were built, the objectors noted, the impact on London’s 
environment would be irreversible. In a joint objection, Greenwich and Croydon 
borough councils told the inquiry that there could ‘be few things more immutable 
than a motorway’, and argued that the final decision on the Ringways would be ‘the 
most far reaching of any decision to affect the city of London in its history’.84 For the 
Reverend J. Carolin, a private objector, the motorways would bring ‘wholesale 
destruction’ on a ‘scale unparalleled since Hitler’s blitz’, devastating longstanding 
communities that were ‘of immense importance in our present disordered society’.85 
Numerous objectors emphasised the legacy that the motorways would leave for 
future Londoners, with the Grove Park Residents Association telling the inquiry 
panel that if they approved the Ringways the decision would be ‘on your consciences 
for the rest of your lives’.86 In the view of the BMAG, the decision was not simply 
about the character of London in the present, but about the kind of city that its 
residents handed on to their grandchildren. ‘I for one,’ argued the group’s secretary 
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Ronald Pepper, ‘do not want to be remembered as part of the generation that 
despoiled London in the name of some dubious progress’.87 
In Blackheath in particular, the Ringways plan ran up against a conception of urban 
life that was incompatible with the construction of urban motorways. As a London 
suburb with a distinctive ‘village’ character, it was argued that Blackheath would be 
particularly devastated by the arrival of Ringway 1. Indeed, the GLDP appeared to 
conflict directly with the 1967 Civic Amenities Act, a piece of preservationist 
legislation that had been brought forward by the former Conservative Minister of 
Housing and Local Government Duncan Sandys, and passed with the support of the 
Labour government.88 The act, which introduced the concept of designating as 
‘conservation areas’ parts of towns that it was ‘desirable to preserve or enhance’, 
underlines how conservation and development often ran parallel to one another 
during this period. As Davis notes, plans such as the GLDP raised the spectre of 
American cities, with their urban highways and limitless sprawl, and conservationists 
fought to defend the individual character of London’s areas. 89  Blackheath was 
designated as a conservation area under the Civic Amenities Act, and campaigners 
made much use of that status in their fight against Ringway 1. Many of the objections 
relating to Blackheath, a large proportion of which repeated stock text provided by 
the BMAG, made reference to its status as a conservation area, and throughout the 
inquiry campaigners emphasised the special character of the area.90 Objecting to the 
‘destruction of what little beauty London has left to make way for the motor car’, 
one resident, Audrey Turner, described Blackheath as ‘one of the most compact and 
charming’ areas of the city, and argued that ‘no mere consideration of convenience 
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and expediency’ could justify its devastation by Ringway 1.91 In the view of the 
BMAG, the fact that the GLC was willing to drive an eight-lane motorway through 
Blackheath demonstrated that the Council had no coherent vision for the urban 
environment. Whereas many of London’s areas revealed ‘a marked lack of amenity, 
an absence of local loyalty, a lack of facility for development of social life and a 
suburban sprawl’, Blackheath’s status as a cohesive ‘village’ community meant that it 
should be a model for urban development. ‘Surely,’ the BMAG argued, ‘the aim of 
long term social planning should be to develop the rest of the London suburbs in a 
manner calculated to give them the advantages of Blackheath, rather than to reduce 
Blackheath to the level of the rest’.92 Blackheath’s ‘village’ character was something 
‘to be encouraged and not destroyed’, and if London was to survive ‘as a place to live 
in as well as work in’ it had to be saved from the motorway.93 
If Blackheath was to survive, one option for the campaigners there was for Ringway 
1 to run through a deep tunnel under the village. This had been put forward as a 
potential solution almost as soon as the Ringways proposal had surfaced, and it 
formed a key part of the Blackheath objectors’ case during the inquiry.94 It also 
received the backing of Buchanan, who was asked by the GLC to produce a report 
on how Ringway 1 should be incorporated into the Blackheath area, and concluded 
that a tunnel would be the only way to preserve its character.95 Ultimately, however, 
the Blackheath tunnel option was viewed as a last resort, as the campaigners were 
united with other objectors in the aim of preventing the Ringways from being built 
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altogether. Rather than building motorways, it was argued that the GLC should 
pursue a different strategy. It was the contention of the objectors that, in addition to 
all the physical and social devastation that they would bring to the areas through 
which they passed, the Ringways would not even achieve their primary aim of 
reducing London’s congestion. To the contrary, the main impact of the new roads 
would be to encourage more people to make more journeys by car, leading eventually 
to greater congestion.96  
As part of their case, the LMAG, together with the London Transport and Amenities 
Association, hired J. Michael Thomson, a research fellow in transport at the London 
School of Economics, to examine the GLC’s proposals. Thomson and his team 
concluded that ‘the motorways would generate a volume of traffic some 70 to 100 
per cent greater than would materialise otherwise’.97 Therefore, while the GLC may 
have been sincere in its desire to improve London’s environment, the centrality of 
urban motorways to the development plan demonstrated that the Council’s priorities 
were all wrong. Thomson argued that the economic and social costs of ‘providing 
roads and parking space for everyone to use cars for almost all journeys’ were so 
great that ‘one is compelled to conclude it is impossible’. To a significant degree, 
Thomson’s study anticipated the measures that would be implemented in London in 
subsequent decades. Instead of building the Ringways and attempting to cater for 
rising car use, the answer was to discourage people from driving in London, and to 
find a means ‘to persuade them into choosing public transport for some of their 
journeys’.98 Much of the objectors’ case, therefore, rested on arguing that the GLC 
should invest in public transport instead of motorways. The campaign group Women 
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on the Move, for example, described the Ringways as ‘extravagant’, and called for 
‘proposals for implementing a policy of public transport and for restraining private 
car trips’.99 Similarly, Greenwich and Croydon councils argued that the roads would 
not reduce congestion, and that the money should instead be spent on ‘greatly 
improved and convenient public transport networks’.100 
In examining the case made against the GLDP, it is important not to overlook whom 
the objectors were, and how this may have influenced the arguments used in 
opposition to the motorways. Davis argues that the dispute over the GLDP entailed 
a clash between one ‘feature of 1960s affluence’ – rising private car ownership – and 
another in rising owner-occupation of housing. Owing to the threat posed by the 
motorways to housing and the character of local environments, London’s growing 
ranks of owner-occupiers mobilised to oppose the GLC’s plan. The campaign against 
the Ringways – which succeeded in gaining 100,000 votes in the 1969 GLC elections 
under the banner of ‘Homes Before Roads’ – was a ‘middle class resistance 
movement’ through which a wide circle of ‘informed white-collar laymen’ challenged 
the designs of the planners.101 Where in the past the GLDP might have proceeded 
without hindrance, by the end of the 1960s affluence and gentrification had ensured 
that ‘inner London no longer consisted exclusively of a mute and malleable working 
class’.102 Davis’s argument is a convincing one, and it is borne out by examination of 
the archival evidence. It is surely no coincidence that two of the most vocal 
campaigns against the Plan originated in two of London’s most affluent and desirable 
suburbs, Hampstead and Blackheath, and it is significant that the two campaign 
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groups led the way in forming the LMAG. Both the Hampstead and Blackheath 
groups were supported by those with the financial and cultural capital necessary for 
mounting an effective campaign against the motorways. The leader of the BMAG 
was the local MP Roland Moyle and the chair of its first meeting was the Labour MP 
and future Prime Minister James Callaghan.103 The chair of the LMAG was the 
Labour MP Douglas Jay, and its membership included thirteen other MPs, as well as 
65 local residents’ associations and conservation groups.104 The campaigners’ political 
connections ensured that its case was heard in Whitehall, with deputations received 
by both the Minister of Transport and the Minister for Planning and Land.105 There 
can be little doubt that the campaign against the Ringways had its roots in London’s 
affluent middle class, and the areas from which many of the objections originated 
back up Davis’s observation regarding owner-occupation. 
Nevertheless, the campaign’s middle-class status need not diminish its importance as 
an appeal for the protection of the urban environment. While working-class voices 
may have been largely absent, and many objectors may have been motivated, at least 
in part, by ‘not-in-my-back-yard’ concerns, it is still significant for the emergence of 
environmental politics that such a major battle arose around the Ringways plan. The 
conception of city life put forward by the objectors to the GLDP diverged 
dramatically from the vision put forward by the GLC. Although both sides took as 
their starting point the idea that rising car ownership posed a major threat to the 
quality of life in cities, the objectors argued that the urban environment could not 
possibly be improved by the construction of major motorways. Whereas the GLC, 
taking inspiration from Buchanan, argued that wholesale redevelopment offered a 
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technological fix to the environmental problems faced by the city, the anti-
motorways campaigners contended that both the tangible and intangible qualities of 
the urban environment would be ill served by the modernist Ringways project. Not 
only would residents face losing their homes and green spaces, and face an even 
greater menace from noise and fumes, but they would also face being separated from 
one another by the motorways running through their areas, causing irreparable 
damage to the life of cohesive communities. For the objectors, whose middle-class 
status reflected their ‘postmaterial’ aspirations, the urban environment was not 
defined simply by its physical features, but also by the social relationships that 
formed among its inhabitants. The motorways, the objectors, argued, would destroy 
those relationships and diminish the quality of life, and the Layfield Inquiry was 
urged to take account of this in its consideration of whether to recommend the 
approval of the GLC’s development plan. 
The Layfield Report and the demise of the Greater London Development Plan 
Having opened in July 1970, the Greater London Development Plan Inquiry finally 
closed on 9 May 1972, following 237 days of hearings. With the inquiry proceedings 
at an end, the responsibility fell to the chair, Frank Layfield, and his panel to consider 
their recommendations to the Secretary of State for the Environment, who would 
make the final decision on whether to approve the Plan. The Layfield Report was 
passed to the Secretary of State, Geoffrey Rippon, on 18 December 1972, and 
published on 19 February 1973. While Layfield did not recommend the approval of 
the GLDP in its original form, he did recommend that Rippon should accept the 
Plan if certain amendments were made by the Council. This would include a version 
of the Ringways plan. The GLC’s proposal for four motorways was deemed to have 
been excessive, and Layfield argued that ‘what is needed can be adequately achieved 
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by no more than two complete orbitals, an inner and an outer’. It was recommended 
that Ringway 1 should be built, along with a second motorway on the outskirts of 
London. If possible, the panel suggested, an alternative route should be found for 
Ringway 1 that did not pass through Blackheath.106  
Given that Ringway 1 had been at the heart of many objections to the GLDP, 
Layfield’s recommendations represented a significant defeat for the objectors. 
However, while he stopped short of advising the scrapping of the motorways, it is 
clear from Layfield’s report that the case made against the Plan shaped his 
perspective on the future of London’s environment. Like both the GLC and the 
objectors, Layfield started from the position that there was no way of avoiding the 
challenge posed by traffic in town. Rising affluence was bringing ‘the ownership of 
cars within reach of an ever increasing section of the community’, and that trend had 
shown that ‘freedom of movement is seen by a large majority as an attractive feature 
of modern living’. A minimalist approach to the congestion problem would only lead 
to a further decline in conditions, and positive action was needed ‘if London is to 
remain tolerable as a living place and viable as a work place’.107 
Layfield agreed with the GLC that road building had to form part of the solution, 
but he did not agree that the Council had paid sufficient attention to the potential 
environmental impact of the Ringways. He noted that the largest volume of criticism 
at the inquiry had concerned the environmental implications of the GLC’s proposals, 
and pointed out that, while there was growing recognition within the Council that ‘a 
transport plan should be an integrated strategy for movement and for the 
improvement of the environment’, this had not been apparent when the GLDP was 
submitted in 1969. The original Plan had been heavily weighted towards roads as the 
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solution, and Layfield recommended that the Plan should be strengthened in regards 
to ‘the improvement of public transport and the improvement of the 
environment’.108 While arguing that the GLC should pay greater attention to public 
transport, Layfield stopped short recommending the introduction of restrictions on 
the flow of traffic within London, on the grounds that ‘the degree of restraint needed 
would be draconian, would be unacceptable to the public and would damage the 
economic life of London’.109 New roads did need to be built, and movement could 
not be restricted, but that did not mean that London had to be sacrificed to the car. 
For Layfield, the motorways would only be acceptable because he believed that they 
offered a solution to the environmental problems caused by traffic congestion. 
‘Movement,’ he wrote, ‘is a means to an end, not an end in itself.’ The creation of 
‘reasonable conditions of movement must be geared to tolerable conditions of 
living’. If the quality of life in London was not placed at the forefront of the 
development plan, Layfield concluded, ‘the urban environment [would] be turned 
into a motorised hell’.110 
Layfield also drew particular attention to the problem of pollution. While the 
provisions of the 1956 Clean Air Act (see chapter three) and successive legislation 
had ‘almost removed pollution from domestic heating in London’, the growth of the 
traffic problem meant that Londoners faced an increasing risk from ‘carbon 
monoxide, lead and other components of fumes from vehicles’. Layfield noted that 
concerns around air pollution had been voiced frequently by objectors over the 
course of the GLDP inquiry, and contrasted such concerns with the GLC’s 
contention that vehicle fumes did not present a significant threat to human health. 
The final report did not make specific recommendations on how the mitigation of 
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pollution should be incorporated into a revised GLDP, but it did argue that the GLC 
could do more, and it advised the Secretary of State to take note of concerns around 
air pollution in considering whether to give final approval to the Ringways plan.111 
Ultimately, Layfield’s recommendations were to prove moot. Although the Secretary 
of State accepted the advice given to him in the Layfield Report, with its proposal for 
two orbital motorways, the victory of the Labour Party in the 1973 GLC elections 
coincided with the demise of the Ringways idea. The GLDP had been devised under 
a Labour-led GLC in the mid-1960s, and the party had not opposed it while it was 
taken forward under the Conservatives after 1967, but by 1973 Labour had lost its 
enthusiasm for the Plan. Davis argues that this was a reflection of the widespread 
unpopularity of the proposals – the GLDP didn’t die because Labour won control of 
the GLC, but rather because ‘its over-ambition had been exposed during the public 
scrutiny process’. The Layfield Inquiry had ‘magnified every flaw in the Plan’, and 
sapped the political will to proceed with its implementation. It was a protracted 
process, but in the end the objectors emerged victorious. In 1976 a version of the 
GLDP without the motorways received ministerial approval, and remained as part of 
GLC planning policy until the Council’s abolition in 1986.112  
Conclusion 
Although it ultimately came to nothing, the GLDP provides a rich case study 
through which to examine the development of environmental politics during the 
1960s and the early 1970s. As is also discussed in chapter five, in the early 1960s, 
traffic congestion was identified as one of the most significant challenges facing 
Britain’s towns and cities, and as planners and politicians searched for a solution, the 
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problem came to be conceptualised as ‘environmental’. In his high-profile report, 
Colin Buchanan outlined the scale of the challenge, and framed it in terms of its 
impact on the urban environment, asking what constituted a ‘good’ environment and 
whether such an environment could be reconciled with the rapid and seemingly 
unceasing growth in volumes of motor traffic. In one sense this was conservationist, 
in that it sought to conserve what was considered valuable to British urban life, but 
the solutions that Buchanan proposed were modernist and radical. Motorways, which 
had been the source of excitement and wonder when they had first been built 
between cities in the 1950s, were offered as a means for fixing the urban 
environment, but their construction promised to transform much that was 
recognisable about Britain’s towns and cities. 
At the heart of the GLDP was a proposal to solve London’s traffic problem using 
the model put forward by Buchanan. From our present vantage point, it seems 
utterly unsurprising that a plan to build four eight-lane motorways in London would 
meet significant opposition, but what is striking about the history of the Ringways is 
that they were presented as an environmental solution. The GLC emphasised that the 
GLDP would enhance an urban environment that had been rendered unsatisfactory 
by the coming of the motor car, while their opponents argued that London’s 
environment would be devastated by the construction of the motorways. That 
disagreement led to the largest public inquiry in Britain to date, and the 
‘environment’ became the battleground on which that inquiry was fought. 
It should be noted that, at this stage, the concept of the ‘environment’ was loosely 
defined. Broadly, it referred to the surroundings within which people lived, both 
urban and rural, but the common thread that bound the various conceptions was the 
emphasis on ‘quality of life’. For both the supporters and the opponents of the 
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GLDP, the issue was ‘environmental’ because the Ringways would either enhance or 
diminish the quality of life in London. Similarly, as was discussed in chapter five, the 
Department of the Environment was so named because the policy areas with which 
it was concerned were seen to relate to the quality of life. For political actors in the 
post-war era, the enhancement of the quality of life continued to involve the securing 
of basic conditions of sanitation and housing, but it also entailed the provision of 
surroundings in which people could enjoy the benefits of affluence. In this respect, 
there is continuity across the central chapters of this thesis. In the inter-war period, it 
was argued that National Parks and the preservation of the countryside would have 
health benefits for the urban population, but the policy was also presented as one 
that could contribute to a rising standard of living for workers enjoying access to 
greater leisure time. In the post-war decades, the main political parties became 
increasingly attentive to the desire for amenable surroundings among an increasingly 
affluent population, and the environment came to be considered to have growing 
electoral saliency. It was in this context that the battle was fought over the London 
motorways. 
In London, the GLC pointed out that the motorways would provide relief from the 
accidents and fumes associated with traffic, but also stressed that they would 
enhance the beauty and tranquillity of the city. The British Roads Federation, 
meanwhile, proposed that mobility was essential to urban life, and argued that a 
‘good’ environment had to accommodate the freedom of the individual to drive a car 
within the city. The objectors, while arguing that the accidents and fumes would 
become worse, also emphasised the importance of social interaction to the urban 
environment, and expressed concern that communities would be severed by the 
motorways. On the whole, the environmental vision of the objectors was not one 
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that involved outright opposition to economic growth and technological progress, as 
represented in the GLDP by mass car ownership and motorway construction. In line 
with many of the arguments examined in this thesis, the objectors’ case sought to 
reconcile development and conservation, and envisaged a role for governance, both 
national and local, in achieving the ideal balance. In spite of the timing, opposition 
was not driven by an ‘anti-industrial’ spirit, not by the radicalism that Meredith 
Veldman argues shaped environmental politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s.113 
Together with the formation of the Department of the Environment, the challenge 
of traffic in towns and the fierce dispute over the GLDP demonstrates how the 
environment had acquired political resonance in Britain by the early 1970s. Global 
concerns over pollution played their part, but to a large extent British environmental 
politics were shaped by domestic anxieties. Affluence had raised expectations around 
‘quality of life’ while, at the same time, key symbols of affluence, particularly the 
motor car, appeared to threaten the continued rise of living standards. While they 
were by no means at the top of the political agenda, the securing of a ‘good’ 
environment and the enhancement of ‘quality of life’ were firmly established as 
responsibilities of government, both national and local, by the early 1970s, and that 
background should be borne in mind when considering the further rise of 
environmental politics and environmental activism over subsequent decades. 
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It has been the aim of this thesis to demonstrate that the inter-war and post-war 
periods were crucial to the development of environmental politics in Britain. 
Whereas much of the existing literature foregrounds social movements and radical 
critiques of industrial society, this thesis challenges the assumption that 
environmental politics is a product of 1960s ‘counter-culture’, and argues that greater 
significance should be attached to developments within mainstream politics between 
the late 1920s and the early 1970s. During this period, a range of problems of 
governance were identified as arising from the interaction between society and its 
surroundings, and by the beginning of the 1970s the concept of the ‘environment’ 
was established as a unified field of public policy, subject to increasing state 
regulation in the name of enhancing the ‘quality of life’ of the British population. 
This was a process that took place with reference to town and country, as debate 
occurred on how to improve rural and urban conditions, and the term ‘environment’ 
entered political discourse as a label for both ‘natural’ and built surroundings.  
The centrality of both town and country is reflected in the episodes examined in the 
five central chapters of this thesis. In chapter two, efforts to preserve the countryside 
in the 1930s and 1940s were clearly linked to the ‘natural’ environment, but the issue 
exposed tensions between urban and rural interests. National Parks and town and 
country planning legislation were proposed with the purpose of protecting rural areas 
from ongoing urban and industrial development, while National Parks were also 
advanced as a means for providing new recreational spaces for Britain’s urban 
population. For some campaigners, the latter aim sat uneasily with a wish to shield 
the rural landscape from the influence of city life. If National Parks offered a means 
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of temporary escape for the urban population, in chapter three the focus is upon 
efforts to improve conditions within the city itself. The London smog of 1952 
exposed the severity of air pollution resulting from the combustion of coal in both 
industrial and domestic settings, and highlighted the need for legislative measures to 
improve the atmosphere in British towns and cities.  
Chapter four returns to the rural environment, exploring the tension in the 1950s 
and early 1960s between the British nuclear power programme and the continuing 
appeal for the preservation of the countryside. The need to site nuclear power 
stations in remote locations clashed with the interests of those who wished to protect 
unspoilt sections of the rural landscape, while divisions opened up between 
preservationists and locals who desired the economic benefits of industrial 
development. In chapters five and six, the focus is largely upon urban problems, as 
both chapters demonstrate how concerns over traffic congestion in towns and cities 
in the 1960s and early 1970s played a key role in the conceptualisation of the 
‘environment’ as a field of government policy. Use of the term ‘environment’ became 
widespread during the 1960s in response to the problem of traffic in towns, and in 
Greater London in the late 1960s and early 1970s the ‘environment’ became the 
ground on which the battle was fought over the construction of an urban motorway 
network. Chapter five also examines the increasing attention paid in the 1960s to the 
pollution of the land, air and water, which posed challenges for both ‘natural’ and 
built surroundings, and prompted the reorganisation of administrative structures. 
The extension of state regulation 
In contrast to existing studies, including those by authors such as Bill Luckin and 
David Matless that downplay ‘anti-industrial’ radicalism, this thesis places central 
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government and the British state at the heart of the story.1 Across the period 
examined in this thesis, a key feature of the development of environmental politics 
was the extension of state regulation. As James Vernon argues, an essential 
characteristic of modernity is the breakdown of traditional power structures, rooted 
in local and personal relationships, and the growth of new forms of governance to 
manage problems that arise from the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation.2 
Vernon’s work is focused on Britain in the nineteenth century, but the developments 
that he describes continued during the twentieth century. Throughout this thesis, the 
environmental problems that are discussed arose from the interaction between a 
modern, urban, industrial society and its surroundings, and they triggered political 
debates in which solutions were proposed that required the extension of state 
governance. As chapter two shows, as concern grew in the inter-war period over the 
destruction of the countryside, government stepped in to examine the problem, and 
eventually strengthened state regulation through legislative measures. It is important 
to recognise the importance of official committees of inquiry in raising the profile of 
environmental problems. The committees on National Parks chaired by Christopher 
Addison (1929-31) and Sir Arthur Hobhouse (1945-47) provided thorough 
investigations of the issue, and set out frameworks for legislative action. The powers 
of national and local government to protect the countryside from development were 
extended by Town and Country Planning Acts in 1932, 1943 and 1947, and by the 
National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act in 1949. 
A similar pattern was followed with the problem of air pollution in the 1950s, as 
government appointed an investigative committee under Sir Hugh Beaver, which 
recommended significant state action to curb the menace of coal smoke in urban 
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areas. In 1956, the Conservative government of Anthony Eden passed the Clean Air 
Act, which gave the state new powers to control the emission of smoke from both 
industrial and domestic sources. Chapter four examines the historical clash between 
the imperative of a nuclear power programme and existing legislation designed to 
control the development of the rural environment. The 1949 National Parks Act 
presented an obstacle to the plan to construct a nuclear power station in Snowdonia, 
while the Electricity Acts of 1947 and 1957 ensured that the public inquiries into the 
siting of atomic installations had to take account of rural ‘amenity’ when considering 
the suitability of a proposed location. During the 1960s, state regulation developed 
further. As is discussed in chapter five, concerns over pollution, underlined by the 
Torrey Canyon oil tanker disaster in 1967, prompted a reconsideration of official 
procedures by Harold Wilson’s Labour government, and in 1969 the Prime Minister 
established a permanent Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. Wilson also 
amended National Parks legislation to make it a statutory duty for all government 
departments to factor ‘the desirability of conserving the natural beauty and amenity 
of the countryside’ into their decision-making processes. At the same time, the 
difficulties of meeting the challenge of traffic in towns led to significant changes to 
the machinery of government, culminating in the creation of the Department of the 
Environment (DOE) by Edward Heath’s Conservative government in 1970. Heath 
entered office with a commitment to shrinking the size of government, which was a 
key aim of his 1970 review of Whitehall machinery, yet with the DOE he created the 
third largest government department, and significantly expanded the state’s role in 
regulating environmental problems. 
It is important to place the extension of environmental governance in the context of 
inter-war and post-war politics, particularly in terms of the growth of the welfare 
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state, and the increased willingness of political actors on both the left and the right to 
apply the machinery of government to the aim of improving the material conditions 
of the British people. As chapter two makes clear, there is no need to over-emphasise 
the existence of a political consensus in mid-century Britain, but there is much 
evidence that the Labour and Conservative parties frequently overlapped in their 
aims. On National Parks, the two parties differed in their emphasis, with Labour 
concentrating on the social democratic virtues of public access and the Conservatives 
on the preservation of the landscape and the protection of rural interests, but there 
was broad agreement that the power of the state should be used to protect areas of 
outstanding natural beauty.  
The policy overlap between the two parties was exemplified by the shared use of the 
language of planning. Interest in industrial and economic planning grew during the 
inter-war period, particularly among organisations of ‘middle opinion’ such as 
Political and Economic Planning and the Next Five Years Group, and that combined 
with an intensifying case for the planning of physical development in both urban and 
rural areas. From the early 1930s, the case for preserving the countryside was 
presented in terms of town and country planning, and planning law was strengthened 
first by the wartime coalition, and then by the Labour government of Clement Attlee. 
While the Conservatives loosened the restrictions upon their return to government in 
the 1950s, particularly by abolishing development charges in 1954, the party 
remained broadly committed to the principle that planning was a necessary part of 
physical development, and that it should involve a degree of regulation by the state at 
both a national and local level. Over subsequent decades, the field of town and 




Confronted with the problem of air pollution in the 1950s, the Conservative 
governments of Churchill and Eden proved willing to entertain solutions that 
necessitated the creation of new forms of state regulation. The existing literature 
portrays the Conservatives as complacent and reluctant to act in the wake of the 
1952 London smog, but, as chapter three argues, there was in fact much attention 
paid within Whitehall to the effects of coal smoke emissions. The government’s 
approach was underlined by the attitude of the Minister of Housing and Local 
Government, Harold Macmillan, who displayed scepticism towards the idea of 
addressing air pollution, while also laying the groundwork for greater regulation. 
While bemoaning that it was a ‘symptom of the Welfare State’ that ‘everybody 
expects the Government to solve every problem’, Macmillan nevertheless accepted 
that the political context of the 1950s required the government to act, and he set up 
the committee under Sir Hugh Beaver that would conduct a detailed investigation 
and recommend new legislation to control smoke pollution. Although the 
government’s legislation of 1956 was not as far reaching as the measures 
recommended by the Beaver Committee, it would be incorrect to argue that it 
amounted to a sell-out to industrial interests. The Clean Air Act represented a 
significant extension of environmental governance, and it is worth noting that, in 
spite of the air pollution debate occurring under a Conservative government, 
arguments concerning personal freedom received a relatively muted hearing 
compared with arguments in favour of greater legislative controls. 
During the 1960s, as governments struggled to come to terms with the challenge of 
traffic in towns, planning was consistently presented as the means for shaping an 
amenable urban environment. Ernest Marples, the Conservative Minister of 
Transport, spoke in late 1959 of the need to actively create ‘a design for living in the 
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fourth quarter of [the twentieth] century’, and both parties presented the integration 
of planning and transport policy as the key to addressing the problems posed by 
mass car ownership. Local and regional authorities were not urged to curb their 
interventionist tendencies, but rather to produce comprehensive plans for the 
remaking of Britain’s urban fabric, a strategy that received its fullest expression in the 
Greater London Development Plan and the proposal to construct four eight-lane 
motorways in the capital. By the late 1960s the political consensus was that transport 
and planning could not be handled in isolation, and the Ministry of Transport, the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and the Ministry of Public Building and 
Works were merged to form the DOE. In setting up the new department, the Heath 
administration was not simply adjusting the structure of government. The aim, as 
was acknowledged in departmental documents, was to facilitate ‘the evolution and 
operation of a broadly conceived environmental policy’, and to enable the 
development of ‘a coherent set of programmes in the environmental field’. By 
creating the DOE, the government consciously conceptualised a range of problems – 
which included countryside preservation, traffic in towns, and the pollution of the 
air, land and water – as ‘environmental’, and established them as appropriate objects 
of state regulation. 
Health, risk and ‘quality of life’ 
To a significant degree, the development of environmental politics in Britain 
occurred in response to the risks that modern life posed to public welfare. In this 
respect, this thesis is informed by the work of the sociologists Ulrich Beck and 
Anthony Giddens, whom have both argued that the material advantages of 
industrialisation have been gained alongside increased dangers to human life and 
welfare. Throughout the period considered by this thesis, political debates took place 
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against a background of what Beck has described as the ‘hazardous side effects’ of 
modernity, and public health arguments carried significant weight in determining 
whether governments were willing to address environmental problems.3 While the 
National Parks debate was not conducted solely in terms of health, chapter two 
shows that the case for the preservation of the rural landscape proved particularly 
attractive to both Conservative and Labour governments when it was presented as 
advantageous to public welfare. For the campaigners connected with the Council for 
the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE), the priority was to protect the 
countryside from development, but at the same time it was argued that National 
Parks would offer healthy recreational spaces for Britain’s unhealthy urban 
population. During the 1930s, campaigners realised that government was most 
responsive when the case for National Parks was linked to public health, and the 
argument moved to the centre as legislation became a likely prospect in the 1940s. 
The risks posed by life in towns and cities were starkly illustrated by the problem of 
air pollution in the 1950s and, as chapter three shows, there was significant 
continuity between the clean air debate and the sanitary reforms of the nineteenth 
century. Enoch Powell drew that comparison in Parliament in 1955, when he argued 
that there was precedent for government to address a ‘definite evil’ through the 
passage of reforming legislation. The air pollution problem also underlines the 
significance of events in exposing weaknesses in governance and prompting the 
extension of environmental regulation. The London smog of 1952 proved incredibly 
shocking, first in its visual impact and then, more importantly, in its impact upon the 
city’s mortality and morbidity rates. By taking the lives of 4,000 or more Londoners, 
the smog highlighted the risks posed by smoke emissions, and made it incredibly 
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difficult for government to ignore the issue. The role of events is again underlined in 
chapter five, with the Torrey Canyon tanker spill searing the risks of oil pollution on to 
the public consciousness. Anxiety over the dangers posed by pollution to the land, 
air and water was central to discussion of the environment within the Labour 
government in the late 1960s, and undoubtedly played an important role in the 
decision to establish the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in 1969. 
However, while it is certainly significant, risk is not sufficient for explaining the 
development of environmental politics in twentieth century Britain. Throughout the 
period explored in this thesis, environmental governance was extended not only in 
response to tangible threats to public health, but also in response to a broader 
concern for ‘quality of life’. From the inter-war years onwards, and particularly 
during the post-war decades, a perception developed among political actors that it 
was no longer sufficient for governments to secure the basic material conditions of 
the population, as they had, for example, with the sanitary reforms of the nineteenth 
century. Instead, governance was seen to reach beyond basic welfare and material 
security, and encompass the provision of greater levels of comfort. This changing 
role of government connects to growing levels of prosperity during the post-war 
period, and the political emphasis placed upon the aim of broadening public access 
to affluence. It is in this regard that Ronald Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialism can 
help to explain the development of environmental politics. 4  As an increasing 
proportion of the population moved beyond a struggle for basic material wellbeing, 
expectations shifted, not towards a rejection of material values, but rather towards a 
desire across all classes for conditions in which to enjoy the benefits of affluence. A 
broadly prosperous society, with widespread, albeit uneven, access to disposable 
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income and increasing amounts of leisure time, was seen to demand clean, amenable 
surroundings in which to pursue both working life and recreation. 
Such developments are apparent in chapter two with the debate around town and 
country planning and National Parks. While a significant case was made for the 
benefits to public health, the arguments for the preservation of the countryside 
extended beyond such concerns. Although the inter-war years predate the 
widespread affluence of the post-war decades, the period was characterised by the 
increasing democratisation of leisure and the extension of access to holidays with 
pay, and it was argued that the creation of National Parks would provide all classes 
with spaces in which to enjoy rural recreation. For the working classes, it was argued 
that this would prove particularly beneficial, not only in terms of health, but also in 
terms providing a respite from town life and broadening public appreciation of the 
British countryside. For more prosperous sections of society, National Parks were 
also presented in terms of quality of life. Motoring organisations such as the 
Automobile Association and the Royal Automobile Club argued that Parks would 
provide opportunities for owners of cars to drive their prized possessions in areas of 
outstanding natural beauty. 
In chapter three, the problem of air pollution relates clearly to risk and public health, 
but there was nevertheless a broader concern around living standards. Even for those 
lucky enough to escape the detrimental health effects of pollution, smoke was seen 
to undermine the quality of life in British towns and cities, and it was argued by the 
government’s Committee on Air Pollution that cleaning up the air would ‘secure 
happier and more healthy living conditions for millions of people’. In chapter four, 
the problem of where to build nuclear power stations reveals tension between 
different elements of post-war affluence. While atomic energy was presented by 
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government as the key to securing the continued growth of prosperity, opponents of 
individual power stations saw it as clashing with the aim of protecting the British 
countryside. At the public inquiry at Trawsfynydd, where the power station was to be 
positioned in the Snowdonia National Park, it was argued by the president of the 
Youth Hostels Association that National Parks were themselves ‘symbols of a high 
standard of living’, through which a materially affluent society took steps to restrain 
its excesses in the interests of the broader quality of life. Environmental protection 
was presented as integral to the enjoyment of affluence, and as entirely in keeping 
with the pursuit of prosperity. 
In chapters five and six, which focus on the 1960s and the early 1970s, quality of life 
takes centre stage in driving the extension of environmental governance. When the 
Heath government created the DOE in 1970, it was the stated aim of the new 
department to ‘[improve] people’s living conditions’, and the Secretary of State Peter 
Walker told his staff that the DOE was the department ‘most concerned with 
improving the quality of living in this country’. When the term ‘environment’ was 
used in British politics in the period leading up to the creation of the DOE, it was 
usually with reference to the aim of improving the quality of life. At the centre of 
that aim lay the challenge of traffic in towns, which was presented, in line with the 
work of the influential planner Colin Buchanan, as a case of a great symbol of 
modernity and affluence, the motor car, posing an unprecedented threat to the fabric 
of urban life. With the Greater London Development Plan, the Greater London 
Council (GLC) proposed that the construction of a network of motorways could 
save and improve the quality of life in the city, while opponents of the Plan argued 
that the roads would serve only to accelerate its destruction. For both sides, the aim 
was to secure the quality of life, and that aim was to be achieved by shaping a ‘good’ 
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urban environment. The growing political saliency of quality of life was summed up 
by the GLC at the public inquiry, when it noted that ‘a general revolution of 
expectations’ had taken place in the post-war period, whereby higher living standards 
had ‘widened the horizons for the vast majority’. This was reflected at the national 
level by the creation of the DOE, through which it was acknowledged that the 
parameters of governance had expanded beyond the provision of basic levels of 
public health to involve the promotion of greater standards of living. The quality of 
the ‘environment’, which was seen to encompass both rural and urban surroundings, 
was considered to be central to the enjoyment of everyday life. 
Political actors, NGOs and public opinion 
The increasing political saliency of ‘quality of life’ points to the importance of 
political actors in the development of environmental governance. Over the course of 
the inter-war and post-war periods, both the Conservative and Labour parties came 
to acknowledge that there was political value in supporting environmental policies. 
This occurred in relation to National Parks, when both parties committed to the 
policy in the 1940s, and air pollution, when the Conservative government, despite 
some reservations, realised that it was in its political interests to pass clean air 
legislation. However, it was during the 1960s that the Labour and Conservative 
parties truly began to speak the political language of the environment, and by the end 
of the decade environmental policies were viewed as having vote-winning potential. 
The word ‘environment’ appeared in both party manifestoes in 1970, and the release 
by the outgoing Labour government of a White Paper on pollution was viewed in the 
press as a transparent attempt at presenting its environmental credentials to the 
electorate. In July 1970, the new Conservative government under Edward Heath 
became the first to mention the environment in the Queen’s Speech. 
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The rise of the environment up the party political agenda reflected the interest of a 
number of influential individual actors. Richard Crossman took a keen interest in the 
problems of the urban environment during his time as Minister of Housing and 
Local Government, while Wayland Young, Lord Kennet, as a junior minister in the 
same department, played a key role in advancing concern around pollution. There 
was also notable interest from Anthony Greenwood, Edward Short, Michael Stewart 
and, perhaps most importantly, Anthony Crosland, whose work as Secretary of State 
for Local Government and Regional Planning laid the groundwork for the creation 
of the DOE. There was also personal interest from the Labour Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson, who spoke on a number of occasions of the growing importance of 
the environment, describing it in 1969 as ‘moving to the centre of the political stage’. 
The Wilson governments deserve to be viewed as significant in the development of 
environmental politics in Britain, but credit is also due to Heath, who in 1970 
described environmental governance as ‘among the highest priorities of the 
seventies’. 
It is important to note that there was also political pressure from beyond the 
parliamentary frontbenches. Throughout the inter-war and post-war periods, 
backbench MPs played an influential role in promoting environmental policies. In 
the early 1930s, the Conservative MP Edward Hilton Young was central to the 
extension of planning regulations to the countryside, and received support from a 
number of colleagues, including his fellow Conservative John Buchan, Labour’s 
Philip Noel-Baker and the Liberal Herbert Samuel. For issues that did not sit at the 
very top of the political agenda, the work of backbenchers ensured that government 
could not simply ignore them. That was certainly the case with air pollution, when 
MPs such as Tom Driberg, Norman Dodds and Marcus Lipton asked frequent 
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questions following the 1952 London smog. The private member’s bill of the 
Conservative MP Gerald Nabarro was crucial in prompting the government to 
accelerate the presentation of its own Clean Air Bill, and Nabarro received 
enthusiastic support from MPs on both sides of the Commons. 
While elected politicians played a key role, it is also important to acknowledge the 
contribution of Whitehall officials, who were integral to the shaping of 
environmental policies across the period. Following the smog of 1952, civil servants 
within the Ministry of Health quickly began to investigate, and crucially brought 
expert medical knowledge to bear in establishing the impact of the incident on 
London’s mortality and morbidity rates. Similarly, as concern grew over numerous 
forms of pollution during the 1960s, civil servants advised the government on how 
best to respond. An investigation into departmental responsibilities was led by the 
government’s Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Solly Zuckerman, leading eventually to the 
establishment of a central coordinating unit staffed by scientists. Government also 
received expert guidance from specialists appointed to investigate particular 
environmental problems. The architect and conservationist John Dower was invited 
to produce a report on National Parks during the Second World War, while in the 
1950s the Beaver Committee was comprised of experts from a range of fields 
connected to the problem of air pollution. In the early 1960s, Colin Buchanan was 
appointed by the Ministry of Transport to apply his technical expertise to the 
challenge of traffic congestion in towns and cities, and his recommendations proved 
influential in shaping changes to the machinery of government later in the decade. 
Such investigations reflect the growth in complexity of governance during the 
twentieth century, and underline how the environment entered British politics 
through formal governmental structures. In a nation committed, as authors such as 
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David Edgerton and Jim Tomlinson argue, to developing its economic and 
technological capacity, the state applied scientific and technical expertise in an effort 
to solve the environmental challenges posed by modernity.5 
Environmental policies were also promoted throughout the period by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). Nabarro received support in preparing his 
Clean Air Bill from the National Smoke Abatement Society, an organisation that had 
campaigned around the issue of air pollution since the late nineteenth century. As 
chapter two shows, the CPRE played a significant role in promoting the protection 
of the countryside, and it was joined by a range of outdoor and conservationist 
organisations in campaigning for the introduction of National Parks. However, while 
NGOs did play a role, this thesis does not overstate their contribution, nor does it 
emphasise the importance of an ‘environmental movement’ in the development of 
environmental politics in Britain. NGOs did not provide the only voices in the 
various debates, and in some key instances it is difficult to attribute much influence 
to them at all – for example, the response of government to the challenge of traffic 
in towns, and the eventual creation of the DOE, was not prompted by pressure from 
campaigning organisations. In this respect, this thesis diverges from the existing 
literature, including works that support its overall case. For example, Matless on 
inter-war preservationism and Peter Thorsheim on clean air both emphasise the 
centrality of campaigners, whereas this thesis argues that greater significance should 
be attributed to the state and formal political actors.6 
One important contribution that NGOs did make was to add to a perception within 
government that there was public demand for action to address environmental 
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problems. During the 1930s and 1940s, campaigners linked to the CPRE pushed the 
notion that there was widespread interest in National Parks, and this was internalised 
by government departments, which argued that they were implementing the policy in 
response to public demand. In the post-war period, a key role was played by media 
coverage of environmental problems. In chapter three, the belief within government 
that public opinion demanded air pollution measures was fuelled by press attention 
to the 1952 smog and its aftermath, while during the 1960s media reports on growing 
concern over pollution were reflected in increased government attention to the 
problem. It is difficult to judge where the public stood on environmental issues 
during the inter-war and post-war periods. There are snapshots in this thesis, 
particularly with the public inquiries on nuclear power stations and the London 
motorways, but they provide an inconclusive picture. Members of the public came 
down on both sides of the arguments, with some supporting major infrastructure 
projects and others taking the preservationist perspective. However, the importance 
of public opinion lies less in where it actually stood, and more in how it was 
perceived by political actors. Throughout the period explored in this thesis, a 
perception developed within government that there was public concern over 
environmental problems, and this made an important contribution to the rising 
political saliency of the environment, and to the extension of environmental 
governance. To a large extent, this perception had its roots in ideas of what the 
public desired in an age of affluence, but it also stemmed from how government 
gauged the popular response to particular environmental events. 
Rationalising development 
Ultimately, the problems behind the growth of environmental governance in inter-
war and post-war Britain arose as unwanted side effects of ongoing economic 
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development. The destruction of the rural landscape, urban traffic congestion, and 
the pollution of the air, land and water all had their roots in industrialisation, 
urbanisation and rising economic prosperity. However, it is crucial to note that 
environmental politics did not take shape as a backlash against technological 
modernity – the arguments advanced in the debates examined in this thesis were on 
the whole not radical, and the outcomes did not represent major departures from 
political norms. The dominant tone of the debates was neatly captured in the words 
of the conservationist Max Nicholson at the 1958 Dungeness nuclear power inquiry. 
Nicholson argued that many people in Britain possessed a ‘split personality’, desiring 
‘economic development and a higher standard of living’, while also wishing for ‘the 
intangible values of our civilisation to be upheld and preserved’. 
Across the period explored in this thesis, the objective of environmental governance 
was to establish an accommodation between continuing economic development and 
the preservation and enhancement of society’s surroundings in both town and 
country. When the Conservative MP Edward Hilton Young proposed his Rural 
Amenities Bill in the early 1930s, he argued that there was no reason why the 
preservation of the countryside had to interfere with industrial activity and involve 
the arresting of development. The key was to strike a balance, an aim that Herbert 
Samuel summed up as ‘the rationalisation of development’. That approach mirrors 
what Matless describes as the ‘planner-preservationism’ of the CPRE, which ‘entailed 
not a conservative protection of the old against the new’, but rather an attempt to 
reconcile progress and preservation.7 It is argued in this thesis that this philosophy 
was present not only in campaigning organisations, but also in the approach of the 
state and leading policymakers. It can be identified throughout the cases examined in 
the central chapters, with environmental policies always representing an attempt to 
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offset the unwanted side effects of modernity, while retaining its perceived benefits. 
The discipline of town and country planning exemplifies this aim, as policies were 
adopted in the hope of finding a compromise between the imperatives of 
development and the provision of amenable urban and rural environments. In the 
1930s and 1940s, physical planning gained a foothold in British policymaking, both 
as a means for reconstructing urban spaces and as a method for preventing the 
destruction of the countryside. As chapters five and six show, during the 1960s and 
early 1970s planners were tasked with devising a means by which the reality of mass 
car ownership could be squared with the maintenance of desirable living conditions 
in Britain’s towns and cities. 
Often, even the keenest advocates of environmental protection emphasised the 
importance of economic development. As we have seen, parliamentary proponents 
of rural protection in the 1930s framed their ideas in terms of the ‘rationalisation of 
development’, and this was reflected in the approach of organised campaigners. 
Members of the CPRE-affiliated Standing Committee on National Parks were always 
eager to point our that they were neither ‘cranks’ nor ‘faddists’, and a common 
assertion was that National Parks could not be allowed to become ‘museum pieces’ – 
rural industries such as agriculture had to be allowed to continue, and campaigners 
were not even prepared to declare their total opposition to heavier forms of 
industrial development, if the national interest would be served by it. During the 
nuclear power inquiries, explored in chapter four, opponents of individual power 
stations were generally keen to stress that they supported the British pursuit of 
atomic energy, and were only opposed to the construction of facilities at specific 
locations. Similarly, in chapter six, opponents of the London motorways did not 
generally approach the issue from a position of outright opposition to mass car 
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ownership and urban road building. There was acknowledgement that the urban 
environment was subject to constant evolution, and that rising affluence and the 
demand for greater mobility were not trends that could be halted. 
While it is a central contention of this thesis that significant forms of environmental 
governance developed in Britain during the inter-war and post-war periods, it is 
important to recognise that environmental politics always had their limits. By the late 
1960s and early 1970s, governments had become attentive to environmental 
problems, but their willingness to act was always constrained by dominant political 
priorities. All governments of the period prioritised economic growth and the 
prosperity of the electorate, and throughout this thesis it can be seen that 
environmental policies were most likely to be pursued when they aligned with those 
aims. The problem of air pollution, discussed in chapter three, provides a clear 
example. The emission of smoke posed a direct threat to public health, which 
spurred government to act, but it was also shown by the Committee on Air Pollution 
to have detrimental economic effects. By presenting government with the 
opportunity to save as much as £250 million per year, as well as the means for 
preserving coal stocks at a time of supply shortages, the Committee framed clean air 
legislation as both a socially and economically attractive measure. The environmental 
policies of the 1960s and early 1970s can also be viewed in this light. In a period of 
increasing public affluence, quality of life was viewed as a potential electoral issue, 
and the measures of the late 1960s, leading up to the creation of the DOE in 1970, 
were intended to demonstrate the government’s commitment to rising living 
standards. Economic growth would continue to be pursued, but it would go together 
with improvements to the environment in the name of quality of life. Environmental 
governance would enhance, rather than hinder, the experience of affluence. 
	
	 283 
However, in situations in which dominant political priorities did not converge with 
the aim of preserving and enhancing social surroundings, environmental policy 
invariably lost out. The clearest example of this comes in chapter four, with the 
failure of objectors to prevent the construction of nuclear power stations. The 
government’s commitment to atomic energy, which it presented as a great 
technological leap and a vital economic step, made it unlikely that opponents of 
individual stations would win their battles. Ultimately, government was willing to 
disregard amenities and National Parks legislation in order to drive forward its 
nuclear power programme. Furthermore, the nuclear power inquiries revealed that 
local populations were not united in their opposition to the stations. Particularly in 
North Wales, where unemployment and population decline were endemic problems, 
many locals spoke out in support of nuclear power, with their desire for 
technological progress and economic development far outweighing their interest in 
preserving the rural environment. In chapter six, opponents of the London 
motorways faced similar obstacles. Road building may have produced huge numbers 
of objections, but it reflected the reality that the majority of people either owned cars 
or desired to acquire them. While the London motorways plan did eventually 
collapse, it did not represent a total defeat for the idea of accommodating motor 
transport in towns and cities. National and regional governments were only ever 
willing to go so far to satisfy environmental concerns. 
Rethinking environmental politics 
This thesis began by defining ‘environmental politics’ as the debate over the impact of 
human society on the ‘natural’ and built environment, and the attempt to manage that impact 
through public policy. Over the course of its five central chapters, the thesis has shown 
that such a debate occurred in Britain throughout the inter-war and post-war periods, 
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and demonstrated that the ‘environment’ had acquired a significant position in 
mainstream British policymaking by the early 1970s. The concept of the 
‘environment’ was loosely defined. Broadly it referred to both urban and rural 
surroundings, and within political circles it was used with reference to the aim of 
improving those surroundings through governance. However, as chapter six shows, 
it was a fluid and contested term. For those that objected to motorways in London, a 
‘good environment’ had to refer to urban surroundings freed from roads and motor 
traffic, whereas for the GLC it could refer to surroundings in which motorways 
played an integral role. For the British Roads Federation, a ‘good environment’ was 
actually defined by the freedom to drive a car without hindrance. Nevertheless, while 
it may have been loosely defined, the concept came to carry significant political 
weight. During the post-war decades, the problems examined in this thesis became 
characterised as ‘environmental’, and with the creation of the DOE in 1970 
environmental governance was enshrined in the structure of Whitehall. The 
‘environment’ had not become a dominant political priority, but governments and 
political parties had become attentive to it, particularly in cases where it crossed over 
with concern for ‘quality of life’, and the developments explored in this thesis created 
a framework for the continued rise of environmental politics beyond the early 1970s. 
It is hoped that this thesis contributes to the understanding of environmental politics 
in Britain in a number of ways. It is clear that the developments of the inter-war and 
post-war periods did not represent a profound and radical shift in political values. 
With this in mind, it is useful to refer again to the work of Michael Bess on post-war 
France, in which he characterises developments in that country as a ‘shallow 
greening’.8 If a ‘greening’ can be said to have taken place in post-war Britain, it 
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should be characterised as equally shallow. The circumstances of modernity led to 
increased public and political concern for the condition of urban and rural 
surroundings, but at no stage was there widespread rejection of the pursuit of 
economic and technological development. The environment took shape as a field of 
policy in the context of a national commitment to Britain’s status as a technological 
innovator and a global economic power. Any Romantic backlash against 
industrialism, as discussed in the work of authors such as Martin Wiener and 
Meredith Veldman, should be seen as forming part of a minority perspective, with 
limited influence on mainstream politics.9 This thesis does not agree that an ‘anti-
industrial’ spirit played a significant role in the development of environmental 
politics in Britain. In much of the existing literature, particularly in the social 
sciences, there is significant emphasis placed upon the role of an ‘environmental 
movement’, radical in character, which is seen to have been integral in bringing about 
an ‘environmental revolution’ by the early 1970s. This thesis downplays the role of 
‘social movements’, and demonstrates the importance of examining events in the 
decades before 1970. The development of environmental politics in Britain was a 
long-term process, and it was to a great extent the result of the introduction of new 
forms of regulation by mainstream political actors, who applied the powers of the 
state to the challenges posed by modernity. Radical ‘ecocentric’ activism, which 
Andrew Dobson sees as representing an entirely new political ideology, made a 
negligible contribution to the creation of the political framework that was in place in 
Britain by the early 1970s.10 This thesis also underlines the importance of national 
contexts. Those authors, such as John McCormick and Joachim Radkau, that have 
portrayed the development of environmental politics and environmental activism as 
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a ‘revolution’ have tended to take a global perspective, leading to the risk of missing 
the nuances of domestic political circumstances. 11  While the environmental 
challenges faced by Britain were by no means unique, and the British government did 
become active in international environmental debates in the 1960s, this thesis shows 
that environmental governance took shape largely in response to domestic problems, 
within the constraints of inter-war and post-war British politics. 
By taking a national perspective, this thesis can also contribute to the understanding 
of the wider political history of inter-war and post-war Britain. In seeking to explain 
the growth of the state and the extension of governance in the twentieth century, it is 
worth paying attention to the role of environmental problems. While housing was 
the primary motivation behind the growth in influence of town and country planning 
in the 1930s and 1940s, the desire to preserve sections of the countryside played a 
role, and National Parks policy was one component of the cross-party support for 
planning that emerged during the Second World War. Without overstating the 
existence of a post-war consensus, environmental policies can be used to highlight 
the willingness of both the Labour and Conservative parties to extend state 
intervention. The clean air legislation of the 1950s provides a clear example of how 
the Conservatives, albeit with a degree of reluctance, felt compelled in the age of the 
welfare state to strengthen the powers of government in order to solve a social and 
economic problem. The growth in the post-war era of the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government, which would evolve into the DOE, the third largest Whitehall 
department, underlines how environmental challenges helped to drive the expansion 
of the British state. This thesis can also offer a new perspective on the Labour and 
Conservative governments of the 1960s and early 1970s, and shifts in the issues 
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contested by the parties at general elections. While both parties continued to 
prioritise economic growth, their deployment of the language of the ‘environment’ 
and ‘quality of life’ shows that they were seeking new issues through which to 
broaden their electoral appeal. The environment was by no means the primary 
political concern at the beginning of the 1970s, but it deserves to be given greater 
consideration in histories of the Wilson and Heath governments. 
It is also important to acknowledge the limits of this thesis, and identify some areas 
for further research. As a study of developments at the level of government and 
mainstream party politics, the thesis does not explore changing cultural conceptions 
of the ‘environment’, and it would be valuable to investigate how such conceptions 
intersected with political change during the inter-war and post-war periods. There is 
also scope for enquiring more deeply into public opinion on the environment across 
the period explored in the thesis, although there are difficulties relating to 
methodology and available sources, and for providing a more detailed examination of 
political change from the perspective of activists and campaigning organisations. 
Further research is also needed into the relationship between national and local 
politics, and the role of local governments in developing and implementing 
environmental policies. Furthermore, while this thesis touches upon the contribution 
of technical experts to the discussion of environmental problems and the 
formulation of policy, there is undoubtedly scope for a more systematic exploration 
of the role of expert knowledge in shaping the emergence of the environment as a 
field of governance. 
Although this thesis focuses on the period up to the early 1970s, and there is a need 
for further study of the years that followed, it is nevertheless hoped that the 
arguments of its five central chapters can inform our understanding of subsequent 
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events. Environmental politics continued to take shape after 1970, and there were of 
course important new developments. The 1970s saw the emergence of new, 
apparently more ‘radical’ environmental organisations, notably Friends of the Earth 
(FOE) and Greenpeace, which adopted a global perspective on environmental 
problems and engaged in high-profile direct action in opposition to projects such as 
nuclear power and road building.12 From the 1970s, and through into the 1980s and 
1990s, there was increased emphasis placed upon the environment as a shared global 
challenge, as problems such as overpopulation, climate change and the destruction of 
the ozone layer came to be perceived as posing an unprecedented threat to the 
stability of the ecosystem.13 As Glen O’Hara notes, enthusiasm for planning waned 
during the 1970s, not only in the field of comprehensive economic and social 
planning, but also in terms of the physical redevelopment of urban centres.14 There 
was a backlash against the urban planning of the post-war years, and the demise of 
the Greater London Development Plan, examined in chapter six, was characteristic 
of the mood of the post-1960s period. 
However, while changes did occur after 1970, there was also significant continuity 
with the developments of the inter-war and post-war periods. Planning fell out of 
favour, but it left a legacy in environmental politics. It was well established that the 
securing of amenable surroundings in town and country was a responsibility of 
government and, while transport was turned back into a separate ministry in 1976, an 
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environmental department continued to form part of the machinery of Whitehall.15 
Wholesale redevelopment was no longer popular as a method for addressing the 
challenges of the urban environment, but solutions continued to be sought to the 
problem of traffic in towns. In London, motorways were rejected, and policy 
eventually turned to focus upon congestion charging and investment in the transport 
infrastructure, both of which were solutions put forward by objectors at the Greater 
London Development Plan inquiry. 
There has also been continuity in the diplomatic arena. As is noted in chapter five, 
the British government was involved in international discussions on environmental 
problems during the 1960s, and there was significant activity within the Foreign 
Office in the lead up to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm. It is also necessary to ask just how influential new forms 
of environmental activism really have been in the years since the early 1970s. As 
Matthew Hilton et al show in their study of British NGOs, the supposedly ‘radical’ 
organisations such as Greenpeace and FOE underwent significant professionalisation 
and institutionalisation during the 1980s and 1990s, and while they did engage in 
forms of direct action, the focus of their activity was upon the lobbying of central 
and local government.16 While this activity was on a larger scale, and was more 
professional and better funded, it is legitimate to ask how different it really was from 
the lobbying carried out by the CPRE in the 1930s and 1940s in support of National 
Parks, or the work of a range of conservationist organisations that opposed the 
construction of nuclear power stations in the 1950s and early 1960s. Furthermore, as 
has been noted in this thesis, any claims for environmentalism to represent a major 
mass social movement must include the membership and supporter figures of 
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‘moderate’ groups such as the National Trust and the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds, whose emergence long pre-dates the 1970s. 
Since 1970, economic development has continued to be the dominant political 
priority. As Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton note, affluence did not go away, 
even amid the economic difficulties of the 1970s, and much of the British population 
continued to experience rising living standards and greater access to consumer 
goods.17 While growth has been challenged by radical greens, and development 
projects have faced organised protest, it would be difficult to argue that there has 
been a major shift in values within the political and social mainstream. For example, 
in the mid-1990s radical protests against road building, most famously on the site of 
the proposed Newbury bypass, gained significant media attention, but they did not, 
on the whole, achieve their aim of preventing construction. 18  More recently, 
industrial and political support for shale gas exploration has led to debate on whether 
‘fracking’ ought to be permitted within National Park areas. There are clear echoes of 
the nuclear power inquiries discussed in chapter four, as British energy requirements 
are weighed against the statutory protections afforded to areas of natural beauty. As 
with nuclear power, economic imperatives appear likely to win the day – in 
December 2015, MPs voted in favour of allowing gas exploration within protected 
areas.19 Similarly, the ongoing shortage of housing stock, particularly within the 
Greater London region, has ignited debate around green belt regulations, pitting the 
principle of preservation against far more practical considerations. Following the 
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2015 general election, the Conservative government has indicated that planning 
restrictions in the green belt may be relaxed.20  
Since the 1990s, one of the guiding principles of mainstream environmental politics 
has been ‘sustainable development’, which describes the aim of balancing economic 
growth with the protection of the environment.21 While the idea has of course grown 
in sophistication, and has taken on a global emphasis, there is a clear line of descent 
from the debates examined in this thesis. Proponents of rural protection in the inter-
war period sought the ‘rationalisation of development’, and physical planning was 
often practised with the aim of reconciling progress and preservation. Environmental 
policies emerged before 1970 as attempts to strike a balance between economic 
development and amenable surroundings, and that has continued to be the purpose 
of mainstream environmental policy in the decades since 1970. It should also be 
noted that there has not been a wholesale shift towards an ‘ecocentric’ outlook on 
society’s relationship with its surroundings. There is, of course, widespread concern 
for ‘nature’, but for many of the headline environmental problems, such as climate 
change or air pollution, the dominant outlook continues to be ‘anthropocentric’, with 
the emphasis placed squarely upon the risks and inconveniences posed to the human 
population. 
To a substantial degree, environmental politics has continued to be conducted within 
the long-established frameworks of the British system. While a Green Party was 
established in 1973 (initially as the PEOPLE Party), and has enjoyed some electoral 
success (it secured 15 per cent of the vote in the 1989 European elections, and it 
currently has one Westminster MP), it cannot be viewed as anything more than a 
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minor party.22 The success of environmental policy continues to rest upon the 
willingness of the major parties to drive it forward and, while the parties have 
become more attentive in recent decades, environmental problems have remained 
second order political concerns. As this thesis shows, mainstream British politicians 
began to attach significance to the environment during the 1960s, and subsequent 
events should be interpreted in that light. Much emphasis is placed in the literature 
upon Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 speech to the Royal Society, in which she 
acknowledged the existence of global warming, and the need to tackle the problem at 
a global level.23 Thatcher described environmental protection as ‘one of the great 
challenges of the late twentieth century’, but she was not the first British Prime 
Minister to speak in such terms.24 As chapter five shows, both Harold Wilson and 
Edward Heath spoke of the need to address environmental challenges in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Similarly, the 1990 government White Paper This Common 
Inheritance has been described as the first such document to deal with the 
environment, yet in reality it was a successor to the Wilson government’s 1970 White 
Paper The Protection of the Environment: The Fight Against Pollution.25 The environment 
did not suddenly enter British politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There is a 
longer-term history, and it is important to acknowledge this when considering how 
the environment has been handled within mainstream politics in recent decades. 
It could certainly be argued that British society has become more ‘green’ since the 
early 1970s. Undoubtedly, membership of environmental NGOs has risen 
considerably, and greater attention is now paid to the environment in the media and 
within mainstream politics. Environmental practices, in particular recycling, have 
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entered the daily routines of the British public, and climate change has become a key 
factor in debates over transport and energy use. However, in spite of such 
developments, it would be difficult to argue that this ‘greening’ has been anything 
other than shallow. Economic development remains an overriding political priority, 
and the British public have not, on the whole, abandoned aspirations of pursuing an 
affluent lifestyle aided by the trappings of technological modernity. It would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis to suggest whether such a shallow green society is 
inadequate for meeting the environmental challenges of the twenty-first century. 
Environmental politics may yet succeed, or they may fail, but whatever the outcome, 
the origins should be traced back beyond the 1970s and, in the case of Britain, 
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